The subjective and the objective: the philosophy of Thomas Nagel. by Lee, King Hang Roger. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy.
The Subjective and the Objective: 
The Philosophy of Thomas Nagel 
Lee King Hang Roger 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 
1998 
^ ^ 
l h ^ ^ l \ ^ ^ ' ~ " U^nVERSSTY J^JJ 
% ^ F �•^‘,:�^^ 
""""***ttH4Ba>Wj^ -<**^*^ 
Abstract 
Throughout the past two decades, Thomas Nagel has advanced a highly 
original view of philosophy. Though hundreds of articles and reviews have been 
published on him, they are inadequate in at least two aspects. Firstly, there is not any 
comprehensive discussion on his philosophy as a whole. As a resuh, not many people, 
as far as I know, can really appreciate the unique and important contribution ofNagel 
and defend his project. Besides，Nagel himself has never clarified and justified the 
concepts of intuition, reality, and the distinction between the subjective and the 
objective, which together form the foundation of his philosophy. Therefore, I think it 
is now the time to make a detailed study of Nagel's philosophy and assess his real 
contribution. 
Li this essay, I want to argue that � Nagd,s unique contribution lies in his 
effort in giving a new sense to philosophy through reformulating traditional 
philosophical problems in a way that captures their essence and showing that they are 
all grounded on certain fundamental facts of human b e i n g s . � Nagel's general 
account of the common source of philosophical problems, instead of being dogmatic, 
is well grounded. The task is to be accomplished by a careful examination of his 
three central concepts. In Chapter 1, I will discuss the meaning and the status of 
“intuition，，in Nagel's philosophy. I will argue that though Nagel does rely his 
project heavily on our intuition, he is by no means dogmatic and irrational in his trust 
of it Then, I will examine Nagel's conception of viewpoint. I will explicate what a 
viewpoint in general, and subjective and objective viewpoint in particular, are. In 
Chapter 3, I will investigate Nagel's conception of reality. I will explain what he 
means by and how he establishes from our intuitions the subjective and the objective 
reality. Then, I will explore and justify his original claim that all philosophical 
problems are essentially the results of the conflict between our subjective and 
objective viewpoints in Chapter 4. Finally, I will conclude by discussing what Nagel 
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INTRODUCTION 
0.1 Whv Study Thomas Naqel? 
It has been 11 years since the first publication of Thomas Nagel's 
generally praised book The View From Nowhere in 1986^ (and 18 years since 
Mortal Questions^, which is the prelude to the former). Though hundreds of 
articles and reviews have been published on the thought of Nagel, they are, in 
my opinion, inadequate in at least two aspects. Firstly, most of these articles 
only focus on one particular aspect of Nagel's thought, especially his 
philosophy of mind. Few of them make comprehensive discussion on his 
philosophy as a whole. There are indeed commentators^ who can spell out 
and evaluate the originality of Nagel's way of bringing various seemingly 
disparate philosophical problems under the general structure of the conflict 
between the subjective and the objective points of view. None of them, 
however, really succeed in，or are even aware of the need of, on the one 
hand, appreciating the unique and important contribution Nagel has made to 
philosophy, and hence, on the other, defending the validity of his project. 
By that,丨 do not mean that they neglect Nagel's wit in projecting a 
general structure to accommodate all philosophical problems. Nagel has 
surely done this. But is it all that he has done? Does he merely provide us 
with a new conceptual framework in viewing how philosophical problems can 
be linked together? If it is so, it is difficult to see what unique and significant 
contribution he has made to philosophy, if any. What is the point of producing 
1 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, Oxford University Press, 1986. 
2 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge University, 1979. 
3 Most of them are short book reviews on The View From Nowhere, e.g. Edward F. Mooney, 
Christopher Peacocke, Colin Mcginn, and A.W. Moore. 
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one more framework among the others? Why should we choose his 
framework rather than others? Most importantly, why do we need such a 
general description if the enterprise of philosophy itself is worthless, as 
contemporary pragmatists claim? It is not surprising that while there are 
numerous articles and reviews on Nagel's particular ideas, there is, as far as I 
know, not even one single book published on his philosophy. In other words, 
Nagel, I think, is underestimated and his real contribution does not receive the 
appreciation it deserves. 
Besides, there is a very important thing which Nagel himself has 
never done. There are three basic concepts that form the foundation of his 
philosophy: intuition, reality, and the distinction between the subjective and 
the objective. What seems to me to be inadequate is his lack of direct and 
explicit clarification and justification of them. And it is, I think, the very 
obstacle that hinders our proper understanding, and hence appreciation of 
Nagel. 
For example, Nagel is regarded by some as a dogmatist in his 
adherence to intuition. Nagel gives us the impression that he always appeals 
to our intuition and grounds his objections to other's claims on their being 
counter-intuitive, "incredible" or "impossible to believe”. It seems that his 
opponent may legitimately challenge him by either rejecting Nagel's reliance 
on intuition or claiming that he upholds a different set of intuitions. 
On the other hand, many commentators have pointed out that Nagel's 
distinction of the subjective and the objective are far from being clear, and 
even ambiguous. Such ambiguity leads to the confusion between the 
epistemic and the ontological subjectivity/objectivity. That is, they charge 
Nagel to have slid from "the subjective conception of reality" to "subjective 
reality". If the charge is justified, Nagel's philosophy of mind — anti-
physicalist and anti-reductionist —and hence his ontology will be severely 
undermined. 
Since Subjective and Objective^ and The View From Nowhere, Nagel 
himself has never attempted to clarify his use of the concepts or defend 
'MQ, chap 14, p.196-213. 
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against these charges. Consequently, while those who buy Nagel's ideas do 
not even attempt to defend his project, those who do not simply ignore his 
writings. Though I can understand that Nagel wants to avoid the "burden"^ I 
don't think it is a satisfactory way of response. Since the concepts of intuition, 
reality and the subjective/objective distinction are fundamental to his whole 
enterprise of reformulating philosophy, I consider his inaction highly 
unsatisfactory. And I think once these concepts are clarified, those charges 
can be refuted. 
Because of all the inadequacies mentioned above, I think it is now the 
time to make an in-depth study of Nagel's philosophy and assess his real 
contribution. 
0.2 The Contribution of Thomas Naqel 
Though we cannot really appreciate Nagel's contribution before we go 
into detailed discussion of his philosophy, it is helpful to have a preliminary 
idea of what he has achieved. In my opinion, Nagel has done, throughout his 
philosophical career, much more than just giving new insight to particular 
areas of philosophical discussion and laying out the general structure of 
various philosophical problems. His unique contribution lies in his effort in 
GIVING A NEW SENSE TO PHILOSOPHY through reformulating 
traditional philosophical problems in a way that captures their essence 
and showing that they are all grounded on certain fundamental facts of 
human beings. 
If Nagel is successful, it is a real contribution. It is because 
philosophy perse is undergoing a crisis of legitimization. Some contemporary 
5 "While I admire those, like Dworkin and Searle, who have the stomach and the talent for this sort of 
polemic, I have lost what appetite I ever had for it, and hope instead that the current wave of confusion 
will subside if we just ignore it. I think it is a great burden for a field of theoretical inquiry if its 
practitioners have to compete for the approval ofthose who don't understand the issues", in Thomas 
Nagel, Other Minds, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 9. 
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philosophers declare the “death” of traditional philosophy. The whole 
discipline — not only the answers it gives but also the very questions it asks 
—simply does not make any sense. In other word, we just don't see the point 
of —and hence or otherwise, do not care, what the philosophers are doing. 
Some philosophers even try to show that a) investigation in traditional 
philosophical problems yields no fruitful result; b) all these problems are 
dissolved as unreal; and thus c) it is pointless to continue to waste our time 
(and money). The study of philosophy can be of cultural and historical 
interest, i.e. it may help us a lot in understanding the details of a particular 
culture in a certain historical epoch. There is, however, no need to ask those 
philosophical questions any more. As a result, it seems necessary that 
philosophers, if they deny that their effort is meaningless, must in one way or 
other legitimize what they are doing. It involves at least the justification of the 
significance of the philosophical problems in the face of the fact that most, if 
not all, of them remain unsolved despite the unceasing effort of the most 
brilliant minds throughout the history of philosophy. 
Nagel's reformulation of the traditional philosophical problems is 
precisely an important contribution against this background. If what Nagel 
has said is true, then, in laying out the general structure and foundation of 
these problems — the conflict between the subjective and the objective 
viewpoints, which are fundamental features of human beings, Nagel shows 
that these problems have a very deep connection with us. In fact, they are 
originated from us. 
In this way, the significance of them is redefined. Philosophical 
problems are worth asking and investigating because on the one hand, the 
problems themselves reveal basic facts about us, and on the other hand, we 
human beings, given these facts of us, cannot but ask and pursue the 
answers to these problems even though no definite solution is guaranteed. 
They are all mortal questions 一 questions both asked by and about human 
beings. 
Therefore, we can see what the greatest contribution of Nagel is. 
While many others claim that philosophy has already come to an end, Nagel 
reminds us that we are indeed just at the beginning. Though his solutions 
may not be definite and final, he gives us a new and, in my opinion, correct 
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direction in tackling traditional philosophical problems in a way that can do 
justice to their profundity. In doing so, philosophy is re-established as the 
pursuit of the ultimate concerns of human beings. 
0.3 Whv do we need such reformulation? 
I have given a brief account of Nagel's main contribution, i.e. project 
of reformulation of philosophical problems. Whether his reformulation is 
justified can only be the conclusion of this essay. However, there is a 
challenge that must first be dealt with before we proceed. One not sharing 
Nagel's aspiration may reject the very need of reformulation. In other words, 
instead of showing what is wrong with Nagel's reformulation, one may 
challenge that we simply do not need any reformulation of this kind at all. 
Given the fact that no substantial solutions have been found to most 
traditional philosophical problems, reformulation is needed only if we accept 
Nagel's view that philosophical problems are real and that they are not solved 
because they have not been formulated appropriately so far. If we reject this 
view and take philosophical problems as pseudo-problems, there is no point 
in asking for any reformulation, because there is nothing to be reformulated. 
How can we respond to it? Firstly, we should notice that the 
challenge itself necessarily involves a certain reformulation of philosophical 
problems. Those who make this point must give some reason for the claim 
that all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems. He must at least give 
an explanation of why such pseudo-problems appear to be real. This 
explanation involves essentially an account of the real nature of philosophical 
problems, i.e. what philosophical problems are, how they arise, and why they 
are unreal. But then, what is it if it is not a reformulation of philosophical 
problems? 
Accordingly, we can see that the challenge is in fact not what it 
appears to be. It is not a challenge of the need of reformulation per se, but 
merely an alternative reformulation to that of Nagel. In other words, it is in 
fact a direct competition between two rival accounts of the nature of 
philosophical problems on the same level. 
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Therefore, one cannot discard Nagel's reformulation at the outset, and 
has to show what is wrong with Nagel's version of reformulation and how his 
own account is better if he wants to refute him. This, of course, implies a 
precise understanding, and hence a careful study，of the content and 
justification of Nagel's project. 
0.4 The Approach of This Essav 
In this essay,丨 want to argue that Nagel's general account of the 
common source of philosophical problems, instead of being dogmatic, is well 
grounded. The task is to be accomplished by a careful examination of his 
three central concepts. In Chapter 1，I will discuss the meaning(s) and the 
(respective) status of "intuition" in Nagel's philosophy.丨 will argue that though 
Nagel does mly heavily on our intuition, he is by no means dogmatic and 
irrational in his trust of it. Then, I will examine Nagel's conception of 
viewpoint. I will explicate what a viewpoint in general, and subjective and 
objective viewpoint in particular, are. In Chapter 3，I will investigate Nagel's 
conception of reality. I will explain what he means by and how he establishes 
from our intuitions the subjective and the objective reality. Then, I will explore 
and justify his original daim that all philosophical problems are essentially the 
results of the conflict between our subjective and objective viewpoints in 
Chapter 4. Finally, I will make a brief remark of what Nagel regards as the 
ultimate mystery about us as a conclusion. 
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1 
INTUITION 
In arguing for his post-Philosophical culture, Richard Rorty 
distinguishes two anti-pragmatist groups of philosophers — the Technical 
Realists and the Intuitive Realists^. Between the two, he argues, intuitive 
realism is a more basic form of realism: 
What we should conclude, I think, is that technical realism 
collapses into intuitive realism 一 that the only debating point the 
realist has is his conviction that the raising of the good old 
metaphysical problems...served some good purpose, brought 
something to light, was important^. 
Accordingly, Rorty tries to show that if intuitive realism is refuted, no viable 
form of realism is justified and we can only accept his pragmatist diagnosis of 
philosophical problems. Nagel, whom Rorty labels as one of the 
representatives of the intuitive realists, becomes his main target. 
Though Rorty, in some sense, is correct in calling Nagel an intuitive 
realist, he is wrong in his argument against him. In this and the following 
chapters,丨 want to explicate and defend Nagel's intuitive realism. I will try to 
argue that Nagel's intuitive realism is more plausible than its pragmatist denial, 
provided that we have a proper understanding of his conception of intuition and 
how and what kind of realism can be derived from it. 
6 Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy", in After Philosophy: End or Transformation, Kenneth 
Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (ed.), p.36-54. 
7 Ibid., p.45. According to Rorty, technical realism refers to the view "that recent, technical 
developments in the philosophy of language have raised doubt about traditional pragmatist criticisms of 
the 'correspondence theory of truth,’ or, at least, have made it necessary for the pragmatist to answer 
some hard, technical questions before proceeding further". On the other hand, intuitive realism, is 
essentially "the sense that the depth the human significance, of the traditional textbook 'problems of 
philosophy' has been underestimated, that pragmatists have lumped real problems together with 
pseudoproblems in a feckless orgy of 'dissolution'" see p. 36. 
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1,1 Rorty's Argument Against Intuitive Realism 
In his famous paper "Pragmatism and Philosophy", Rorty delivers an 
argument against intuitive realism and he takes Nagel as his target. I want to 
argue that though Rorty's argument may be able to render certain forms of 
intuitive realism as implausible, it fails to refute the Nagelian version. I want to 
show that the apparent strength of Rorty's argument rests on his inadequate 
understanding of Nagel's conception of intuition. Even if Rorty's argument 
works, it works only in a trivial sense against some straw-made versions of 
intuitive realism, and it does nothing to undermine the Nagelian version. In this 
section, I will first set out Rorty's argument against intuitive realism. Then, in 
Section 1.2, I will distinguish three senses of intuition adopted by Nagel and 
explain the respective meaning of his claim that "one should trust ....intuition 
over arguments"8. 
The main argument of Rorty against intuitive realism is as follows. 
The complaint of an intuitive realist is that the pragmatist diagnosis and 
dissolution of traditional philosophical problems fails to explain and capture our 
intuitions. In reply, Rorty accepts that charge, but argues that the real issue 
between the pragmatist and the intuitive realist is concerned precisely with the 
status ofintuition^, i.e. whether we should try to capture these intuitions at all. 
He first admits that we do have and cannot escape having intuitions 
like "truth is more than assertibility", "there is more to pains than brain states", 
and "there is a clash between modern physics and our sense of moral 
responsibility"^®. He then gives an historicist-anthropological explanation to our 
having them, claiming that we have those intuitions because we "have been 
educated within an intellectual tradition built around such claims — just as we 
used to be educated within an intellectual tradition built around such claims as 
‘If God does not exist, everything is permitted,' ‘Man，s dignity consists in his 
link with a supernatural order,' and ‘〇ne must not mock holy things'. 
8 Preface, MQ, x. 
9 Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy", p.47. 
'° Ibid., p.45. 
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If all intuitions are of this nature, and if intuitive realism rests upon our 
intuitions, it is not warranted. It can at most show that a certain set of 
problems are fundamental for a certain culture, in the sense that “you will not 
understand a certain period in the history of Europe unless you can get some 
idea of what it was like to be preoccupied by such questions，，”. However, the 
traditional problems are not "deep" in the sense of being able to reveal some 
fundamental aspects of human being as such, which are not just what appear 
to be the case for a particular culture, but what is the case. Therefore, Rorty 
argues that though we do have those intuitions, we had better leave them 
alone, instead of wasting our time discussing those "deep" problems in the 
hope of capturing them. 
Can Rorty's argument refute Nagel's intuitive realism? I think not. 
First of all, it is rather doubtful whether Rorty really has an argument. To be 
sure, Rorty does give a brief historicist-cultural explanation of some of our 
intuitions, explanation which claims that they are merely the results of our 
socialization. However, he has never proved that his explanation is the only 
correct one, and that it can be applied to all our intuitions. What he can show 
is at most that some of our intuitions may be merely cultural products. To 
support his view that all intuitions are merely cultural products, Rorty seems to 
appeal to the following facts: 
① Whoever can be said to have any intuition must be educated in a 
certain culture. 
② Different cultures have different sets of intuitions. 
③ Some of our once firmly held intuitions are now abandoned or even 
forgotten, ceasing to be our intuitions anymore. 
Neither any one nor any combination of them entail that our intuitions are 
merely cultural products. In order to justify his pragmatist explanation of our 
intuitions，Rorty has to prove that: 
a) Whatever one inherits from one's culture is only valid for this culture; 
b) There are no common intuitions among people of different cultures; 
11 Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy", p.47. 
11 
The Foundation of The Philosophy Of Thomas Nagel 
c) Even if there are common intuitions, they only represent what are 
common among the different cultures, rather than what are real. 
None of them are self-evident and no substantial argument for them has ever 
been given. Accordingly, Rorty's account of our intuition is at most one ofthe 
possible explanations rather than the only correct one. 
It seems that Rorty himself is aware of this. In saying that he just 
wants us to change our subject and recommends a new intellectual tradition, 
he seems to admit that Nagel's claim that we should try our best to capture the 
intuitions which we cannot escape is an intelligible alternative to his 
recommendation of ignoring them, and his proposal is in no justified way 
superiorto Nagel's: 
For the pragmatist, the only thing wrong with Nagel's intuitions is 
that they are being used to legitimize a vocabulary……that the 
pragmatist thinks should be eradicated rather than reinforced. 
But his only argument for thinking that these intuitions and 
vocabularies should be eradicated is that the intellectual tradition 
to which they belong has not paid off, is more trouble than it is 
worth, has become an incubus. Nagel's dogmatism of intuitions 
is no worse, or better, than the pragmatist's inability to give 
n0ncircul3r 3rgumeAts.i2 
I don't know how one is supposed to be taken seriously if he admits 
that he has no noncircular argument for his recommendation. My admittance 
of the irrationality of my suggestion that everyone should eat rubber if they 
want to be healthy does nothing to reduce its irrationality. Still, Rorty may 
argue that it is nevertheless an argument: since the Enlightenment intellectual 
tradition has not paid off, is more trouble than it is worth, and has become an 
incubus, intuitive realism, which is a contemporary version of this tradition, 
should be abandoned. It is, however, of little help. 
Firstly, if Rorty is not just making some senseless utterance, we find 
that, in saying that the discouraging history of philosophy supports his claim 
that there is no real problem of philosophy, he is appealing to that history as a 
ground for his claim. Rorty observes that the history of philosophy indicates 
that the inquiry of those philosophical problems has resulted in no substantial 
12 Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy", p.47. 
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success. Several hundred years of effort have failed to reveal any interesting, 
deep truth which philosophers have been pursuing. Moreover, it is not clear 
why or in what sense it is something that should bother us, as Nagel insists. 
To Rorty, it is a welcomed fact, for it supports his claim that philosophy has 
"outlived its usefulness", that there is not any philosophical truth to discover. 
However, it is at most a very small part of the truth, as far as what we 
can see from Rorty. Given that the discouraging history of philosophy does 
support Rorty's claim that philosophy has outlived its usefulness (call it C1), it 
also supports (at least) the following three claims: 
C2 Philosophical problems have not been properly formulated so far. 
C3 Human beings have not worked hard enough on these 
philosophical problems. 
C4 Human beings are not intelligent enough to solve the problems. 
Obviously, the fact that there is no substantial success in philosophy can be 
validly derived from C1, C2, C3 or C4. Even if we grant that Rorty is legitimate 
in appealing to the history of philosophy and that this history is "really" 
discouraging, and it does support C1, it does not imply that C2, C3 and C4 are 
wrong. Besides, though, under our assumption, that this history is 
discouraging can be a correct description, it is never proved that it is the 
correct one. Nagel himself has shown us another picture of the history of 
philosophy, which focuses not on the continual failure of various attempts to 
answer the philosophical problems，but on the unceasing revival of the 
problems: 
The history of the subject is a continuous discovery of problems 
that baffle existing concepts and existing methods of 
solution...historicist interpretation doesn't make philosophical 
problems go away, any more than the earlier diagnoses of the 
logical positivists or the linguistic analysts did. To the extent 
that such no-nonsense theories have an effect, they merely 
threaten to impoverish the intellectual landscapes for a while by 
inhibiting the serious expression certain questions. In the name 
of liberation, these movements have offered us intellectual 
repression.i3 
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If we conceive the history of philosophy in this way, we will arrive at a 
different conclusion, namely that the history of philosophy supports C2, C3 and 
C4. Of course, Nagel does not appeal to the course of history; he always relies 
on rational argument. The point I want to make is that if we appeal merely to 
the history of philosophy, we can arrive at no reliable conclusion, since we can 
pick up different aspects of it and obtain conflicting results. To decide which 
conclusion is better, or even which aspect of the same history is relevant, we 
have to appeal to further argument, which means that it is not sufficient to 
appeal only to the history of philosophy. 
Moreover, the assertion that "the Enlightenment intellectual tradition 
has not paid off, is more trouble than it is worth, and has become an incubus" 
can support his conclusion only if he can justify that: 
a) Nagel's intuitive realism is part of this tradition. 
b) Every possibility of this tradition has been explored. 
c) Nagel's reformulation of philosophical problems fails to capture our 
intuitions which are sources of those problems. 
Again, he has proved none of them. In fact, if it is Rorty's only argument 
against Nagel's intuitive realism, it obviously does not work, for his central 
claim that "the intellectual tradition to which they (the intuitions) has not paid 
off, is more trouble than it is worth, and has become an incubus" is true only if 
Nagel's project is proved to be impossible by other arguments, and hence 
cannot be used to refute it. 
Suppose there is a class of primary 3. No one in this class has 
solved the sum 1234+5678 = . A hardworking student, Gary, thinks that it 
can be solved, and thus works hard on it and proposes a solution 6912. 
Another student, Ray tells the other classmates that Gary is a fool. When 
asked why he says so, he replies that he does not have any better answer for 
the sum, or any proof that the sum is unsolvable. His only reason for saying 
that is simply that so far no one has succeeded in solving that sum. Everyone, 
he recommends, should better stop thinking about that sum, which probably 
has no answer. The absurdity of Ray's argument is that if Gary really provides 
a correct answer to the sum, Ray's assertion that no one in the class has ever 
13 VFN, p. 11. 
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solved it provides nothing against either Gary's effort or the significance of the 
problem. Rather, he now has to prove that Gary is wrong by argument without 
appealing to that assertion, if he wants to uphold his belief in the assertion 
rationally. Similarly, Rorty's central claim that "the intellectual tradition to which 
they (the intuitions) has not paid off, is more trouble than it is worth, and has 
become an incubus，，assumes that no one can improve that situation, which is 
true only if Nagel's project is proved to be impossible by other independent 
arguments. If this argument is acceptable, we can also reject Rorty's effort in 
reviving pragmatism on similarground. 
Furthermore, even if Rorty did prove that Nagel's intuitive realism is 
some kind of groundless dogmatism, it still could not show that his 
recommendation is better. It at most shows that both of them are not good 
enough, and what is most rational to do is to find a third way out. Even if we 
should change our subject, why must we change as Rorty recommends? 
Besides, why can't we keep our subject and try some other unattempted 
approaches, given no other better subject is available? 
Above all, even if Rorty's argument works, does it mean that Nagel's 
intuitive realism is refuted? Again, I do not think it does. According to Rorty, 
the intuitive realists — including Nagel 一 claim that "philosophy requires one 
to do justice to everybody's intuitions" ^ .^ Characterizing intuitive realism in this 
way, Rorty gives us the impression that it is quite absurd. The problem is 
whether any intuitive realist, especially Nagel, has this in mind. The answer 
depends on how we understand that statement. 
If it means that we should take into account and consider in equal 
terms (i.e. do justice to) all intuitions of everybody, which are so different for 
different people of different cultures, or even conflicting with each other, and 
hope that we can miraculously have a resolution which all rational people 
accept, intuitive realism seems to be quite absurd. However, an intuitive realist 
need not hold this view. Nagel, particularly, does not commit to the above 
interpretation. What, then, is his conception of intuition? 
15 Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy", p.47. 
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1.2 The Priority of Intuition 
1.21 The Problem of Intuition 
In the Preface of Mortal Questions, Nagel states explicitly his 
"philosophical sympathies and antipathies": 
...one should trust problems over solutions, intuition over 
arguments, and pluralistic discord over systematic 
harmony...Given a knockdown argument for an intuitively 
unacceptable conclusion, one should assume there is probably 
something wrong with the argument that one cannot detect -
though it is also possible that the source of the intuition has been 
misidentified. If arguments or systematic theoretical 
considerations lead to results that seem intuitively not to make 
sense, or if a neat solution to a problem does not remove the 
conviction that the problem is still there, or if a demonstration that 
some question is unreal leaves us still wanting to ask it, then 
something is wrong with the argument and more work needs to 
be done. Often the problem has to be reformulated, because an 
adequate answer to the original formulation fails to make the 
sense of the problem disappear. It is always reasonable in 
philosophy to have great respect for the intuitive sense of an 
unsolved problem, because in philosophy our methods are 
always themselves in question, and this is one way of being 
prepared to abandon them at any point [my emphasis].^^ 
The above passage is very important, for it summarizes the basic 
orientation of Nagel's philosophy. Despite that, it is highly compressed and 
not really as clear as it appears to be, and thus gives rise to a lot of puzzling 
question. Why should we trust intuition over argument? What does it mean? 
Isn't it irrational not to accept a belief that is the product of a "knockdown" 
argument? Why should we reformulate a philosophical problem when its 
"adequate" solution is counter-intuitive, instead ofdiscarding our intuitions? 
From the passage quoted above, we can see that intuition, which 
seems to be even more reliable than rational argument, has a very special 
status in Nagel's project. However, what Nagel really means when he 
suggests that we should trust intuition over argument is far from clear. As a 
result, a lot of serious misunderstandings are invited. We are tempted to 
15 Preface, MQ, xi. 
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draw two mistaken interpretations. Nagel may be interpreted as a defender of 
common sense. Under this interpretation, our intuitions are what we take for 
granted in our everyday life, beliefs that we do not question. These 
commonsensical beliefs in turn determine and justify other less fundamental 
beliefs. Since these beliefs are the product of our socialisation, and their 
content depends on our culture, the education we receive, and any other 
social factors, they are essentially context-dependent. In other words, people 
brought up in different cultures may have different sets of common sense, and 
so Rorty, in claiming that our intuitions reveal merely the particular features of 
a given culture, may be correct according to this interpretation. 
Moreover, Nagel appears to be an irrationalist. It is rather bizarre to 
regard Nagel, who always stresses the importance of rational argument, as 
an irrationalist. This view, however, seems to be supported by the passage 
quoted at the beginning of this section. If Nagel rests his theory on intuitions， 
trusts intuitions over arguments and recommends that "[g]iven a knockdown 
argument for an intuitively unacceptable conclusion, one should assume there 
is probably something wrong with the argument that one cannot detect", and 
intuitions are just our commonsensical beliefs，it seems to follow that what we 
accept in our everyday life, no matter what their sources are, determine what 
we should believe. What is rational is determined, instead of determining, by 
our common sense^^. 
Consequently, it seems we have to admit that it is quite impossible 
to settle any conflict among intuitions. For, if our intuitions are what we base 
ourjustification on, they cannot themselves be justified by anything else, and 
we can employ no independent criteria to judge whether they are justified. 
Worse than that, the term ‘intuition，，is ambiguous and Nagel himself 
employs the term in different senses in different situations without ever trying 
16 For example, Vinit Haksar takes Nagel exactly as an irrational defender of commonsense: "Like 
many sceptics Nagel in the end seems to fall back on our commonsense intuitions. In the case of bats 
he simply assumes that bats have an inner life. His discussions of moral issues as well as metaphysical 
issues in the book are usually based on the assumption that our intuitions are sound. He points out that 
he trusts intuition over arguments; when arguments and theoretical considerations clash with our 
intuitions, something is wrong with the arguments, and this may justify Nagel's belief that bats have an 
inner life. But he carries this trust too far. In fact, it is this excessive trust that leads to his 
irrationalism. For as we saw earlier if we are willing to abandon some of our subjective intuitions, we 
could avoid the clash between the subjective and the objective approaches" (my italic). See his "Nagel 
on Subjective and Objective", in Inquiry 24, p. 113. We will come back to discuss his paper in chapter 
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to explain what he means clearly. In fact, it appears that he only asserts, 
without any explicit argument, that we should trust our intuition. As a result, 
the issue of whether Nagel's project is significant may be reduced to just a 
matter of whether one accepts Nagel's attitude toward his intuitions or not. 
Someone who does not share Nagel's respect for intuition, or who holds a 
different set of intuitions, can simply ignore Nagel's project. 
It is then obvious that without a proper understanding of Nagel's 
conception of intuition, we cannot even make sense of his project of 
reformulating philosophical problems. Therefore, I am going to show that, 
though Nagel has great respect for intuition, he is neither a diehard defender 
of (no matter whose) common sense, nor an irrationalist who distrusts the 
authority of reason. In what follows, I want to provide an explication of and an 
argument for the claims of the above passage. It will be divided into two 
parts. Firstly, I will try to clarify the concept of "intuition", exploring the 
different senses it carries and their respective roles in Nagel's theory. 
Through this clarification, I will argue that what Nagel trusts is not our 
common sense but something much deeper, in the sense that all reflective 
rational beings have reason to endorse. In specifying the nature of this deep 
intuition,丨 hope to show that Nagel's reliance on intuition is rational. Then, I 
will show how his project of reformulating philosophical problems can in turn 
be justified by this rational reliance on intuition. 
1.22 Intuition as Intuitive Perception 
Early in this century, the term "intuition" is usually understood as 
"intuitive powet", referring to "an intellectual power of arriving at abstract 
truths，，i7，a capacity or faculty which enable us to "see" a particular kind of 
truth directly without any inference. Derivatively, "intuition" sometimes refers 
to "intuitive knowledge", that which we grasp through our power of intuition. It 
is specifically used to refer to kinds of knowledge that are in some sense 
immediate, certain and a priori, e.g. mathematical or, to some, ethical truths. 
4. 
17 Bemard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 93-94. 
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However, it is not what Nagel has in mind. In saying that we should 
trust our intuition over argument, he never means that what is obtained by our 
mysterious intuitive power is in any sense superior to what is arrived at with 
our reason. That Nagel is an unyielding defender of the authority of universal 
reason is evident in all his works, and he devotes a whole book in defending 
the objectivity of reason as the "last word" in different forms of inquiry^^ In 
fact, he writes clearly just before the passage quoted at the beginning of this 
section that: 
It is important to try to avoid making claims that are vague, 
obscure, or unfounded, and to maintain high standards of 
evidence and argument. But other values are also important, 
some of which make it difficult to keep thing neat/^ 
What need to be done here is to provide a coherent interpretation of 
the relation between his trust of intuitions and appeal to reason as the final 
judge. That is what I am going to do in this section. 
What does Nagel mean by "intuition"? In my opinion, Nagel 
employs the term in mainly two senses, both are equally important but pIay 
different roles in his theory. On the one hand, he takes "intuition" as a kind of 
direct perception, while on the other hand, he refers to a certain set of beliefs. 
"Intuitions" in the latter sense fall into two categories - the revisable and the 
unrevisable intuitions. Basing on this analysis,丨 will show that the meaning of 
Nagel's claim that we should trust intuitions over arguments is threefold. 
Let us begin with "intuition" in the first sense. Nagel uses the term to 
refer to what we apprehend and cognise immediately. "Intuitions", in this 
sense, means our direct perceptions and recognition (and the related and/or 
resulted senses and feelings) of the world, ourselves, and the relation 
between us. For example, the very problem of free will, according to Nagel, is 
"a bafflement of our feelings and attitudes - a loss of confidence, conviction or 
equilibrium''^^. The paradoxical phenomenon of moral luck, he writes, is the 
result of the "perception of one of the ways in which the intuitively acceptable 
18 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford University Press, 1997.) 
19 Preface, MQ, x. 
20 VFN, p.l l2, my italics. 
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conditions of moral judgement threaten to undermine it all"^^ And Nagel 
writes that the philosophical sense of absurdity of life "must arise from the 
perception of something universal - some respect in which pretension and 
reality inevitably clash for us all"^^. 
Such perceptions need not be the products of some of our 
mysterious faculties. Nor must they be, as usually ascribed to intuitive 
knowledge, in any sense absolute, certain or a priori. Indeed, it is not 
appropriate to regard them as knowledge at all if we understand "knowledge" 
as the set of true beliefs. What is essential to them is just that they are direct 
or immediate, in the sense that they are obtained without evident rational 
thought or inference, and that they are preverbal, i.e. not formulated verbally 
yet. Intuitions are just what we are aware of vaguely before we express them 
in propositions. 
Intuition" in this sense is very important and has a special priority for 
Nagel. When he says that the real source of philosophical problems is our 
intuition, what he has in mind is this intuitive perception ^^: 
...philosophy is not like a particular language. Its sources are 
preverbal and often precultural, and one of its most difficult tasks 
is to express unformed but intuitively felt problems in language 
without losing them [my emphasis].^^ 
Indeed, the main theme of the Nagelian project is exactly to 
provide precise verbal formulations for those intuitive perceptions which 
give rise to senses and feelings of bafflement we obtain as a result of our 
interaction with the world. In doing so, Nagel hopes to identify what the 
problems really consist in and thus what the right direction of our search 
for their solution should be. To understand this, we must first understand 
how, according to Nagel, philosophical problems arise. 
No one will object that the main theme of Nagel's philosophy is human 
being. What Nagel relentlessly endeavours to deal with are those mortal 
questions，the questions of human beings. They are important problems we 
21 "Moral Luck", inMQ, p. 27, my Italics. 
22 "The Absurd", in MQ, p. 13, my Italics. 
23 It is my terminology and Nagel has never used it. Here, "perception" should be understood in a 
boarder sense, referring roughly to all forms of awareness, including senses and feelings. 
24 VFN,p.n. 
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all face and are puzzled about — the problems of mind-body relation, 
freedom, value, sex, the meaning of life, death, political ideal, war, what one 
should believe and what one should do. They all seem to be inevitable to us. 
People start wondering at the amazement of the nature of the world and 
human beings in their young age, without knowing any philosopher or 
philosophical theory. We encounter them in our everyday life, in our reflection 
upon our being in the world. In other words, these problems basically are not 
the products of philosophy; philosophy does not create its own problems. 
Quite the reverse, it is the result of our attempt to make sense of ourselves. 
We all seem to have a natural, intuitive and pre-theoretical perception of the 
problems. We just can't help asking them once we begin to reflect upon 
ourselves, despite the fact that we have not got any conclusive solution so far. 
The basic concern of Nagel is always the problems themselves. 
Accordingly, philosophy, to Nagel, is primarily a discourse dealing with these 
problems. It consists of two parts: the attempt to ask the questions and the 
attempt to answer them. Usually, one concentrates on the latter, taking a 
particular formulation of a certain problem for granted, and then proposing 
different arguments and solutions to it. Sometimes we even seem to find the 
"solution". It is, however, the former that is vital. How a question is asked to a 
large extent determines what kinds of answer are available. If a question is 
not formulated in an appropriate way, it will simply miss the point and fail to 
address the very issue involved. 
To Nagel, it is precisely one of the main problems with some of the 
contemporary philosophers. These philosophers claim to have put an end to 
the inquiry of some or all of the philosophical problems，in one way or other. 
They can roughly be divided into two groups. One of them claims to have 
dissolved most, if not all, of the philosophical problems through linguistic or 
cultural / historical analysis. These problems are shown to be the result of the 
misuse of language or the products of cultural/historical circumstances, and 
thus unreal or at most the residue of a particular language. Philosophy is then 
reduced to either conceptual analysis or cultural/historical study, or even a 
dispensable, clumsy way of viewing the world^^. 
25 Taking philosophical problems as pseudo-problems arising from (the misuse or imperfection of) 
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On the other hand, there are those who do ask and claim to have 
provided solutions to these questions. But in doing so they usually assume a 
particular method (usually the scientific ones) and formulate the questions in 
such a way that for some of the questions, the solutions are guaranteed by 
that method, while others are simply excluded as being meaningless. With 
these final solutions，philosophical problems are either solved or dissolved, 
and philosophy is no more^^. 
Despite the claim of these two groups of philosophers, Nagel remains 
totally unconvinced. Even though we are told either that all these problems 
are unreal or that the real ones have already been solved, Nagel observes 
that, for most of them, we just cannot stop asking them again. To Nagel, the 
most important thing is not merely to get solutions, but the appropriate ones. 
An appropriate solution, if there is any, must be one that is of an appropriate 
question, a question that is formulated appropriately. A given formulation of a 
particular problem is not appropriate unless it can capture our preverbal 
intuitive perception of the essential sense of the problem that generates the 
problem. Understood in this way, an appropriate formulation does not 
necessarily guarantees a neat and easy answer. On the contrary, it is usually 
the sign of posing a wrong question that a certain simple but unconvincing 
solution is proved to be the adequate one for the question. It may be the right 
answer for that particular formulation of the problem, but not that for the 
original problem. An appropriate formulation itself must reveal to us why they 
are so puzzling and why they are so difficult to solve (or even not solvable). 
What matter, what generate the need for philosophy, are our intuitive 
perceptions of our situation, the problems encountered in life. Formulations 
language and taking philosophy as only conceptual analysis is the common attitude among logical 
positivist (e.g. A. J. Ayer, Camap and the Vienna Circle) and the ordinary language philosophers (e.g. 
Gilbert Ryle and John Austin). The most important representative is, of course, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
see his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigation. Another contemporary 
example is Michael Dununett, who conceives realism as a "semantic thesis" which "involves 
acceptance, for statements of the given class, of the principle of bivalence", see "Realism" in his The 
Seas of Language, p. 230. Regarding philosophers taking philosophy as only culturaLliistorical 
analysis, see Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and, in the field of ethics, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, After Virtue. 
26 An important representative of this reductive attitude is Daniel C. Dennett, see his Consciousness 
Explained. For Nagel's critique of Dennett, see chapter 7 "Dennett: Content and Consciousness" and 
chapter 8 "Dennett: Consciousness Dissolved" of OM, p. 82-89. ” 
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which fail to do justice to the problems, especially those which lead to the 
dismissal of the problems, are for that reason inadequate and even 
problematic. What we need most are the right questions — the appropriate 
formulations of the problems. Therefore, the fundamental task of philosophy, 
according to Nagel, is to "express unformed but intuitively felt problems in 
language without losing them"^^. 
It is exactly what Nagel has been doing in his writings. Nagel has 
never provided any solution, in the sense of a definite answer which puts a full 
stop to the pursuit of the problem, to any philosophical problem，directly or 
indirectly. It is simply not his main focus. Nagel labouriously works on the 
formulation of these problems over and over again and drills deeper and 
deeper. We can say that he deliberately stays in this fundamental stage of 
philosophical reflection in case there is any hasty and ungrounded leap to the 
pseudo-solution. To him, we are at a too early stage to answer the questions, 
since we do not even have the appropriate questions to answer. Before the 
right track is set, we cannot go anywhere without missing our destination. 
Therefore, Nagel's main concern is to reveal and account for our intuitive 
perceptions, the "sense of misery" we have regarding the philosophical 
problems. He does it by first showing how the available formulation of a 
particular problem is inadequate and hence how its best solution (or 
dissolution) fails to eliminate our puzzlement about it. Then, he argues for a 
reformulation of the problems indicating where the real problem lies, and what 
the form of the real solution should take. 
From the above discussion (which is largely an exposition of the 
passage quoted at the beginning of this section), we can have a preliminary 
understanding of why, for Nagel, we should trust intuitions over argument. At 
first glance, we should trust them because they are the real sources of the 
philosophical problems，and so the fact that an answer fails to do justice to 
them provides good reason for us to re-examine it. If the answer is proved to 
be adequate to the problem formulated in a certain way, we then have good 
reason to question the formulation. Despite that, we should be very careful 
not to exaggerate this trust of intuitions and interpret it as a trust of intuitions 
27 VFN,p.ll. 
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over reason. To Nagel, reason always has the last word and cannot be 
displaced even by intuition. It can be noticed from the fact that a beliefs 
being counter-intuitive is itself a reason for our distrust of it. However, we can 
make full sense of Nagel's claim only after we have understood his 
employment of intuition in the sense of intuitive belief. 
1.23 Intuition as Intuitive Belief 
In the last section, we have examined one sense of intuition adopted 
by Nagel, i.e. intuition as intuitive perception, which is the source of 
philosophical problems. Accordingly, we have a rough explanation of why we 
should trust intuition over argument. We should do so because the solution of 
a particular problem is supposed to account for and, ideally, remove our 
sense of puzzlement generated by our intuitive perceptions. If the solution 
fails to accomplish any of the tasks, it seems to be a prima facie reason for 
doubting the validity of the solution, even if it is derived from rational 
arguments. I admit that it is vague and incomprehensive at this stage, but let 
us just put it side for the time being and examine the other sense of intuition 
employed by Nagel. Vagueness and obscurity will be,丨 hope，dispersed in the 
course of our discussion. 
As we have mentioned, there are different senses of "intuition" — as 
a mysterious faculty, as a special kinds of knowledge attained by it, or as 
intuitive perceptions. However, "intuitions" is most commonly used in current 
philosophical discussions，especially in practical ethics，in the sense of 
"intuitive beliefs", which refers roughly to our spontaneous convictions, a 
specific set of verbally formulated beliefs which we take for granted pre-
reflectively, accept immediately without resorting to any rational argument. In 
other words, they are more or less equal to our commonsensical beliefs, 
except that they are "deeper" and more fundamental, in the sense that they 
pre-reflectively seem to be what we cannot but accept, and need no 
justification. Instead, other beliefs are derived from and sometimes justified 
by them. 
Nagel sometimes use "intuitions" to refer to this commonsensical 
beliefs, especially in his discussion of ethical and political issues. We can 
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substitute "intuition" for "common sense" in the passage below without 
changing its meaning: 
Common sense suggests that each of us should live his own life 
(autonomy), give special consideration to certain others 
(obligation), have some significant concern for the general good 
(neutral values)，and treat the people he deals with decently 
(deontology). It also suggests that these aims may produce 
serious inner conflict. ^^  
And he once remarked that the question "do our intuitions of moral 
requirements on action have any objective basis, or are they mere intuitions, 
internally consistent but without objects?" a familiar issue from ethics^^. 
If by trusting intuition over argument Nagel means we should always 
trust commonsensical beliefs whenever they conflict with other beliefs which 
are supported by rational argument, it seems that Nagel is an irrational 
defender of our commonsense. Furthermore, since the sets of 
commonsensical beliefs are different for people of different communities and 
even the same community in different historical epochs，and they have the 
ultimate authority in justification, relativism seems then to be inevitable. 
Here, we should be very careful about the nature of these intuitions 
as a special kind of commonsensical beliefs. Although we take them for 
granted pre-reflectively, it does not mean that they are necessary truths that 
can never be revised or abandoned on reflection. For example, it was an 
intuitive belief for the ancient Greeks (and even Aristotle) that some people 
were born to be slaves. They simply took it for granted and devised their 
social-political system upon it (and other accepted beliefs). However, not 
much civilized people accept this view anymore. Rather, the belief that 
everyone is equal by birth (whatever it means) becomes our intuition 
nowadays. Of course, it may turn out that we are wrong and the former view 
is indeed correct, but the point is that this kind of belief is revisable in the light 
adequate reason. Therefore, for Nagel, although intuitions as 
commonsensical beliefs should be respected, they do not override reason. 
To distinguish this kind of intuitive belief from the one I am going to 
28 VFN, p. 166. 
29 POA, p.57. 
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discuss, let us call them revisable intuitive beliefs. Two points that are closely 
related should be noticed about them. Firstly, since revisable intuitive beliefs 
are what we begin (our theoretical reflection and practical decision) with, they 
need not be revised or abandoned under normal circumstances. In other 
words, they are beliefs that we should accept if there is no sufficient reason 
against them. Nevertheless, they are revisable in the sense that they are not 
immune from rational criticism. They can be revised or even abandoned if we 
have sufficient reason to do so. In this sense, they are not indubitable. In 
Nagel's own words: 
Common sense doesn't have the last word in ethics or anywhere 
else, but it has...the first word: it should be examined before it is 
discarded， 
On the other hand, there is another set of intuitive beliefs that are 
indubitable, in the sense that it is impossible for them to be doubted rationally. 
To make the distinction dear, let us call them unrevisable intuitive beliefs. 
They represent facts that are undeniable and there is no other alternative than 
taking them as objectively true. What I have in mind is what Nagel calls 
Cartesian thoughts, thoughts that no one can attempt to doubt without 
immediately discovering the doubt to be unintelligible: 
However reasonable it may be to entertain doubts as to the 
validity of some of what one does under the heading of 
reasoning, such doubts cannot avoid involving some form of 
reasoning themselves, and the priorities I have been talking 
about show up in what we fall back on as we try to distance 
ourselves from more and more thoughts.... Certain forms of 
thought can't be intelligibly doubted because they force 
themselves into every attempt to think about anything.^^ 
Is it appropriate to interpret Nagel's Cartesian thoughts as 
unrevisable intuitive beliefs? Clearly, Nagel never employs my terminology. 
Besides, the examples of Cartesian thoughts he discusses most are not some 
particular beliefs but forms of thought. Worse than that, he seems to have 
said something against this interpretation: 
30 VFN,p.l66. 
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Again, let me emphasize that I am not talking about a set of 
unrevisable beliefs (though I believe the simplest rules of logic 
are unrevisable)...lt is possible to accept a form of rationalism 
without committing oneself to a closed set of self-evident 
foundational truths.^^ 
On what ground, then, can we interpret these Cartesian thoughts as 
unrevisable intuitive beliefs? To make sense of our interpretation, we must 
first understand what Nagel takes "Cartesian thoughts" to be. In his latest 
book The Last Word, Nagel tries to defend the objectivity of our 
understanding and justification against those he groups under the name 
"subjectivists". His main idea is that though it is possible and sometimes 
rational to suspect that many of our beliefs and their justifications are just 
reflecting our cultural and psychological makeup, we cannot take everything 
as subjective in this manner. According to Nagel, there are thoughts 
(revealed by Descartes in his meditation) which "we cannot get outside o f , 
thoughts that we cannot form any external account of (i.e. a psychological or 
cultural explanation of all kinds of our knowledge or reasoning) and that we 
simply "think straight": 
There are some types of thoughts that we cannot avoid simply 
having — that it is strictly impossible to consider merely from the 
outside, because they enter inevitably and directly into any 
process of considering ourselves from the outside, allowing us to 
construct the conception of a world in which, as a matter of 
objective fact, we and our subjective impressions are contained. 
33 
Suppose a person X holds a certain belief p which is thought to be 
objective, representing what is the case independently. Another person Y can 
challenge thatp is indeed subjective, reflecting only what from the perspective 
ofX is the case. In other words, p is merely the result of and hence justified 
by the psychological states, socialization and cultural indoctrination of X. 
Anyone who does not share all these with X need not believe in p\ and if we 
can show that the social norms or traditions from which p is derived are 
3 i ^p .61 . 
32LW,p. 69. 
“LW, p. 19. 
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irrational, we can reject p. In fact, many unreasonable beliefs are discarded 
in this way, and the process plays a significant role for the growth of 
knowledge. 
However, it will be a completely different case if we take all kinds of 
belief, reasoning and justification to be subjective. There must be at least 
some kinds of thought that are objective, and whose objectivity cannot be 
doubted intelligibly. For Y to claim that p is just a subjective belief of X 
sensibly, it must be understood as an objective claim, i.e. stating what is the 
case in itself, and not just for Y. In other words, whenever anyone makes a 
claim that any belief is subjective, he must regard this claim objective, since: 
The concept of subjectivity always demands an objective 
framework, within which the subject is located and his special 
perspective or set of responses described.〗< 
It can be explained in the following way. When Y claims thatp is 
subjective or relative to a particular perspective, he must at least give an 
explanation of p — of its nature and its source, and justify why it is valid for X 
only. To be convincing, he must at least admit that X is wrong (for certain 
reasons) in taking p as something objective. Moreover, he must argue that 
his claim {q) that p is subjective does not commit the same mistake as p. That 
is, Y must commit to the thought that q is not just what he believes, but is 
objectively true. If it is not the case, Y would mean that it is from his 
perspective only that p is just the product of the interplay of the particular 
psychological, cultural and historical factors o f X and X is wrong in taking p to 
be objective. However, q, then, can not undermine p as it appears when 
understood in the above way. Any claim of criticism of any belief as 
subjective must itself be objective for it to make sense. 
Suppose X claims that: 
p ' : There is some thought which is objective. 
Y can refute p，only if he can show that: 
q，: No thought is objective. 
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Which of them is right? How can we determine? There seems to be two 
possibilities — we either (1) choose arbitrarily, or (2) make the choice through 
evaluating the reasons for and against the claims rationally. Which one 
should we take? It seems that if we take (1)，we can choose either p，or q\ 
and none of them is more preferable than the other. It suggests that q，is at 
least as good as p\ But why should we choose (1)? The question itself 
demands an answer that is supported by reason. (1) should at least be 
supported by the claim that: 
r No rational argument is needed in choosing (1) and (2)_ 
The point, however, is that r needs argument too! Even if someone 
recommend us to choose (1) by saying that (1) is easier to do, we can only 
understand him as meaning that: 
a) We should choose whatever is easier to do. 
b) (1) is easier to do than (2) 
Therefore: 
c) We should choose (1) instead of (2). 
Obviously, a)-c) is an argument. It means that it is inevitable to appeal to 
reason, and it is not begging the question, since: 
The charge of begging the question implies that there is an 
alternative — namely, to examine the reasons for and against the 
claim being challenged while suspending judgment about it. For 
the case of reasoning itself, however, no such alternative is 
available, since any considerations against the objective validity 
of a type of reasoning are inevitably attempts to offer reasons 
against it, and these must be rationally assessed.^^ 
In other word, it is not intelligible for us to question the objectivity of reasoning 
per se. Given any proposition s, we cannot but, either explicitly or implicitly, 
give reason for or against it, orfor or against the need of giving reason for 0厂 
''LfF,p.l6. 
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against it, if we take s not to be just a series of symbols but proposition that 
conveys thought. We can question the objective validity of a particular type of 
reasoning, but we can do so only by providing reasoning of another type. 
There is simply no escape. 
This, being objectively valid, in turn, refutes q，. Though not all 
thoughts are objective, at least some of them are. Among all objective 
thoughts, Nagel calls those that "resist being undermined by considerations of 
the contingency of our makeup, the possibility of deception"^^ Cartesian 
thoughts. In The Last Word, Nagel concerns mainly about "framework of 
methods and forms of thought that reappear whenever we call any specific 
propositions into question" ^\ Although he does not positively discuss specific 
beliefs to which there is no alternative, he does admit this possibility^^ In fact, 
he, following Descartes, takes "I exist" to be one of therr|39, and this leaves 
room for interpreting Cartesian thought as unrevisable intuitive belief. In what 
is left in this section, I will try to justify my interpretation by showing how the 
thought "I exist", which is an example of Cartesian thoughts, is an unrevisable 
intuitive belief. 
On the one hand, "I exist" is an intuitive belief. Firstly, it is the verbal 
formulation of one of our intuitive perception, the perception of the fact that I 
exist. Once it is so formulated, it is an instance of our spontaneous 
convictions, a belief that we take for granted pre-reflectively and accept 
immediately without resorting to any rational argument. Besides, it is 
fundamental, in the sense that they pre-reflectively seem to be what we 
cannot but accept, and need no justification, and is presupposed by most of 
our beliefs. On the other hand, it is unrevisable. It is an instance of 
Cartesian thought, which cannot be rationally regarded merely as subjective. 
I can mistake my identity, memory, physical features and anything about me 
except the fact that I exist, because my doubt about myself is impossible if I 
do not exist. In other words, my doubt about my existence inevitably implies 
' 'LW,p . 24. '^ LW,p. 20. 
"LPF,p. 69. 
38 "The thing to which there is no alternative may include some specific beliefs, but in general it will not 
have that character (my emphasis) ’’’ LW, p.69. ''LW,p. 20. 
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my existence, rendering the doubt unintelligible. 
Accordingly, we can generalize our discussion of the nature of 
the specific belief "I exist" to say that a belief is an unrevisable intuitive 
belief if and only if: 
(I) It is what we take for granted, or at least can easily be 
recognized 
without any, or with minimal, reflection, (i.e. intuitive) 
(II) Once it is recognized, it is impossible, in the sense of 
unintelligible, for us to doubt it rationally, since any act of doubting 
presupposes it. (i.e. unrevisable) 
To put it in another way, we can say that the class of unrevisable 
intuitive belief is the product of the class of intuitive belief and the class of 
Cartesian thought. Of course, as we have seen, not all intuitive beliefs are 
unrevisable and it may not be the case that all Cartesian thoughts are 
intuitive beliefs^®. However, there are at least some beliefs, such as "I 
exist", which are intuitive and unrevisable. And, as Nagel says: 
...once the existence of a single thought that we cannot get 
outside of is recognized, it becomes clear that the number and 
variety of such thoughts may be considerable. It isn't only “I 
exist" that keeps bouncing back at us in response to every effort 
to doubt it: Something similar is true of other thoughts which, 
even if they do not always carry the same certainty, still resist 
being undermined by considerations of the contingency of our 
makeup, the possibility ofdeception, and so forth.^^ 
4° It appears that Nagel divides all Cartesian thoughts into two groups 一 framework of methods or 
forms of thoughts, and particular beliefs (LW, p. 69). I believe that the distinction is rough. The 
framework or form of thought itself is expressed in belief or sets ofbeliefs. What Nagel really means 
is that these beliefs are inescapable because they specify the forms of thought to which there is no 
alternative. The belief "If p then q, p, therefore q" is not only a logical truth we cannot be believe, but 
also specifies how we must think, i.e. our thought is sensible only if it is not contradictory with the 
belief. Similarly, "There is a way the world objectively is" and "There are ways we should act" are not 
merely beliefs we should accept. They also specify the way ofhow we are most rational to think, i.e. it 
is always more plausible that we should, at the outmost limit, think of the way the world is and the way 
we should act independent of any conceiving perspectives than taking a subjective view. It may be the 
case that all Cartesian thoughts are unrevisable intuitive beliefs, but I need not make this claim to 
justify my interpretation. This is enough for me to show that at least some of them are. 
''LW,^. 20. 
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What else, then, are unrevisabIe intuitive beliefs? Some paradigmatic 
examples will be “I am thinking", “1 mean something by my words"^^ and 
"There is some way the world is"^^ In the following chapters, I will consider 
some of the candidates and explain how Nagel's view of reality and hence his 
conception of philosophy can be justified upon them. Before that, let us first 
justify Nagel's trust of intuition over argument in the light of what we have said 
so far. 
1.24 Trusting Intuition over Argument 
So far, we have discussed what the term "intuition" is meant by Nagel 
in different contexts. To Nagel, "intuition" sometimes refers to "intuitive 
perception", and sometimes refers to "intuitive belief. Regarding the latter 
case, it can refer to either "revisable intuitive belief or "unrevisabIe intuitive 
belief. Basing on this distinction, we can now examine what Nagel really 
means when he claims that we should trust our intuitions over argument. In 
this section, I will try to show that there are different senses of "trusting 
intuition over argument" corresponding to different senses of "intuition" and 
how each of them can be justified in a way compatible with the 
acknowledgment of the authority of reason. 
As mentioned, the generation of a philosophical problem and the 
search for its solution consists in the following procedure. In encountering the 
world and ourselves in everyday life, we develop some intuitive perceptions, 
sometimes with corresponding senses and feelings of puzzlement. These 
senses and feelings drive us to think about them and demand some 
explanations that can to some extent eliminate this bafflement. We begin by 
identifying what the problems are through attempting precise verbal 
formulations to them. According to these formulations, we produce some 
hypotheses, identify and justify some relevant beliefs as the premises, and 
then derive our conclusions from them. That is, there are mainly four stages: 
42 LW, p. 44. "Just as I cannot doubt whether I exist, I cannot doubt whether any of my words have 
meaning, because in order for me to doubt that, the words I use in doing so must have meaning." 
''LW,p. 81. 
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① Identification and formulation of the problem 
② Identification of all the relevant premises 
③ Justification of all the relevant premises 
④ Deducing the conclusion from all the justified relevant premises 
If a philosophical problem is formulated appropriately, and a certain 
solution is derived from a sound argument (i.e. a valid argument with true 
premises) under this formulation, our intuitive uneasiness towards it, even for 
Nagel, is impotent in justifying our doubt about the solution. Nor can we 
appeal to our intuitive beliefs that conflict with it. It seems to be more likely 
that we should revise or even abandon them in the light of this. Under the 
circumstances, i.e. under the assumption that ali ①-④ are properly done, we 
must trust argument over intuitions, because our intuition cannot provide us 
with reason to doubt the argument even if its conclusion is counter-intuitive in 
this case. 
Suppose a person Mr. 0 gives an argument A for a solution S to a 
particular philosophical problem P. Nagel is accused of being an irrationalist 
precisely because he seems to maintain: 
C We should reject or doubt S，even if A is sound, if S is counter-
intuitive. 
For some, C is equal to: 
C# We should reject or doubt S, even if A is sound, if S seems strange 
to us. 
It seems to be clear that C# is irrational. If Nagel really holds C, and C is 
equal to C#, he seems to be an irrationalist. Can Nagel escape the 
accusation?丨 think he can. Firstly, C is different from C#. C is equal to C# if 
and only if "being counter-intuitive" is equal to "being strange to us", and it is 
not, at least not to Nagel. Though what is counter-intuitive is usually strange 
to us, not everything strange is counter-intuitive, and most of the beliefs that 
seems strange to us when first encountered can be accepted without the 
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need of giving up our fundamental beliefs. Therefore, C would be equal to 
C# only if we take "being strange to us" as meaning "being so strange that it 
threatens our fundamental beliefs，，. Then, the apparent ridiculousness of C 
can be reduced. 
Of course, Mr. 0 will not be satisfied. "You have not addressed the 
main issue. Though C is not equal to C#, C itself is irrational. If S is 
supported by a rational argument and you refuse to accept it by appealing to 
your intuition, you are still an irrationalist. You can call yourself an intuitionist, 
but you have to admit that all intuitionists are, in taking intuition as a higher 
authority than reason, irrationalists." 
Is the challenge justified? It depends on how we interpret C. In fact, 
C is a poor formulation even if there is truth in it. As I have said, Nagel 
explicitly gives the last word to reason, and he would raise no objection to any 
solution if it is appropriately formulated and supported by a sound argument, 
even if it is counter-intuitive. The main point, however, is that in ordinary 
practice, this very assumption is by no means justified. It is always possible 
for us to make mistakes in any one of the four stages mentioned above, and 
in most cases： 
...reasoning provides us not with proof but only with reasons for 
believing a conclusion likely, or for preferring it somewhat to the 
alternatives...The reasons that support a conclusion do not 
typically rule out the possibility of its falsity, even if they are very 
strong.•…Often reasoning in the strict sense does not support our 
conclusions directly but only justifies us in trusting or distrusting 
the more particular judgments and intuitions that occur to us 
naturally, or as the result of experience.^^ 
As Nagel says, "an examination of what is wrong with the conclusion 
may shed some light on what is wrong with the argument"^^ How can a 
solution supported by an argument be problematic? It can be so in two 
aspects. Firstly, it is sometimes not as clear as one thinks whether one's 
argument is really sound as it appears. The problem is more on the truth 
and/or the justification of the premises than on the validity of the form of the 
44 LW, p. 78. 
45 VFN, p. 95. 
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argument. It is relatively easier to determine whether an argument, given a 
set of premises, is valid or not. It is, however, always possible that there are 
flaws one has not detected or cannot detect, given our existing capacity (e.g. 
analytic power) and available knowledge (empirical or otherwise). On the one 
hand, premises thought to be true may be in fact false, and there may be 
some implicit premises that are not self-evident but have never been 
established. On the other hand, our acceptance of a certain premise may be 
the result of certain criteria of truth or justification, or methodologies that are 
themselves problematic: 
It is always reasonable in philosophy to have great respect for 
the intuitive sense of an unsolved problem, because in 
philosophy our methods are always themselves in question, and 
this is one way of being prepared to abandon them at any p o i n t . 
All these possibilities are not ruled out by the fact that the solution does 
follow from the given premises. However, it seems that we always ignore 
these possibilities. Having given a carefully considered argument, we always 
tend to think that we have found the solution. It is natural since we all have 
such an irresistible desire for solutions that we tend to close our eyes and 
shut down our brains as soon as we think that we have got ones. Such 
belief, however, is not justified. We should always bear one simply rule in 
logic in mind: The truth of the conclusion of a valid argument is preserved if 
and onlyifaW the premises are true. 
Secondly, even if we can show that the argument is not only valid but 
also sound and that the conclusion does follow from it, it is still possible that 
this conclusion may not be the appropriate solution to our original problem. It 
is because it is always possible that the very formulation of the problem itself 
is problematic. That is, the formulation fails to capture the essential sense of 
the problem, which drives us to work out such formulation. In this case, the 
solution can still be rejected as inadequate since the real problem has not be 
addressed yet. 
All the things said above are just, of course, possibilities so far, and 
' 'MQ, xi. 
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whether it is actually the case needs to be argued. So, what can justify our 
doubt about the validity of the solution? What give us reason to doubt about 
the soundness of an argument and the appropriateness of the formulation of 
the problem? It is, according to Nagel, the fact that the proposed solution is 
counter-intuitive — "intuitively unacceptable", "intuitive not to make sense", or 
it "does not remove the conviction that the problem is still there".^^ Nagel's 
argument goes like this: 
0 We should accept S if P is formulated appropriately and A is sound. 
0 implies that: 
© If S is unacceptable, we at least have reason to doubt that either A 
is unsound orthat P is not formulated appropriately. 
According to Nagel, 
0 S is unacceptable if it is counter-intuitive. 
Therefore, 
0 If S is counter-intuitive, we have reason to doubt that eWherA is 
unsound orP \s not formulated appropriately. 
At this point, we are back to the central issue of our discussion. 0 is 
my formulation of Nagel's claim that we should trust intuition over argument. 
How should we understand it? Firstly, we should notice that in making the 
claim, Nagel does not use the term "argument" to refer to the general 
employment of reason, but only the particular employment of it under a 
particular formulation ofa problem. In other words, Nagel does not mean that 
our intuitive perceptions or intuitive beliefs are always responsible for the final 
verdict, that we should always reject judgments that conflict with it, even /7we 
have strong reason to believe that they are true. For Nagel, reason is always 
the final judge and we should always believe what we have the strongest 
reason to believe. The question now becomes: What does it mean to trust 
our intuition over argument while acknowledging the ultimate authority of 
reason in justification simultaneously? The general answer is that our intuition 
provides us with reason to doubt the particular employment of reason in a 
particular problem under a particular formulation. It should be noticed that 
even in this particular case, the last word is given to reason 一 we trust our 
47 Preface, MQ, x. 
36 
The Foundation of The Philosophy Of Thomas Nagel 
intuitive uneasiness because it provides us with reason to doubt. Or, in the 
case of intuitive beliefs, we trust them because it is rational to do so. 
Why is it, then, the case that S's being counter-intuitive is a reason 
for us to doubt S? As we have seen in the last two sections, Nagel employs 
"intuition" in three different senses — intuitive perception, revisable intuitive 
belief and unrevisable intuitive belief. Accordingly, there are three senses of 
"being counter-intuitive", and the reasons corresponding to them are, though 
related, different. 
With respect to our intuitive perception, which is the source of 
philosophical problems, S is counter-intuitive if it fails to eliminate our sense of 
bafflement. On the one hand, S may claim to have solved P but leave us 
think that there is still something wrong. On the other hand, S may, in the 
form of therapeutic dissolution, claim to have proved that P is unreal and we 
should not pursue its answer, but fails to convince us that there is no such 
problem at all. All these are counter-intuitive in the sense that they are not in 
accord with our intuitive perception of the existence of P. Since this intuitive 
perception is the source of P, the fact that S fails to answer its demand is a 
reason for us to doubt its validity, as Nagel says: 
...if a neat solution to a problem does not remove the conviction 
that the problem is still there, or if a demonstration that some 
question is unreal leaves us still wanting to ask it, then something 
is wrong with the argument and more work needs to be done. 
Often the problem has to be reformulated, because an adequate 
answer to the original formulation fails to make the sense of the 
problem disappear， 
Our critic, Mr. 0，may object that we should not trust our intuitive 
perception on the ground that we may mistake this vague "sense of 
bafflement" and that it may be corrupted by custom, self-interest, or 
commitment to a theory. It is always possible for us to have some irrational 
and groundless "sense of bafflement", believing that there is a problem when 
there is no more or none at all. So why don't we just put them aside? 
My reply is that even if what has been said is true，it does not follow 
48 MQ, xi, my emphasis. 
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that we should ignore our intuitive perception and that our intuitive uneasiness 
is impotent in justifying our doubt of S. Though our intuitive perception of the 
existence of P may be misidentified and corrupted in the ways mentioned, it 
need not be, and any claim that it is must be argued. What does it mean? It 
means that Mr. 0，in supporting S, must show with further argument that it is 
more reasonable to believe S than our intuition. It implies precisely that a 
beliefs being counter-intuitive provides reason for us to doubt it, and that our 
intuition cannot simply be ignored. Note that Nagel never means that it is a 
sufficient reason for us to reject S. He maintains only that our intuitive 
perception is reliable so long as it is not shown to be irrational. Though the 
following passage is about ethical and political issue，it clearly reflects Nagel's 
general attitude toward our intuition as a watchman of beliefs: 
...the use of moral intuition is inevitable, and should not be 
regretted. To trust our intuitions, particularly those that tell us 
something is wrong even though we don't know exactly what 
would be right, we need only believe that our moral 
understanding extends farther than our capacity to spell out the 
principles which underlie it. Intuition can be corrupted by 
custom, self-interest, or commitment to a theory, but it need not 
be, and often a person's intuition will provide him with evidence 
that his own moral theory is missing something, or that the 
arrangements he has been brought up to find natural are really 
unjust. Intuitive dissatisfaction is an essential resource in 
political theory. It can tell us that something is wrong, without 
necessarily telling us how to fix it.^ ^ 
Certainly, our case will be much stronger if we can, in addition to 
pointing out that S is counter-intuitive, identify what is wrong with A, and/or 
argue for a better formulation for P. While our intuitive uneasiness gives us 
reason to doubt S, it is in turns confirmed by our argument against S. 
Let us turn to our intuition as intuitive beliefs. Regarding our 
revisable intuitive beliefs, S is counter-intuitive if it is conflicting with our 
fundamental commonsensical beliefs that we take for granted pre-reflectively. 
Here, we should be very careful not to take Nagel as meaning that everything 
incompatible with our common sense can be automatically rejected, no matter 
how strong the supporting reason are. All he asserts is just that if S is 
49 E&P, p.7. 
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conflicting with our common sense, we have reason to doubt it. It is 
compatible with the claim that if we have sufficient reason, we can also reject 
and thus revise or even abandoned our accepted beliefs. 
Mr. 0 may again challenge why we should take "being counter-
intuitive" as a reason for doubting S. Why should those beliefs that we take 
for granted pre-reflectively have such priority? Why don't we simply regard 
this as a neutral fact in the matter of justification? My reply, this time, is 
twofold. Firstly, it seems to be obvious that it is always rational to trust our 
accepted beliefs if there is no sufficient reason against them. Familiarity is 
always a reason, though not a sufficient one, for accepting a belief. Besides, 
our consideration of the acceptance and rejection of any belief in question 
must start somewhere, i.e. it must be done on the basis of what we already 
have. There can be no presuppositionless standpoint from which we can 
undertake our reflection, though it by no means implies that any of our 
presuppositions cannot be doubted, modified or even abandoned. Or, in 
Nagel's own words: 
Common sense doesn't have the last word in ethics or anywhere 
else, but it has...the first word: it should be examined before it is 
discarded.5G 
Finally, in the case of unrevisabIe intuitive beliefs, the claim of 
intuition is much stronger than the former two. S is counter-intuitive if it is 
incompatible with at least one of our unrevisabIe intuitive beliefs (let us call it 
U) which is impossible, in the sense of being unintelligible, for us to doubt 
rationally. To be consistent, we have to choose between S and U. Given the 
fact that it is always possible that A which supports S is unsound and the 
formulation of P is inappropriate, and it is impossible for us to deny U 
rationally, the most rational thing to do is to reject S as the appropriate 
solution to P. In turn, we have sufficient reason to assume that either A is 
unsound or P is not formulated appropriately: 
Given a knockdown argument for an intuitively unacceptable 
conclusion, one should assume there is probably something 
wrong with the argument that one cannot detect - though it is also 
possible that the source of the intuition has been misidentified.^^ 
Accordingly, we can consider our unrevisabIe intuitive beliefs as 
5 � V F N , p. 166. 
51 Preface, MQ, xi. 
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having both the first and, in some sense, the last word. On the one hand, 
they provide reasons for us to doubt S, while, on the other, they are decisive 
in rejecting S. Of course, we should not think that it is conflicting with the 
belief that reason has the last word in justification. Indeed，the former is 
implied by the latter: unrevisable intuitive beliefs are decisive in rejecting S 
because they cannot be doubted rationally, and it is the case only if the 
ultimate authority of reason is acknowledged. 
I hope I have provided a plausible interpretation of and argument for 
Nagel's reliance on intuition in the above discussion. I have clarified Nagel's 
concept of intuition and showed how his intuitionism is not irrational as it 
appears to be. In fact, if my interpretation is correct, the trust of intuition — as 
intuitive perception, revisable and unrevisable intuitive beliefs — over any 
specific argument implying counter-intuitive conclusion manifests full 
commitment to the authority of reason. 
Having said all these, it should be noted that it is just the beginning 
of the whole story. In arguing for the priority of intuition, I hope I have 
revealed the foundation of the Nagelian project. In the following chapters, I 
will argue for Nagel's particular version of reformulation of philosophical 
problems. I will discuss some unrevisable intuitive beliefs and explain how 
the central concepts of Nagel's theory are derived from them. 
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2 
VIEWPOINTS 
In the last chapter, we have discussed Nagel's conception of intuition 
and defended his trust in it. The argument, if successful, provides us with 
ground for doubting the plausibility of both the existing deflationary therapeutic 
dissolution and the reductionist solution of traditional philosophical problems. 
It in turn justifies the need for reformulation of those problems, since the best 
solutions to the problems hitherto formulated fails to do justice to the problems 
themselves. The question now is that: Which formulation should we adopt? 
Particularly, why should we accept Nagel's version of formulation — i.e. 
philosophical problems as the products of the conflict between the subjective 
and the objective points of view about the reality? 
To answer this question, we must first have an idea of what he means 
by "points of view", "reality" and the distinction between "subjective" and 
"objective". In my opinion, Nagel's reformulation is grounded on his unique 
conception of viewpoint and reality. In this chapter, I will first discuss the 
nature of viewpoints and its role in Nagel's reformulation. I hope, in the 
course of discussion, to show that the existence of viewpoints is a 
fundamental fact about, not only human, but also all reflective beings. The 
discussion of his conception of reality and its relation with viewpoints will 
occupy the next chapter. 
2.1 The Nature of Viewpoints 
It is obvious that the concept of "viewpoint" is very important in the 
philosophy of Nagel. Almost all his work explores the conflict between the 
subjective and objective viewpoints, and he has much discussion about what 
is meant by a viewpoint's being subjective and objective. He, however, does 
not explain what a viewpoint is and of what it is constituted. Clearly, Nagel is 
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appealing to our everyday conception of "viewpoint". However, it is not clear 
what this everyday conception is, and so we must first take a closer look at it 
before we can have a thorough grasp of his formulation. In this section, I will 
concentrate on exploring the idea of "viewpoint". The discussion will centre on 
the questions of what a viewpoint is constituted, the role it plays, and what are 
counted as conflicting viewpoints. 
Nagel employs different words — perspective, standpoint and point 
of view — to express the idea of "viewpoint". What do they mean? What do 
they refer to? Figuratively, both "viewpoint" and "standpoint" embody the idea 
of a point, a position occupied by something. It is a position from which 
something X^^ views the world. Since X views the world only from its 
viewpoint, what it can view is only what can be viewed from that viewpoint. 
Given that the world is not something that can be viewed only from one 
particular viewpoint, X's position determines its perspective, from which only a 
certain aspect of the world can be viewed. From this preliminary sketch, we 
can see that there are two closely related features of a viewpoint. Firstly, it 
makes something's viewing the world possible. Whenever anything views the 
world, they must do so from a certain position. It is impossible for anything to 
view the world without occupying any position, or, in Nagel's term, it is 
impossible for anything to achieve the view from nowhere, since "it is 
impossible to leave one's own point of view behind entirely without ceasing to 
exist"53. 
Besides, it inevitably implies a limitation on what can be viewed. Now 
I am sitting in my study room. What I can see is the computer in front of me, 
52 For the sake of convenience, I employ the following symbols to represent the basic elements 
involved in our conscious act ofviewing throughout the essay: 
X: a viewer (any being which is capable of viewing, i.e. perceiving and/or conceiving) 
P： a viewpoint (a set ofpreconditions which enable X to view) 
Pa, Pb, Pc...: different viewpoints (different sets ofpreconditions for viewing) 
P [0], P [ 1 ], P [2]...: different viewpoints with different levels of objectivity 
(the greater the number, the more objective a viewpoint is) 
0 : an object being viewed 
VO: the view (i.e. perception and/or conception) of 0 formed by X from P/the appearance of 0 
t o X f r o m P 
VOa, VOb, VOc...: different views of 0 from different viewpoint Va, Vb, Pc. •. 
V0[0], V0[1], VO[2]...: different views o f O with different levels of objectivity 
(the greater the number, the more objective a view is) 53 VFN, p. 67. 
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the table on which it is placed, several books and some stationery. I am shut 
out from the rest of the world. I have to leave the room if I want to see the 
things outside. Furthermore, though I can see my computer, what I can see is 
in fact only an aspect of it, namely the monitor screen. I cannot see its back, 
top or any other side of it and 丨 have to change my relative position to it if I 
want to do so. 
So far, what is said above is just figurative, taking "view" and "point" 
literally. Clearly, Nagel means not only "a position from which one sees" by 
"viewpoint". Indeed，he employs the term in a very broad sense. To 
understand what he means by it, we have to examine what he means by 
"viewing". 
For Nagel, "viewing" refers to all activities of perceiving and 
conceiving. Perceiving refers to all the activities of direct awareness — 
seeing, hearing, tasting, sensing, feeling, etc, which are common in all 
conscious beings. Given an object 0 (which can either be a thing, an issue, 
or even the world), perceiving 0 means the direct awareness of 0 . Let us call 
the result of the act of perceiving, i.e. what is perceived, perception. The 
perception of 0 is then the way in which 0 is perceived. It need not involve 
any understanding. On the other hand, conceiving^^ is an act of 
understanding and apprehension that involves concepts and beliefs. 
Conceiving an object 0 means generating, upholding and developing beliefs 
about 0 . These beliefs may either be descriptive or evaluative. The act of 
conceiving usually involves perception — in fact, these beliefs are usually the 
product of the interpretation of perception. Let us call the result of the act of 
conceiving conception. Thus the conception of 0 is the set of beliefs about 
055. Therefore, the view of 0，the result of viewing 0，is the perception and/or 
the conception of 0. For the sake of simplicity, let us call any such view of 0 
VO. 
Accordingly, a viewpoint P is the place from which 0 is perceived and 
conceived. However, it, like "viewing", should not be taken literally, in the 
54 By "conceiving", I do not mean "imagining" or "envisaging" in general. Instead, I mean the 
conscious activity of conceptual thinking and its resulting set of beliefs. 
55 In general, a conception is a set of beliefs concerning what there is and what one should do. 
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sense of physical location only. We should take it as referring to the totality of 
all the subjective pre-conditions 一 those that related to the viewer 一 that 
render any act of viewing (i.e. perceiving and conceiving) possible. Such pre-
conditions include the viewer's physiological and psychological structure (and 
capacities), spatial location，socialisation, traditional and cultural influences, 
commonsensical beliefs and even personal experience，etc^®. The specific 
content of these pre-conditions (i.e. a particulartype of physiological structure, 
a certain set of traditional and cultural beliefs, etc.) determines howO appears 
— h o w it is perceived and conceived. In other words, a viewpoint determines 
the content of V0, i.e. its corresponding view — perception and/or conception 
— ofO. 
What then is a viewer^ Not everything in the world, as far as we know, 
is a viewer. Something X is a viewer if and only if it is capable of viewing the 
world. It is capable of viewing the world if and only if it has a viewpoint. What, 
then is essential involved in the fact that X has a viewpoint P? In one of his 
most celebrated article "What is it like to be a bat?" Nagel, appealing to our 
intuition, specifies the essential fact involved in the fact that an organism has 
conscious experience: 
...fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states ifand 
only if there is something that it is like to be that organism — 
something it is like forthe organism.^^ 
Nagel calls this "the subjective character of experience". He does not provide 
an argument for it, but 丨 think we can (and should) accept it on the ground that 
it is an unrevisable intuitive belief ——belief that, once it is recognised, no 
alternative to it is intelligible. If there is nothing that it is like to be X，we 
cannot even form the thought that X is conscious. Conversely, granted that 
there is something it is like to be X，we cannot but agree that X is conscious, 
56 These items are jore-conditions only in relation to a particular act of viewing a particular object 
(which can either be a thing or an issue) 0. A particular belief is a pre-condition if and only if it is 
among those which are taken for granted in giving rise to VO. It may itselfbe a part of another 
conception which is the result of another set ofpre-conditions, i.e. from another viewpoint. On the 
other hand, a newly acquired belief is always incorporated into the original set of pre-conditions for us 
to view other objects. 
“"What is it like to be a bat?", in MQ, p.l66. 
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no matter how its appearance, physiological and psychological structure are 
different from ours. To recognise this, we need only form the general 
conception that there is something it is like to be X，and we need not know 
what it is like to be X at all. 
Here, Nagel is mainly concerned with perceptual experience, but the 
point can be generalised to cover all conscious phenomena. In arguing 
against physicalism, Nagel daims that it is impossible to exhaust all the 
phenomenological features (i.e. subjective mental phenomena) with a 
physical account alone, since 
...every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a 
single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, 
physical theory will abandon that point of view.^^ 
In other words, in abandoning the particular viewpoint of X，a 
physicalist account is sure to miss the fact that there is something it is like to 
be X, which is essentially connected to the fact that X is conscious. Though 
what has perceptual experience must have a viewpoint, the latter is not the 
unique feature of the former. In my terminology, which is in accord with that of 
Nagel, viewing (i.e. perceiving and conceiving) covers all kinds of conscious 
states. It means that X is conscious if and only if X views. Since that X views 
implies that X has a viewpoint, it is simply unintelligible to say that X is 
conscious but it does not have any viewpoint. Therefore, we can generalise 
Nagel's talk of conscious perceptual experience to a specification of what X's 
having a viewpoint consists in: 
X has a viewpoint if and only if there is something it is like forXto be X. 
Then, we can say that X has a viewpoint Pa means that for a given 
object 0，0 appears to X in a certain way VOa which is determined by the set 
of preconditions on the basis of which X perceive and/or conceive 0 . (It does 
not imply that there is not a way 0 is independently of Pa. Nor does it entail 
that VOa cannot reveal the independent nature of 0.) With a different set of 
pre-conditions, what it is like to be X is in turn different. Accordingly, we can 
say that a viewer is a being for which there is something it is like to be it. A 
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viewpoint is a set of pre-conditions that determine how something appears to 
a viewer. 
Two points should be noted. Firstly, we should not, at this stage, take 
it as meaning that a viewpoint determines the nature of 0 . What a viewpoint 
determines is merely a corresponding perception and/or conception of 0， 
which may or may not reveal the real nature of 0 . Besides, in saying “a 
viewpoint determines the content of its corresponding view of 0”，I do not 
mean that any one of those pre-conditions is the sufficient and necessary 
condition for what we perceive or conceive of 0 . All I mean is just that: given 
a specific set of pre-conditions (i.e. from a particular viewpoint Pa), it, as a 
whole, is sufficient for our having a particular view of 0 (VOa). In other words, 
if any two individuals which perceive and/or conceive 0 from the same 
viewpoint, i.e. with the same set of pre-conditions, their perception and/or 
conception of 0 will be the same. 
But what is meant by "the same viewpoint"? In a strict sense, two 
viewpoints are the same if and only if the sets of pre-conditions constituting 
them are the same; and two sets of pre-conditions are the same if and only if 
every single pre-condition of them is qualitatively identical. It is obvious that 
no two viewpoints can be the same in such a strict sense, which can easily be 
shown by fact that no two things can occupy the same space at the same 
time. However, it would be an oversimplification to claim that all viewpoints 
are different. To be more precise, we should specify clearly whether they are 
different in the relevant aspect and how different they are. In other words, 
though no two viewpoints are exactly identical, it is always possible that some 
of them are the same or similar to a certain extent in some relevant aspects 
regarding particular issues. Regarding a given object 0，if two viewpoints Pa 
and Pb are the same, they will give rise to the same view of 0，i.e. VOa and 
VOb are the same. 
I have said that a viewpoint is the totality of all the pre-conditions that 
render viewing possible and limit what can be viewed (i.e. what things/issues 
can be viewed) and what the view is (i.e. how the thing/issues are viewed). It 
58 "What is it like to be a bat?", in MQ, p.l67. 
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implies that a set of preconditions constitutes a viewpoint if and only if there is 
something 一 a viewer 一 which can view a given object on the basis ofthem. 
While a viewpoint determines what a view is, it also defines what the viewer X 
is, i.e. what X views as. Suppose we are discussing the problem of the 
existence of God G. When a person X holds the view that there is God 
(VG[christian]) on the ground that it is recorded in Bible (P[christian]), he 
makes his claim as a Christian{X[chvistian]). Assume that he is at the same 
time a physicist, and is asked to provide a scientific proof for the existence of 
God. If his mind is clear enough, that he should admit that as a physicist 
(X[physicist]) he cannot prove empirically that there is a God, in which he 
has absolute faith as a Christian. In other words, from the viewpoint of 
physics (P[physicist]), he should hold the view that there is no God 
(VG[physicist]). When he considers the issue G from two different 
viewpoints, P[christian] and P[physicist], his views VG[christian] and 
VG[physicist ] are not only different but also conflicting, in the sense that they 
cannot both be true. In viewing G from P[christian], X is a Christian while, 
when he views from P[physicist], he is a physicist. Of course, X is still the 
same person, but we can see that he views G as two different individual 
X[christian] and X[physicist]. In this sense, we can say that what an 
individual is can be defined by the viewpoints from which it views^®. 
Here, we have a special case of two conflicting views held by the 
same individual from two different viewpoints. However, we can generalize it 
to the formulation that regarding a given object 0，an individual X holds two 
conflicting views if and only if: 
① There is an individual Xa who views 0 from a viewpoint Pa. 
② There is an individual Xb who views 0 from a viewpoint Pb. 
③ The view VOa, which is determined by Pa, conflicts with VOb, which is 
determined by Pb; which means: 
③，What is considered to be the case in VOa is considered not to 
be the case in VOb. 
④ Xa and Xb is the same individual. 
59 Of course, there can be other different ways to define what an individual is. 
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It should be noted that what is stated above is a general formulation. 
It says nothing about in what aspect Pa is different from Pb. Particularly, it 
says nothing about whether the difference between Pa and Pb is that of level 
of objectivity, which is an instance of the general case. When Nagel says that 
philosophical problems have their deep source in our conflicting viewpoints, 
he refers to the special and not the general case. In what way, then, Pa and 
Pb are different in their level of objectivity? How should we understand the 
distinction between the subjective and the objective viewpoints? What is 
meant by "the objective view conflicts with the subjective view"? 
2.2 The Subiective and the Obiective Viewpoint 
As I have mentioned in the Introduction, the chief contribution of 
Nagel lies in his effort in arguing for a unique version of reformulation of 
traditional philosophical problems. Roughly speaking, Nagel thinks that a 
human being X is capable of viewing and does view (i.e. perceive and 
conceive) an object 0 (a thing or an issue) from two different viewpoints Pa 
and Pb (i.e. with two different sets of pre-conditions)——the subjective and the 
objective. Since the set of pre-conditions on which X views 0 determine its 
view (perception and conception) of 0 V0, Pa and Pb give rise to two 
different views VOa and VOb respectively. The situation may be easier to 
handle if: 
0 Though VOa and VOb are different, they are compatible; 
or © Though they are incompatible, we have sufficient reason to 
consider one of them dominates the other; 
or © Though none of them win decisively, they are held by two 
different individuals and so they at worst remain silent and insist 
their own views without convincing the other. 
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Unfortunately, in many cases, especially in the case of philosophy, 
stalemate seems to be the fate. In most of the philosophical problems, the 
fact is usually that there are conflicting views generated by different 
viewpoints, "one point of view claims dominance over another, more 
subjective one, and that claim is resisted，，®。. Worse still, "the same individual 
is the occupant of both viewpoints"®^ This conflict, according to Nagel, is the 
deepest source of the perplexities of all philosophical problems. The task of a 
philosopher, then, is "to juxtapose the internal and external or subjective and 
objective views at full strength, in order to achieve unification when it is 
possible and to recognize clearly when it is not"® .^ 
What is said above is at best a condensed statement of what Nagel 
has in mind. Much clarification and justification are needed. In the last 
section, we have discussed what a viewpoint and a view are, discovered that 
a being X's having a viewpoint essentially involves the fact that there is 
something it is like for X to be X, and specified what X has two conflicting 
viewpoints means. We are now in a much better position to explore what 
Nagel takes to mean by the distinction of the subjective and the objective 
viewpoint. We have outlined Nagel's general formulation of traditional 
philosophical problems, but two important questions must first be answered 
before we can really understand and evaluate his conception of philosophy. 
Firstly, under what condition do we call a viewpoint subjective or objective? 
What is the respective nature of a subjective viewpoint and an objective 
viewpoint? Secondly, what is the nature of this distinction between subjective 
and objective? In this section, l will clarify this important distinction through 
answering these two questions in turn, while the questions of how the conflict 
between them generate philosophical problems and whether there is any 
possibility of reconciliation will only be dealt with in Chapter 4. 
In our everyday life, we see, hear, sense and feel the world around 
us. Partly on the base of these perceptions and partly on the beliefs and 
values inherited from our families, societies and cultures, we form some 
beliefs and acts upon them. These beliefs are about what the world and we 
60 "Subjective and Objective", inMQ, p. 206. 
61 Jbid., p. 208. 
62 VFN, p. 4. 
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ourselves are, and what we and other people should do. We seldom doubt 
them if nothing goes wrong. It does not mean that we have strong reason to 
support our beliefs. Indeed，we always admit, at least implicitly, the possibility 
that our beliefs are false. We do not doubt them just because we do not even 
have the least thought about them at all; we just take them for granted when 
we live our life. We usually make our judgements and responses promptly 
and naturally. We do, of course, always think hard for some important 
questions in life. However, we just try to figure out what our decision should 
be according to and in harmony with what we have already taken for granted. 
To put it metaphorically, we always look forward in living our life, but we 
seldom look back to what we take for granted that give rise to what we see. 
We are not even aware of their existence. 
One of the unique characteristics of we human beings is that we can 
and do sometimes look back. In the process of looking back, we discover that 
what we hold to be true may simply be the products of what we take for 
granted. We become suspicious about their claim to truth when we find that 
those beliefs from which they are derived are themselves problematic, not 
supported by sufficient reason, groundless or even irrational. It can be 
illustrated with the following examples. 
1. One day, I bought my favourite chocolate ice-cream from a nearby 
supermarket.丨 took a bite of it as soon as 丨 paid for it. To my disappointment, 
it was tasteless. Out of rage, I examined the ice-cream in detail and, to my 
surprise, it was of the right brand and the right favour. "What's wrong with 
it?"丨 wondered. I began to try to recall what 丨 had done before I ate the ice-
cream. After thinking hard for an hour (and the poor cone had, of course, 
melted already),丨 finally knew the truth. There was nothing wrong with my 
ice-cream at all. The fact was merely that 丨 had eaten ten bars of Super 
chocolate just before 丨 went to the supermarket. It was only a problem with 
my physiological condition — my taste. On further reflection, I came to 
realize that how the ice-cream tasted to me may not be solely determined by 
its properties;丨 seemed to have my contribution to it. 
2. In the past, when I saw a beggar lying helplessly on the cold damp 
ground,丨 felt sorry for him, but did not consider myself to have any 
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responsibility for the situation. I thought it was just the necessary evil of the 
prosperity of the society. I did not question about the validity of my beliefs 
and thought that they were true for everyone. One day, I went to library and 
came across a book on communism. My first reaction after reading it was that 
it was ridiculous. How could our society as a whole be unjusP?丨 wondered 
why the communists would have such strange thought and tried to examine 
what beliefs they had and why they endorsed them. During the process, I left 
my viewpoint for the moment and tried to understand the communists from 
their point of view. I was not able to understand them perfectly, but there was 
always improvement. In recognizing that their beliefs presupposed other 
more firmly held beliefs and primary values,丨 was easy to recognize that my 
own beliefs did also have some presuppositions of which I had not been 
aware before. Once this thought emerged, I could not but doubt if my beliefs, 
which 丨 had taken for granted before, were only rational for me, or our culture, 
while those of the others, which had been considered by me to be irrational or 
false, might be rational ortrue. 
The above examples show that under certain circumstances — says 
our encounter with other systems of beliefs, the emergency of problems that 
the existing method or system of beliefs fails to react effectively, or just 
curiosity sparkled occasionally — we question the validity of our existing view 
and wonder "Is it really the case?" Once we turn our attention to these 
beliefs, we naturally want to find out what they exactly are and whether they 
are held legitimately. We want to make sure that they are not acquired 
through some irrational means, or if they really are, we can at least justify our 
continuous endorsement. It seems impossible for us to endorse a certain 
belief while at the same time believing that our endorsement is irrational and 
illegitimate. To ensure that what our view of a certain object is not just some 
illusion, we try to find out how we get this view and whether we are justified in 
holding it. It inevitably, provided that we drill deep enough, leads us to step 
back and look back on, to examine our fundamental beliefs, our intuitions (in 
the sense of revisable intuitive beliefs) and other pre-conditions (says our 
physiological and psychological structure) on which our particular view 
63 Of course, there are different versions of communism, but let us leave the question for the sake of 
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depends. It may turn out that some [or even most] of our former beliefs are 
illusory and do not, as they claim to be, represent what is the case. Some of 
them need to be revised and some may even be abandoned. The result of 
this deliberation will definitely change the view being considered. Either the 
content of our view will be changed (which involves the re-assignment of the 
true value of our beliefs, and/or the enrichment of our existing concepts, 
and/or the generation of new concepts), or the content remains the same but 
our attitude toward it alters as a result of a better understanding of it. The 
present view claims to represent reality, replacing the previous one that is now 
discarded as depicting only an appearance to us. Certainly, the process of re-
examination can go on without an obvious limit, and better views, in the sense 
that they are truer, more capable in telling us what the world really is and what 
we should really do, will be generated and, hopefully, the true view can be 
achieved. 
What is said above can be seen as an abridged, made-simple 
version of Nagel's conception of subjectivity and objectivity. In what follows,丨 
will attempt a detailed explication of it in the light of the above picture and 
what we have established with regard to his conception viewpoint in general. 
Above all,丨 hope to show, in the course of our discussion, that the pursuit of 
objectivity is a fundamental, in the sense of being constitutive, feature of all 
reflective beings. 
A viewpoint P[n] is the set of pre-conditions that enable a viewer X to 
view — perceive and/or conceive — a certain object 0 such that there is 
something it is like for X to be X. In other words, 0 appears to X in a specific 
way determined by P[n]_ How 0 appears to X constitutes X's view V (the 
perception and/or conception) of 0 — VO[n]. Usually, what we are directly 
aware of is merely VO[n] but not P[n] in our everyday life. We do not 
normally look back on the pre-conditions that determine our view. Let us call 
X's looking back, i.e. the attempt of revealing, clarifying, explicating and 
justifying, on its viewpoint P[n] which determines a specific view VO[n], 
reflection64. The n attached to P and V 0 can be substituted by 0 and any 
argument. 
64 Here, the term "reflection" is employed in a rather strict sense, limiting only to the deliberation that 
takes one's current view and its corresponding viewpoint as its objects. In this sense, the calculation of 
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positive integer, representing the level of reflection. V0[0 ] represents the 
primordial view of X on the pre-reflective level, i.e. the view before any 
reflection takes place. P[0], accordingly, represents the pre-conditions which 
determines one's pre-reflective view of the object V0[0] . On this level, V0 [0 ] 
appears to represent what 0 really is, and no consideration of P[0] is made. 
Two very important points should be noted. On the one hand, there is 
not any implication on the substantial content of V0[0] . That a specific 
perception and conception is the pre-reflective view o f X implies nothing about 
what its content is，i.e. how 0 appears to X. For different viewers, their 
starting points are individual and hence the specific content of their views 
varies. An Aborigine in Africa who thinks there are gods in all trees and 
animals has a different pre-reflective view from that of a Chinese scientist. 
The picture of the world which people in the pre-Newtonian era endorsed pre-
reflectively is to a large extent different from that of any modern man who 
accepts the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. However, whether a 
view is pre-reflective is not determined by its content, but by the fact that it is 
the view of a particular individual before he reflects upon it. > 
On the other hand, whether a view is pre-reflective must be determined : 
reflectively, i.e. from a reflective point of view. The revelation that V0[0 ] is 
i 
determined by P[0], that 0 appears to X in such a way because X views 0 
from P[0], is itself the product ofX's reflection. In other words, it is also a 
view of X，which presupposes another viewpoint. It is from this new, reflective 
viewpoint that X comes to know how the former view V0[0] is derived from its 
corresponding viewpoint P[0]. Let us call this new, reflective viewpoint P[1], 
indicating that it is the viewpoint which facilitates its first-level reflection (i.e. 
the reflection upon its pre-reflective view), and its corresponding view (that 
V0[0 ] is the product of P[0]) VO[1]. P[0], V0[0] and their relation become 
the content of VO[1]. As soon as we get here, we, interestingly enough, 
have already formed a new view on a even more reflective level VO[2]，which 
is constituted by our awareness and apprehension of the respective nature 
and relation between P[1] and VO[1]. 
Before its reflection, X takes V0[0] as representing what 0 really is, or 
the sum 23 + 12 = ？ is not reflection, while thinking about what a sum is, how the sign "+" operates 
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the reality of 0 . Holding VO[1], X learns that V0[0] is the product of P[0]. 
Though it does not directly entail that V0[0] is merely the product of P[0] and 
no more, revealing nothing about what 0 is in itself, it leaves room for the 
possibility that V0[0] represents only how 0 appears to us from P[0]. It is 
possible that V0[0] is just valid for X. Another reflective being which is 
different from X may view 0 differently. In order to ensure that its view is true, 
X must try to understand the preconditions on which its view is based. On the 
one hand, it tries to minimize the possible "distortion" due to its specific 
>1 
physiological and psychological constitution. On the other hand, it must f 
examine the given set of primary beliefs which it inherits from its specific 
culture, and sees whether any of them are problematic and need to be revised 
or, when necessary, abandoned. As a result, X is supposed to get a truer 
view of 0 after subtracting those specific elements. 
According to Nagel, this advancement in the level of reflection is in fact 
advancement in the level of objectivit/^. It means that VO[1], apart from 
being of a higher level of reflection, is more objective than V0[0]. P[1], then, | 
is a more objective viewpoint in relation to P[0]. How is that so? In what 
way is a more reflective viewpoint more objective? What exactly is meant by | 
"objective"? Nagel writes: | 
ff 
An advance in objectivity requires that already existing forms of 
understanding should themselves become the objects of a new 
form of understanding, which also takes in the objects of the 
original forms. This is true of any objective step, even if it does 
not reach the more ambitious goal of explaining itself. All 
advances in objectivity subsume our former understanding under 
a new account of our mental relation to the wor ld^ 
As we have seen, our reflection presses us to question whether what 
we take to be true is just true for us, and we do not want it to be the case. We 
want to take a certain view as true because it represents what is the case 
(whatever it means) independent of my believing it. To achieve this, we must 
show that our pre-reflective view V0[0] is not just true for us. We must show 
and how it is possible for us to engage in calculation is. 
65 In this chapter, we only concem about objectivity and subjectivity of views and viewpoints. How 
they are applied to reality will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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that V0 [0 ] is true for all other reflective beings because it represents the real 
nature of 0 . We must show that though V0[0] is obtained through P0[0], it is 
not just an elaboration of and is not "corrupted" or "contaminated" by P0[0]. 
We do this by stepping back and examining both V0[0] and P0[0], and during 
the examination, we justify V0[0] as far as possible and, when necessary, 
correct any possible distorted elements in it: 
It is recognized that one's own point of view can be distorted as a 
result of contingencies of one's makeup or situation. To ( 
compensate for these distortions it is necessary either to reduce \ 
dependence on those forms of perception of judgement in which 
they are most marked, or to analyze the mechanisms of 
distortion and discount for them explicitly.®^ 
The revised view VO[1] is thus less determined by our particularity 
than V0[0] . Of course, VO[1] itself is still derived from something particular to 
us — PO[1], and so the possibility of distortion is always there and further 
reflection is needed. The ideal aim is to achieve an undistorted view of 0 — a j 
'f 
view that is not merely internal to our particular viewpoint and that is to be ( 
achieved by detaching as far as possible from our particularity. This ^ 
1 
"externality" or "detachment", according to Nagel, is the essential character of 丨 
objectivity: ‘ 
...Its essential character，in all the examples cited, is externality 
or detachment. The attempt is made to view the world not from a 
place within it, or from nowhere in particular and no form of life in 
particular at all. The object is to discount for the features of our 
pre-reflective outlook that make things appear to us as they do, 
and thereby to reach an understanding of things as they really 
are. We flee the subjective under the pressure of an assumption 
that everything must be something not to any point of view, but in 
itself. To grasp this by detaching more and more form our own 
point of view is the unreachable ideal at which the pursuit of 
objectivity a ims， 
We can observe a special characteristic of our pursuit of objectivity. 
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cr^  
Objectivity, according to Nagel, is basically "a method of understanding". 
The pursuit of objectivity is driven by our desire to understand the ways the 
world and we ourselves are and what we should do independent of any 
particular viewpoint. Once we recognize the possibility of the falsity of our 
beliefs, we, as long as we are rational reflective beings, cannot but try to 
search for a view that can better represent the reality. Throughout the 
process of reflection, we form more and more objective views VO[2], VO[3], 
VO[4] and so on. The aim is to form “the view from nowhere", a view from no 
particular viewpoint. It is only an unattainable ideal that provides the direction f 
for our pursuit since, as we have mentioned, nothing can view without any 
pre-conditions. 丨 
Only against the background of this process of objective 丨 
advancement can we understand what subjectivity is. From the above 
discussion, we can see the relative character of objectivity. It does not make 
sense to ask whether a particular view VOa, with all its content known, is ^ 
objective in itself. A view is objective only in relation to another with which it 
is compared: I j： 1 
i 
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it 
relies less on the specifics of the individual's makeup and 
position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of 
creature he is. ^° 
Similarly, we can say that a view or a viewpoint is more subjective 
than another if it relies more on the specifics of the individuars makeup and 
position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of creature he 
is. VO[1] (and P[1]), then, is more subjective in relation to VO[2] (P[2]); it is 
more subjective in that it is to a greater extent derived from and determined by 
the particularity of X. It is, however, compatible with the fact that VO[1] (P[1]) 
is more objective than V0[0] (P[0]). 
Objectivity, in this sense, can be understood as a process of 
transcendence of one's own previous views and viewpoints. However, we 
should be careful not to confuse it with subjective transcendence. 
69 VFN, p. 4. 
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It must be distinguished from a different kind of transcendence by 
which one enters imaginatively into other subjective points of 
view, and tries to see how things appear from other specific 
standpoints. Objective transcendence aims at a representation 
of what is external to each specific point of view: what is there or 
what is of value in itself, rather than foranyone7^ 
Here, Nagel is contrasting objectivity with another method of understanding. 
Besides being an attribute of views and viewpoints, subjectivity, like objectivity, 
can also be understood as a method of understanding. If we want to 
i 
understand the objective nature of an external object，the best way is to try to ！ j 
form a more detached 一 not only from my viewpoint but also as many as 
I, 
possible 一 view. The more detached our view is, the more accurate it 
represents the real nature of the object. However, sometimes the object of 
understanding is of a different nature. If we want to understand how a piece of ！ 
beef tastes to a sheep (which won't probably enjoy it), we must try to leave our 5 
own human point of view and imagine from the viewpoint of a sheep as far as 
possible. Generally speaking, in understanding appearance, what we can get 
from detachment is simply not what we want. Instead, we should employ a 
different method in a totally opposite direction, i.e. subjective imagination. \ 
According to it，we should try our best to engage in the particular viewpoint | 
If 
involved — identify all the preconditions of the viewer and think and imagine 
with them. Only through this method can we make sense of views alien to 
ours. 
We should be vigilant that objectivity is not and cannot be reduced to 
intersubjectivity. It may be true that a more objective viewpoint should be 
accessible to more different sorts of viewers than a relatively more subjective 
one since it relies less on the particularity of its viewer. However, it does not 
mean that an objective viewpoint is constituted of what are common to most of 
the more subjective viewpoints. An objective viewpoint is not obtained by 
taking common factors among different subjective viewpoints: 
...the transition to a more objective viewpoint is not 
accomplished merely through intersubjective agreement. Nor 
°^ Ibid., p. 5. 
71 "Subjective and Objective,inM0, p. 209. 
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does it proceed by an increase of imaginative scope that 
provides access to many subjective points of view other than 
one's own. Its essential character, in all the examples cited, is 
externality or detachment7^ 
It is possible that an comparatively more objective view VO[9] (of a viewer Xa) 
may not be accessible to some beings Xb which, because of their constitution, 
are only capable of viewing the world from P[4] (of Xa). It is possible that Xa 
does not possess any essential elements constituting P[9]. 
Besides being relative, the distinction between subjective and | 
objective is not all-or-nothing, but, in Nagel's term, a "polarity": ^ 
'i 
.i< 
At one end is the point of view of a particular individual, having a | 
specific constitution, situation, and relation to the rest of the ； 
world. From here the direction of movement toward greater ‘ 
objectivity involves, first, abstraction from the individual's specific ] 
spatial, temporal, and personal position in the world, then from , 
the features that distinguish him form other humans, then 丨 
gradually from the forms of perception and action characteristic 
of humans, and away from the narrow range of a human scale in 
space, time, and quantity, toward a conception of the world which 
as far as possible is not the view from anywhere within it. There | 
is probably no end-point to this process, but its aim is to regard ‘ 
the world as centerless, with the viewer as just one of its I 
contents.73 ‘ 
In other words, the distinction is really "a matter of degree". V[1] is 
more objective than V[0], but V[2] is even more objective than V[1]. It follows 
that a view can be objective without being completely detached from any 
particularity of the viewer. Only absolute objectivity, i.e. the view from 
nowhere, requires complete detachment. 
If we understand this, we can see why a certain form of argument 
against the pursuit of objectivity misses the point. In his paper "Solidarity or 
Objectivity?"^^, Richard Rorty urges us to abandon the pursuit of objectivity 
and be content with an ethnocentric solidarity internal to a given community of 
72 "Subjective and Objective", mMQ , p. 208. 
73 "Subjective and objective", mMQ, p. 206. 
74 Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.21-34. 
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a particular culture. His central claim is that for a Realist, one who engages in 
the pursuit of objectivity, the whole point of philosophical thought is to detach 
oneself from any particular community and look down at it from a ahistorical, 
transcultural and universal viewpoint. However, since we are people of a 
particular historical epoch and culture, and our reflection must be based on 
what we have inherited, there is no such universal viewpoint which is 
detached from all cultural and historical contingencies. Therefore, we are 
condemned to be ethnocentric and should content with achieving solidarity 
I 
within our ethnos. f 
f I 
The argument would be sound only if we take the distinction between 
subjective and objective as an either-or dichotomy. Assume that we cannot ； 
occupy an absolutely universal viewpoint on the obvious ground that we | 
•i 
'.[ 
cannot in fact escape our contingencies completely. What does it entail? It at ‘: 
most entails that we cannot occupy an absolutely objective viewpoint. 
However, as we have seen, "subjective" and "objective" are relative concepts, 
and they are not all-or-nothing but admit of degree. Accordingly, the pursuit of 
objectivity does not require the possibility of achieving absolute detachment. It 
;i 
requires only that we can take a more detached viewpoint with respect to ^ 
where we viewed the world before. Unless it is shown that we can never i 
detach from our former viewpoint, or that a clear limit of such detachment can 
be set, it is groundless to disprove the pursuit of objectivity. To say that we 
should not pursue objectivity since we can never pursue absolute objectivity is 
as absurd as saying that we should abandon our goal of getting a higher mark 
in the examination since we cannot get the highest mark. 
To close this section, let me emphasize two special and original 
features of Nagel's conception of objectivity that we should always bear in 
mind. Firstly, Nagel only gives a formal characterization of what objectivity per 
se is. All that he specifies is just the essential character of objectivity, i.e. 
detachment (or externality). A viewpoint Pa is more objective than another Pb 
if and only if it is more detached, i.e. relies less on the particularity of its 
corresponding viewer. There is no a priori limitation on the substantial content 
of objectivity. Specifically, there need not be just one kind of objectivity, 
physical or whatever. Nagel's characterization leaves much room for different 
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interpretation of objectivity with regard to different realms of enquiry. Both our 
enquiries of what the world is and what we should do should be in some 
sense objective, but they need not require the same kind of objectivity. It is 
exactly one of Nagel contributions that he tries his very best to explore the 
different possibilities of interpretation of objectivity that are appropriate to 
every specific subject. 
Secondly, Nagel is correct in reminding us that though objectivity is 
basically a method of understanding, that our pursuit of objectivity is primarily ^ 
driven by our desire of understanding, there is no guarantee that an objective [ 
r: i., 
understanding is always the best method of understanding everything in the 
:(• 
world. On the one hand, some portions of reality may be essentially ； 
s 
subjective and thus any objective understanding of them is inappropriate and : 
H 
condemned to distorting their real nature. On the other hand, there are ;; 
'i: 
probably an unimaginably huge amount of things in the world that cannot be 
fully understood even from the most objective viewpoint we can ever occupy, 
'i 
given the finitude of human beings. It can even be acknowledged from our 
objective viewpoint. These will be further elaborated and justified in Chapter 3. ！ 
f ^ 
'f 
2.3 The Existence of the Two Viewpoints as a Constitutive Fact of 
Reflective Human Beings 
So far we have examined what a viewpoint is and what is meant by the 
distinction of the subjective and the objective viewpoint. In this section, I will 
try to show that the existence of our capability of viewpoint the same object 
from viewpoints of different levels of objectivity is a constitutive fact of 
reflective human beings. 
It is quite obvious that we reflective human beings are capable of 
viewing the world and our life from both a more personal, subjective and a 
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relatively more objective viewpoints, and conflicting views are always resulted. 
On the one hand, it is simply undeniable that in our everyday life, everything 
in the world, including ourselves, appears to us in one way or other. A 
conscious being must have a viewpoint, and there must be something it is like 
to be it. In other words, every conscious being must at least have a certain 
pre-reflective view, even if it may contain just some perception. Otherwise, it 
can be in no way counted as conscious at all. Even a bat, in this sense, has a 
view. If we admit that we are conscious being, we must a!so admit that we 
are capable of viewing the world. 
>’\ 
Besides, it also seems to be an intuitive fact that we can and do view V 
our current view from a more objective viewpoint. Although most of the u 
animals, while being conscious, cannot (as far as we know) form beliefs and 
hence cannot reflect upon their own views, we human beings can. We 
sometimes wonder whether what we believe is true and what we do is right, 5： 
and we reflect upon them. Can we doubt rationally whether a reflective being j 
can occupy a more objective viewpoinP? Suppose I hold the view that |; 
(a) All reflective beings can step back to examine the view and their i； 
corresponding viewpoint they currently hold from a more 
objective viewpoint. 
and give my argument for it, and you doubt it. What is necessary in order 
that your doubt is intelligible and not merely an utterance formed by adding 
the phrase “I doubt that" before (a)? Of course, you cannot doubt anything 
rationally without given any reason for it, so you have to make your argument. 
What kind of reason will you give? You must give an explanation of what is 
wrong with my view. You must at the very least show that I have made some 
logical mistakes in my deduction or that I have misunderstood or confused 
some of the key terms. In other words, you must show that (a), which is from 
your viewpoint either false or non-sensible, appears to me to be true only 
because I hold a particular set of beliefs, some of which are false or non-
sensible. Your view is better in that it does not commit to the same mistakes 
75 By "an objective viewpoint", I do mean "the absolutely objective viewpoint". It is clear that not all 
reflective beings can view from the absolutely objective viewpoint, since nothing can view from such a 
viewpoint to form the "view from nowhere". 
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I have made. Besides, your reason cannot be just "since I believe it so". If 
you really want to convince anybody, your claim cannot be just true to you; it 
cannot merely be a product of your point of view. It follows that your doubt, if 
it is rational, must be made from a more detached viewpoint than mine and 
your own personal one，taking both of them as the objects of understanding. 
What else can it be but an objective viewpoint? If your doubt is rational at all, 
it must be made from a more objective viewpoint. Therefore, the fact that you 
can doubt (a) presupposes that, at the very least，you yourself are a reflective 
1 
being which can view from an objective viewpoint. ‘ 
« 
What does it mean? It means that you must show that there are some 
reflective beings that are so different from you that they are reflective but 
cannot occupy an objective viewpoint. In other words, you must show that 
there is at least one being which can engage in what you are doing, i.e. 
reflecting upon his own view or those of others, but cannot do so from a more 
objective viewpoint. Can anyone provide any argument for that?丨 think not, | 
since any reflection, as your doubt about (a), is necessarily performed from an | 
objective viewpoint. To sum up, all reflective beings are capable of viewing ！ 
the world and reflecting upon this view and its corresponding viewpoint from a 1： 
more detached viewpoint. In this sense, a being is a reflective being only if it j, 
f 
can view a given object from both a subjective and an objective viewpoint. It 
follows that the capability of viewing the same object from both a subjective 
and an objective viewpoint is the fundamental feature of all reflective beings; 
this capability is a constitutive fact of all reflective beings, including most 
human beings. 
In this chapter, we have seen how Nagel establishes his conception of 
viewpoint in terms of the subjective-objective distinction. In the following 
chapter,丨 will examine how the distinction is applied to another pillar of the 
Nagelian project — reality. With a proper understanding of Nagel's 
conception of the subjective-objective distinction regarding both viewpoint and 
reality, we can in a better position to understand the real nature of the conflict 
between the subjective and the objective view, why the conflict is so 
intractable and hence appreciate the contribution of Nagel. 
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3 
REALITY 
The ultimate end of the intellectual activities of human beings is to find 
out what the reality is. Here, reality is employed in the broadest sense ^ 
(i 
possible, referring to all that is really the case. Questions about reality can be 
roughly classified into two groups: what there really is and what we really 
should do. Pre-reflectively, we have some views about the world and our 
life, which are specific to our pre-reflective viewpoint. Under certain 
circumstances, especially when we discover problems with our pre-reflective 
views, we may question our beliefs of what there is and what we should do. j 
To make sure that what we believe represents what is really the case, we [ 
examine the view and the particular viewpoint presupposed by it. According || 
to Nagel, our transcendence to a more objective viewpoint is driven by our |; 
impulse to understand reality, i.e. to understand whether our view formerly | 
held represents what the world really is and what we should really do. 
Nevertheless, it may not always be the case that what is real equals to what is 
obtained from the most objective point of view; some portion of reality may be 
intrinsically subjective and can only be understood from a more subjective 
viewpoint. This produces a tension between the two views, which is 
underlined by our natural inclination of obtaining a unified conception of 
reality. As a result, our pursuit of "a highly unified conception of life and the 
world always leads to philosophical mistakes—to false reductions or to the 
refusal to recognize part of what is real"^®. 
We have already seen that Nagel thinks the source of philosophical 
perplexities is the conflict between the subjective and the objective viewpoint. 
Why is such conflict so important? Why can't we just put them aside, or 
taking either of them as the correct view? The answer Nagel provides can be 
76 VFN, p. 3. 
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stated briefly as follows. We can understand the world or our life only by 
having a view of them. Though one's view is determined by the particularity 
of the viewpoint, it is always a view of what is really the case. Since both 
objective detachment and subjective imagination are only methods of 
understanding reality, there is no guarantee that either of them alone is 
adequate or appropriate for us to conceive and understand all that is real. It 
may be that parts of reality can be best understood from the most objective 
viewpoint, while others can only be comprehended from subjective 
perspectives of different degree. Still, due to our specific constitution — ” 
i;i 
physical, psychological and cultural — there is probably a very large portion of | 
reality that is not even conceivable to us. All that is said above amounts to 
saying that there are different kinds ofreality. "What is really the case" admits |:. 
different interpretations. X and Y can both be real without being real in the 
same way. Only against this conception of reality can we understand why the 
conflict between the two views are so difficult to resolve and yet disposable, j 
and why we cannot just get rid of them. [；： 
In this chapter, we will examine Nagel's conception of reality. It will be [i 
divided into four sections. In section 3.1，we will discuss Nagel's unique ？; 
i-^ 
interpretation of "reality". Then, we will examine how he justifies the |：| 
intelligibility of the idea of subjective and objective reality against some ‘ 
counter-argument in section 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, in section 3.4，we will 
discuss the inescapability of the two ideas. Together they will path the way for 
our discussion on the nature of the conflict between the subjective and the 
objective viewpoint. 
3.1 Reconsidering Realitv 
In this section, I will examine Nagel's conception of reality. I will 
analyse his concept of reality and show what his realism claims and how it 
leaves room for the objective and subjective reality. 
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3.11 Realism, Pan-objectivism and Pan-subjectivism 
Contemporary philosophical discussion about reality focuses on the 
fundamental question concerning the criteria ofreality, i.e. how something can 
be said to be real. According to Nagel, there are mainly two attitudes or 
approaches which attempt to put an end to the enquiry: scientism and 
idealism. While the former claims to have solved the problem, the latter 
>1 
maintains that there is in fact no real problem to solve, i.e. the ontological j； 
problem is simply dissolved. 
Scientism is the approach that claims to have solved the problem by 
providing a theory for what there is. It asserts that reality is just scientific — 
ultimately physical — reality, and anything that cannot be discovered and 
understood through our method of empirical science does not exist. 
Regarding any object 0，scientism proposes the criteria that 0 is real only if it I 
is understandable with scientific concepts, theories and methods. In its most ^ 
extreme version like logical positivism， it maintains that all talks about !i 
empirically unobservable entities and facts are simply nonsensical. In a word, 
as Nagel writes: [： 
r ‘ 
...[scientism] assumes that everything there is must be 
understandable by the employment of scientific theories like 
those we have developed to date — physics and evolutionary 
biology are the current paradigms — as if the present age were 
not just another in the se r ies " 
On the other hand,idealism is roughly the approach according to 
which "what there is and how things are cannot go beyond what we could in 
principle think about.”?® To put it formally, an idealist claims that 0 is real only 
if it is conceivable to human thought. If an ontological discussion aims at 
discovering the fundamental nature and structure of reality that is independent 
of any human form of perception and cognition, the idealist approach tells us 
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that there is no point of doing so because "the idea of something that we 
could not think about or conceive of makes no sense"^^. Once we have a 
proper appreciation of the condition of thought, we will see that we simply 
cannot think intelligibly about an independent reality. All we can get is just a 
more refined description of a world for us. 
Nagel explicitly writes against these two attitudes in The View From 
Nowhere，While scientism (regarding its content alone) rejects the reality of 
the subjective realm and/or reduces it to objective reality, idealism denounced 
* 
the very idea of viewpoint-independent objective reality as meaningless. 丨 
i;: 
Since scientism is only one form of expression of a more general impulse，and 1 
i'' 
"idealism" is rather confusing due to its ambiguous usage throughout the 
history of philosophy,丨 want to introduce the terms Pan-objectivism and Pan-
subjectivism for the sake of our discussion. By Pan-objectivism, I refer to the 
attitude that everything real is ultimately objective, i.e. not related to any 
viewpoint. According to it，reality is just objective reality, and what is 
I 
subjective is merely appearance and thus cannot be real. Scientism, in a 『 
sense, is a specific version of it, which interprets objectivity as merely physical | 
objectivity. Pan-objectivism need not take this form, and can admit that there ；： 
are other forms of objectivity, but it does maintain that what is real and what is p z 
essentially subjective are mutually exclusive. In Nagel's words, Pan-
objectivism represents the fundamental belief of people "who believe it 
[objectivity] can provide a complete view of the world on its own, replacing the 
subjective views from which it has developed"^^ On the other hand,丨 call the 
contrary attitude Pan-subjectivism^l According to it, everything real is 
ultimately subjective — i.e. things can be intelligibly said to be real only if they 
are viewable (perceivable and/or conceivable) to us^^. Any talk about 
79 Jbid., p. 90. 
80 See the Introduction of VFN. 
81 VFN, p.5 
82 The distinction between Pan-objectivism and Pan-subjectivism is only roughly drawn, putting aside 
details of the sophisticated relation between the two. For example, it is possible that Pan-objectivism 
can be in some sense interpreted as a special form of Pan-subjectivism, as what Nagel has done to 
scientism, and the content of the former may resist such assimilation. However, for the sake of 
discussion, let us first put this question aside, and consider them to be contrary to each other, i.e. they 
can both be false but cannot both be true. 
83 In this sense, we can say that although scientism claims to represent the independent reality, it is just 
"a special form idealism, for it puts one type ofhuman understanding in charge of the universe and 
what can be said about". Therefore, in attacking scientism, Nagel always takes it as a particular version 
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viewpoint-independent reality is either referring to a viewpoint implicitly or 
simply meaningless. In other words, Pan-subjectivists "don't regard it 
[objectivity] as a method of understanding the world as it is in itself^^. 
According to Nagel, objectivity as method of understanding is overrated by the 
former and underrated by the latter, and both of them "stem from an 
insufficiently robust sense of reality and of its independence of any particular 
form of human u n d e r s t a n d i n g，A s opposing to them, Nagel's realism 
asserts both the objective and the subjective reality. The price for this realist .. 
attitude is the uneasy admittance of the existence of facts which are i l … 
,..i 
inaccessible in a strong sense, i.e. inconceivable in principle, to us human 
beings. Accordingly, both the Pan-objectivist and the Pan-subjectivist 
approaches, claiming to cover all that is real, are wrong in cutting the universe 
down to size. 
We should remember that, all Pan-objectivism, Pan-subjectivism and 
/ 
realism, are only general attitudes of conceiving reality; they only represent 、/ 
what one takes reality ultimately to be — which (all, some or no) part of reality '( 
fi 
is mind-dependent or mind-independent. They in themselves do not imply 1丨 
any specific limitation on the substantial content of what reality consists of. ;[ 
ff 
Being a realist, one can endorse a monist, dualist or pluralist position, and ；： 
believe either everything is material or there are minds in addition to physical 
objects. Similarly, a Pan-objectivist can be a physicalist, functionalist or 
eliminative materialist, while a Pan-subjectivist can hold either that only what 
is physical exists (i.e. scientism), or that everything, from a tree to a university, 
is just cultural and social construction. 
3.12 Reality and Appearance 
To defend Nagel's realist position, we must first clarify what he means 
by reality. We can do so by answering the question: What is the relation 
between reality and appearance? On the one hand, Nagel contrasts reality 
of idealism. . 
84 VFN, p. 5. 
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with appearance, as he writes on the issues of personal identity: 
There must be a notion of objectivity which applies to the self, to 
phenomenological qualities, and to other mental categories, for it 
is clear that the idea of a mistake with regard to my own personal 
identity, or with regard to the phenomenological quality of an 
experience, makes sense...there is a distinction between 




It means that reality is different from appearance. What is real must be in 
some sense objective, and cannot be merely what appears to a particular 
viewpoint (or viewpoints). It seems to imply that what is real is not 
appearance, and what is regarded as appearance cannot be real. On the 
other hand, Nagel clearly holds that "[a]ppearance and perspective are i 
i'' 
essential parts of what there is，’®?. How can we reconcile these two views? ,、 
‘丨丨 
According to our common usage, an appearance is usually an ?；, 
il' 
appearance ofan object 0 to a viewer X，who views from a certain viewpoint ,丨丨 
丨“ 
— a set of pre-conditions for viewing 0 . It is，conceived from the side of the 【 
object, the way in which 0 appears — is revealed — to X. In fact, if we ” 
speak from the side of the viewer, the appearance of 0 to X is what X obtains 
when it views (perceives and/or conceives) 0，i.e. X's view of 0 V 0 (see 
chapter 2). Two points should be noted here. On the one hand, the talk of 
appearance is intelligible only in relation to a viewer. There can be 
appearance only if there is a viewer to which 0 appears. If there is no viewer 
or no conscious being at all, there can be no appearance. The existence of 
the appearance of 0 to X consists in what it is like for X to view 0 . 
On the other hand, there is no a priori limit on the nature of 0 . That 
is, the notion of "the appearance of 0 ” in no way implies what 0 is. It only 
implies that something is perceived and/or conceived in a certain way by a 
viewer. The meaning of this is threefold. Firstly, 0 need not be a physical 
85 Ibid" 
86 VFN, p. 36. 
87 VFN, p. 4. It will be further discussed in the next section. 
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entity, or something external to X. The "something" that is viewed may be a 
fact, a value or even a theory, unless there is an argument showing that it 
cannot be. Secondly, 0 itself can also be an appearance. In this case, the 
viewer is not viewing something other than that which is represented by the 
particular appearance. Consider the case of pain. A pain is essentially a 
pain appearing to a conscious being. It is, however, not an appearance of 
something else. Pain is just the sensation of pain, the appearance itself. 
What a pain is is exactly how it appears to a viewer, i.e. how the viewer 
senses it. According to Nagel, this is true of all kinds of sensation: 丨丨 
L:| 
•5i r'' 
In the case of sensation, the reality is itself a form of appearance, 
and the distinction one between real appearance and apparent 
appearance...Similarity or difference of sensations is similarity or 




Thirdly, the fact that V 0 is the appearance of 0 to X does not imply that it 
1 
cannot also represent what 0 is in itself. It is true that the substantial content ; 
.(‘• 
of VO is determined by the viewpoint of X, but it is not obvious that the former ;? 
is solely determined by the latter，i.e. VO can be nothing but how 0 appears 丨：丨 
to X. VO always claims to represent what is really the case about 0 in intent. 
Though it is false that all different (and even conflicting) views of 0 of 
different viewers represent how 0 is independent of its being viewed, it is 
always reasonable to assume that some are (or at least one is), unless it is 
shown that such assumption is wrong or does not make sense. 
If an appearance is essentially related to a viewpoint, reality can then 
be understood as what is independent of any viewpoint. What is real is not 
just what is the case from a particular viewpoint. Nor is the concept of reality 
exhausted by what is commonly agreed from all viewpoints. The reality of an 
object is the mode of its existence in itself and not from any viewpoint. 
However, if reality is independent of our viewpoint, and appearance is 
essentially related to it, how can appearance be part of reality? Are they not 
mutually exclusive? What is meant by saying that the reality of sensation 
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itself is a form of appearance? 
When we talk about reality, we may take reality as referring to the 
aspect of an object that is independent of any viewpoint. Given an object 0， 
we can describe its different aspects and properties. Consider the case of a 
stool. Suppose we describe it in the following way: it is brown in colour, with 
a square flat top, made of wood and with its specific function: for people to sit 
on. Although they are correct, these descriptions may be regarded as 
representing only how the particular object appears to us human beings with 
our specific viewpoint. The object in itself, i.e. as it is independent from any '! 
particular viewpoint, is different from how it appears. In reality, i.e. detached 
from and independent of any viewpoints, it is composed of numerous tiny 
particles and void. This can be conceived even by creatures that do not 
shared our viewpoint, while the former descriptions are meaningless for 
those intelligent beings which have neither vision nor hips by constitution. In : 
I" 
this sense, we are indeed talking about the objective reality, i.e. the 丨 
.、丨 
independent existence of the stool of any viewpoint. Since the stool is an 
! 
objective entity in the external world, the objective reality of the stool equals 】 
to its reality. That means, while it is in itself made up of tiny particles, it only -“ 
appears to us as having colours and with certain functions. These colours j' 
and functions as appearing to us are not the intrinsic properties of the stool, 
though the structural properties that give rise to them are®®. When we 
consider external objects (things or facts), we always want to know what they 
are as they are independent ofany viewpoint. 
However, it does not imply that reality is exhausted by objective reality 
in all cases. Pre-reflectively, we all believe that there is an external world that 
exists even if there is nothing to think about it. The world is an objective world 
in the sense that it does not depend on any conscious beings in order to exist. 
However, when we take "the world" as the totality of all that is the case, all that 
is real, there is no reason to exclude the possibility of subjective reality in 
advance®®. What is real need not be objective, i.e. independent of any 
88 VFN, p. 36. 
89 Of course, a stool is a stool only if it is understood within a socio-cultural context. In this example, 
however, the word "stool" is used only as a name to fix the reference, referring to that object. 
9° This is, of course, just one sense of"world". Phenomenologists, for example, take it to mean 
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viewpoint. There are things or facts that are so obvious to us that any denial 
of their reality seems to be incredible. On the one hand, it is an intuitively 
unrevisable fact that there are viewpoints in the world — otherwise, even the 
thought that the world is just an objective world is impossible — and they are 
of course not independent of viewpoint. On the other hand, although, as 
mentioned in the above example, the stool is not brown in itself, it is a fact that 
it appears to me as brown. The existence of appearance is as real as the fact 
that the stool is made up of particles, but it simply does not make sense to say ., 
'•f 
that it is a fact independent of any viewpoint — since an appearance must be 1 
t: 
an appearance to a viewpoint. How, then can we say that it is also real? S 
•1 '• 
Here, we should carefully distinguish between two senses of "an 
object's independence of any v i ewpo in t . In a strict sense, we can take it to 
mean that the object in itself is in no way related to any viewpoint. Its 
existence does not require and is not determined by any viewpoint. It exists 
I' 
even if there is no viewpoint and viewing being in the world. Pre-reflectively, 「 V 
mountains, trees, rocks and all the non-conscious natural physical objects are 丨 
1 , 
independent of any viewpoint in this sense. On the other hand, in a relatively 丨 
] '• 
loose sense, we can also mean that the existence of the object itself does not i[ 
'‘f: 
require any viewer to view it. It may be related to a viewpoint in the way that ；； 
the viewpoint is a constituent part of the object. Consider the case of "seeing 
a patch of red". As a conscious activity, it essentially related to the viewer who 
sees this patch of red. Without any viewpoint, there can be no possible sense 
we can make of this description. The existence of this activity, however, does 
not require any further viewpoint to which it appears. Even if there is nothing 
in this world viewing the fact that the viewer sees a patch of red, the fact is real 
nonetheless, provided that that viewer exists. Though it is not objectively 
real, unless we assume that what is real must be objective, it seems artificial 
and groundless to claim that this kind of facts is not real. Therefore, though 
the stool is not really brown in itself and, in a strict sense, "a brown stool" is 
just an appearance to a certain viewpoint, this very appearance itself, the fact 
"horizon", i.e. the background upon which objects appear. I think they are not incompatible and both 
of them reveal certain aspects ofthe concept. 
91 In this chapter, we are concerned about metaphysical objectivity (and subjectivity), as contrasting 
with epistemological objectivity (and subjectivity) in chapter 2. 
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that the stool appears to a certain viewer as brown is not a further appearance 
to any other viewpoints but is real in its own right. 
Accordingly, in the loose sense, we can still say that such subjective 
facts are viewpoint-independent. By that 丨 mean though any appearance is 
essentially related to some viewpoints, the existence of such facts of 
appearance is independent of any other viewpoint from which they are viewed. 
Though the viewpoint to which the object/appearance appears is part of the 
fact an object 0 appears to a viewpoint P in a specific way V0 , this fact itself ;'^  
need not be viewed from another viewpoint in order that it is real. In this ' 
sense, appearance is also part of reality. Therefore, in describing the world as 
a whole, we must include, besides those objective entities or facts that are 
independent of any viewpoint, the subjective reality of viewpoints and the 
appearances derived from them. To confine reality as only either objective or 
subjective reality in advance is to cut the universe down in size: 
h 
H / 
The subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible feature of 
reality...and it must occupy as fundamental a place in any ] 
credible world view as matter, energy, space, time, and i 
numbers...92 :E 
. .i" 
We have seen how Nagel's conception of reality can allow room for 
the possibility of both the objective and the subjective reality. In section 3.2 
and 3.3, we will examine how Nagel's realism about subjective and objective 
reality is justified against his critics. I am going to discuss how Nagel shows 
that the admittance of both subjective and objective reality is more reasonable 
than the denial of either of them, and hence why realism of the objective and 
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3.2 Subjective Reality 
The subjective reality, if there is such thing, is the part of reality that is 
essentially related to a particular viewpoint. It is the kind offact that an object 
0 appears to a certain w.eviwX^that is subjectively real in the primary sense. 
Here, the term "fact" is NOT employed as opposing to "value". It is used in a 
very broad sense, including both descriptive facts 一 facts about what there is 
and evaluative facts — facts about what one should do. A fact is subjectively 
real if and only if it essentially involves a viewpoint (i.e. subjective) but its 
existence does not require a viewpoint from which it is viewed (i.e. real). 
I think the general argument of Pan-objectivism against the existence 
of subjective facts can be briefly stated as follows: 
0 A subjective fact essentially involves a viewpoint. 
0 Whatever essentially involves a viewpoint requires a viewpoint from 
which it is viewed. 
！ 
0 Anything whose existence consists in its being viewed from a : 
viewpoint is an appearance. 
It follows that: 
0 All subjective facts are appearance. 
Since: 
0 What is real is independent of any viewpoint 
It follows that: 
0 Appearance is not real. 
Therefore, 
© All subjective facts are not real. 
The argument is unsound, for it contains false premises and the conclusion 
can be derived from the premises only if we accept a groundlessly strict 
interpretation of "subjective fact", "appearance" and "reality". The crucial 
premise is G. It is important because it is the source of the whole 
misconception of the nature of subjective facts. Granted that both 0 and © 
92 VFN, p.26. 
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are true, 0 is acceptable only if © is also true. © is true only if there is just 
one form of involvement of a viewpoint in a given fact, namely an object's 
being viewed from a viewpoint. However, it is not true because obviously 
there is at least one other way in which a fact can involve a viewpoint, i.e. the 
fact itself is the existence of a viewpoint. The existence of a viewpoint 
essentially involves a viewpoint, but it need not be viewed from another 
viewpoint. It follows that though all appearance is subjective, it is not the case 
that all subjective facts are appearance, and thus © is also false. Even if 
appearance is not real, there is at least one kind of subject facts, namely the 
fact that viewpoints exist, which is not appearance and thus can be real. 
Worse than that, 0 itself is not justified unless a very strict 
interpretation of 0 — one that takes "independent" only in the strict sense, i.e. 
"an object is in no way related to any viewpoint" — is justified. As in 3.1，we 
have seen that "an object's being independent from any viewpoint" can be 
understood in the loose sense, meaning "no viewpoint from which the object 
is viewed is required". So even if both 0 and @ are true, © does not follow. It 
is not obvious that appearance cannot be real. The concept of reality does not i 
exclude appearance, and hence subjective facts, in advance. ；： 
Besides, Nagel provides a positive argument for the reality of 
subjective facts. He takes the subjective phenomena of consciousness as the 
starting point. He establishes them as an irreducible feature of reality in What 
is it like to be a bat?, and further develops a way to understand this kind of 
fact in The View from Nowhere. How does he accomplish this? 
Nagel attacks Pan-objectivism directly at its conclusion. He rejects 
Pan-objectivism not by showing that 0 does not follow from 0 - 0 , but, more 
fundamentally, by arguing that its central claim © should be rejected because 
it is intuitively unacceptable. According to Nagel, the existence of 
consciousness is，in my terminology, an intuitively undeniable fact, a fact that 
we cannot intelligibly doubt. The very act of doubting implies the existence of 
consciousness. The existence of consciousness involves essentially the fact 
that there is something like to be a certain viewer with a particular viewpoint. 
Even if the existence of consciousness is essentially related to a viewpoint, it 
does not require any viewpoint from which it is viewed. In other words, 
conscious activities of viewers exist even if there is no other conscious viewer 
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to view it. Accordingly, the existence of subjective facts of consciousness, 
says our sensation of pain, colour, sound, etc., are intuitively undeniable, 
though they may not really represent what is real about external objects. 
Though the chocolate cone may not really be sweet in itself, it is at least 
sweet for me, and this very fact is real. Compared with the premises of Pan-
objectivism, the recognition of the reality of subjective facts is much more 
straightforward and obvious: it presents itselfdirectly to us. 
Admitting the reality of subjective facts, Pan-objectivism may still be 
i^ 
justified if it can be shown that all these facts can be reduced to something 
objective. It can be done so if and only if it is possible to justify an objective 
account exhaustive of all the subjective facts. In particular, this approach, 
with its different variations — physicalism, behaviourism, functionalism or 
eliminative materialism, etc — has been dominating the discussion of 
philosophy of mind for the past decades in the Anglo-American world. One of 
Nagel's most controversial claims is precisely that the common source of all 
these reductionist theories — Pan-objectivism — simply misses the point, i.e. 





Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really 
intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the 
problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The 
recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several 
analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to 
explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, 
psychophysical identification，or reduction. But....what makes 
the mind-body problem unique....is i gno red . 
Reduction as an approach of understanding can sometimes be justified 
and does contribute greatly to our understanding of the physical world. The 
reduction of lightning to electrical discharge enables us to understand the 
phenomenon better. However, in reducing mental phenomena into something 
objective 一 e.g. brain states or external behaviour, something essential about 
93 "What is it Like to be a Bat?", MQ, p.l65. 
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these phenomena is ignored, and this is unjustified. Nagel's anti-reductionist 
argument can be formulated as follows. 
① Consciousness exists. 
② Consciousness has subjective character essentially.®^ 
③ What is essentially subjective cannot be adequately understood 
without taking its related viewpoint into account. 
④ An objective method of understanding is one which necessarily 
!,.,‘ 
abandons any viewpoint.^^ 1丨 
It follows that: 
⑤ What is essentially subjective cannot be adequately understood 
with an objective method of understanding 
Therefore: 
⑥ Consciousness cannot be adequately understood with an 
objective method of understanding. 
I r i 
The publication of "What is it like to be a bat?" invites numerous i 
k^ 
discussions and there are mainly two types of counter-argument against :[ 
Nagel's view, one being metaphysical and the other epistemological. While 
the former tries to show that there is no distinctive subjective fact about 
consciousness at all (i.e. against ②)，the latter attempts to prove that such 
subjective facts, even if they do exist, can be understood adequately with an 
objective method of understanding (i.e. against ③ ) . I n what follows, I would 
take the views of J. I. Biro^ and Jeff Foss^^ as the representatives of these 
two approaches respectively and argue that they are incorrect both in their 
interpretation ofand argument against Nagel. 
94lbid.,p.l66. 
95lbid.,p. 167. 
96 J. I. Biro, "Consciousness and Subjectivity", in Consciousness, E. Villanueva (ed.), Ridegeview, 
pp.113-133, 1991. 
97 JeffFoss, "On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject", Australasian Journal of 
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3.21 The Metaphysical argument 
No sensible people will seriously deny the existence of consciousness, 
since the very act of denying is itself a conscious process. However, one of 
the hottest debate in philosophy is about the nature of consciousness, the kind 
of existence consciousness is, and whether consciousness is in any sense a 
distinct and irreducible fact. Nagel tries to argue that consciousness is a 
unique kind of existence since it is essentially related to a viewpoint. As a 
I ； fl|i 
result, consciousness has a subjective character which can only be grasped f 
。• • 
by beings capable of taking up the viewpoint or the same type of viewpoint. It 
follows that any objective method of understanding which proceeds by 
abandoning any specific viewpoint will not grasp the complete nature of 
consciousness. 
Nagel's claim, naturally, invites attack from Pan-objectivists 一 those 
with the general attitude that anything real must be understandable through 
some objective means. The direct reaction to this is to claim that there is no 
such subjective fact at all - i.e. nothing is both real and essentially related to a i 
viewpoint: though there is consciousness, it is in no philosophically interesting 丨； 
sense subjective. 』 
, ,广丨 
In his paper "Consciousness and Subjectivity", J. I. Biro tries to 
establish his claim that regarding consciousness, either there is qualitative 
content but no subjectivity, or there is a trivial kind of subjectivity but no 
qualitative content, with his "Two Readings Argument". Biro's argument can 
be briefly stated as follows. According to Nagel, the subjectivity of 
consciousness is the consequence of its essential connection with a certain 
viewpoint. Since Nagel himself has never provided a clear explanation of his 
concept of viewpoint, Biro argues that there can be two possible readings of 
Nagel's concept of viewpoint, neither of them can establish the necessary 
connection between subjectivity and consciousness Nagel proposed. On the 
one hand, we can adopt a fixed reading of "X's viewpoint", according to which 
"X's viewpoint" denotes the location from which X views. X's viewpoint is fixed 
in the sense that the viewpoint Pa X occupies remains the same location even 
Philosophy 67, pp.305-320, 1989. 
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if X moves to another location Pb. In this case, X changes his viewpoint from 
Pa to Pb. Understood in this way, there is some qualitative content of X's view 
but nothing subjective, since there is no reason why a location occupied by a 
viewerXa cannot also be occupied by another viewerXb: 
Locations as such are in principle sharable by different 
observers, at least over time (and if they are thought of as non-
spatial, perhaps even at the same time). And whatever the 
physical possibilities, there is no problem with thinking of the |l： 
same location as occupied by different observers in different 
possible worlds.98 
On the other hand, we can adopt a portable reading of "X's viewpoint", 
according to which "X's viewpoint" is tied to the oibsen/eror viewer, defined as 
whatever viewpoint X occupies. It is portable because the viewer takes its 
viewpoint with it. In this sense, it is not possible for Xa and Xb to exchange 
their viewpoints even if they can exchange their respective locations. 
^ 
According to this reading, there is something subjective about X's viewpoint I 
[：： 
but no interesting qualitative content to the subjectivity of consciousness: t： 
, r , . 
.1；1 
. ,<'‘ 
Now granted that on such a construal Nagel's conclusion that a 
point of view is not inter-subjectively accessible and not 
objectively characterizable does follow. If what matters about my 
experience is its mine-ness...its being so does indeed seem to 
be the sort of thing that cannot be included in any description of 
experience, and thus it may really make experience theory-
resistant. The trouble is that it does so in a merely trivial way: on 
this reading there is no interesting qualitative content to the 
subjectivity that is said to elude theory. There is nothing it is like 
for something to be merely this person's experience rather than 
that one's in the sense of ‘being like，that Nagel insists defines 
consciousness. Mere ownership does not in general contribute 
anything to the nature or character of the thing owned, and there 
is not reason to think that it does so when that thing is 
experience. To assume that it does is both unmotivated and, in 
98 Biro, "Consciousness and Subjectivity", p.l21. 
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the present context, question-begging.®^ 
According to Biro, Nagel faces a dilemma. He cannot adopt the fixed reading 
of "X's viewpoint" since "on such a construal the expression seems to involve 
nothing that could be seen as essentially subjective，，—，because nothing 
would prevent two individual viewers from sharing the same viewpoint. In 
order to preserve the subjectivity of consciousness, Nagel must adopt the 
portable reading, but the cost is that Nagel's claim about subjectivity becomes 
trivial. There can be no interesting qualitative content to this subjective fact, 丨！丨 
and so there is nothing which resists an objective description^°\ 
Biro's account of "X's viewpoint" is oversimplified. Biro himself does 
realize that viewpoint "typically refers to the beliefs, conceptual framework or 
even values of some subject or group", and "Nagel sometimes so use『搬. 
However, he thinks "if the radical claims about subjectivity and consciousness 
blocking the path of objective science are to be sustained on the basis of the 
notion, a more precise and somewhat narrower construal must be adopted 
(my emphaisjs)"io3. |_|j5 construal is indeed very narrow, but, in my opinion, far i| 
i ！ 
from being precise, and such a narrow construal is totally unnecessary to 丨：丨 
丨]| ； 
establish the subjectivity of consciousness. Furthermore, I shall argue that the ! 
illusory appeal of Biro's argument lies mainly in his confusion of two pairs of 
concept: subjectivity with privacy, and objectivity with publicity. 
We can grant that both the fixed reading and portable reading of "X's 
viewpoint" are supported by our everyday usage of the phrase. On the one 
hand, we use the phrase "X's viewpoint" to refer to the specific set of pre-
conditions which X happens to have—, |n this sense a viewpoint is not 
99 Biro, "Consciousness and Subjectivity", p.l22. 
_ ftid,p.l29. 
101 The triviality ofthe portable reading of "X's viewpoint" can be shown with the following example. 
Suppose Mr. B has just bought a new BMW and argues that no one can steal his car: 
B1 By "my car" I denote whatever car I own. 
B2 When my car is stolen, it is no longer owned by me. 
It follows that: B3 When a car is still mine, it cannot be stolen, and when it is stolen, it is no 
longer mine. 
Therefore: B4 My car cannot be stolen. 
Certainly, there is no, prima facie, philosophically interesting content about "Mr. B's BMW". By 
analogy, it is only trivial to stress the subjective feature of"X's viewpoint". 
102 Biro, "Consciousness and Subjectivity", p.l l7. 
io3lbid.,pp.ll7-118. 
104 Here, I am using "fixed reading" in its primary sense, meaning that a viewpoint tied not to the 
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essentially tied to X and so can be adopted by other viewers similar enough in 
the relevant aspects. On the other hand, we do sometimes employ the phrase 
in a portable way, referring to whatever viewpoint X has, and claim that when 
X takes up the viewpoint of another viewer Y, the set of pre-conditions 
identified as "Y's viewpoint" is now called X's viewpoint. What is the 
significance of this distinction? For Biro, Nagel can only adopt either the fixed 
or the portable reading, and while he cannot adopt the former, his adoption of 
the latter renders his claim trivial. However, I do not see why Nagel cannot 
) !丨 adopt the fixed reading and retain his claim about subjectivity. 丨丨 
V' 
First of all, there is no reason why the fixed reading of "X's viewpoint" 
,)• 
should include location alone. Biro seems to justify his narrow construal on 
1.1 ； 
the ground that we should separate the question about reduction of intentional 
••” I 
phenomena (other than phenomena of qualia) from the same question about •：： 
‘：丨‘ 
consciousness. Granted that it is true，i.e. we should concentrate on the 
_ 彳丨> 
question about consciousness alone in the present context, and that beliefs, 
,,i 
values and conceptual framework are irrelevant, there is still no reason why ；'：! 
( 
X's physiological and psychological constitution can be excluded from "X's 丨 
viewpoint". The fact that they are at least as relevant as its location (taking _ 
literally) in rendering any of its conscious acts possible is so obvious that Biro's |: 
("' 
exclusion seems puzzling. One plausible explanation is that limiting the 
denotation of "X's viewpoint" to location might make his point look more 
convincing. If on a fixed reading, "X's viewpoint" only denotes its specific 
spatial location，it is obvious that any viewer other than X may occupy X's 
viewpoint", and it，Biro thinks, shows that there is nothing subjective about 
consciousness. However, if the physiological and psychological constitutions 
of X are included, it seems that at least creatures of other species are not able 
to occupy X's viewpoint. This in turn undermines Biro's claim that if we adopt 
the fixed reading, there is nothing subjective about consciousness. Nagel, 
then, can simply adopt the fixed reading and need not be pushed to the trivial 
portable reading. 
Biro seems to be aware of this problem and in the discussion about 
the case of different species in section 3 of his paper, he seems to have 
viewer, without adopting Biro's interpretation oflimiting the denotation of viewpoint to location alone. 
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modified his fixed reading by admitting that we should also include X's 
physiological and psychological constitutions: 
We can grant that a being with perceptual apparatus /A* will not 
perceive things in the same way as a being with perceptual 
apparatus B*, so that if A has one and B the other, they will 
perceive things differently. But after A and B exchange places, 
not only can we still say...that each would still see what the other 
had seen before, but more importantly, we could say that each 丨 
would perceive as the other would if it had the other's perceptual 
apparatus. If A were in B's place, with B*, he would have the 
same experience as B in fact has (and vice versa). (The same 
kind of experience qualitatively, that is, not, obviously, 
numerically the same exper ience .^ 
From the above, Biro concludes, "Counterfactuals like these make no 
reference to anything essentially subjective.”— in other words, though it is not 
as obvious as the case of location, it is not impossible that other viewers Y [.| 
> i 
may be equipped with the same type of perceptual apparatus as X. As a 4' I 
result, Y may know more or less the same as X himself about what it is like to ]i 
be X. If it is possible at all, there is，Biro believes, nothing uniquely subjective 
to consciousness. Therefore, Nagel still has to adopt the portable reading, 
and only by adopting such a narrow construal may the "anti-objectivists" like 
Nagel show that there is something uniquely subjective about consciousness. 
Here, Biro betrays his confusion of subjectivity with privacy, and objectivity 
with publicity. Nagel can accept the whole passage quoted above without 
giving up the subjectivity of consciousness. Biro's challenge makes sense 
only if by "the subjective character of consciousness" Nagel means "the 
private character of consciousness", i.e. it is accessible only to one single 
individual. When Biro says his case of A and B exchanging their locations and 
perceptual apparatus shows that there is nothing essentially subjective, he 
means that there is nothing private, nothing accessible only to one single 
See what follows. 
105 Biro, "Consciousness and Subjectivity", p. 124.. 
i°6 lbid., p. 124. 
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individual. However, Nagel never advocates anything like that. According to 
him, that something is subjective means merely that it is essentially related to 
a viewpointio7 and can only be understood adequately from the specific 
viewpoint giving rise to it. It does not imply that it is only accessible to one 
single individual, for，on the fixed reading, it is always possible for more than 
one viewer to occupy the same viewpoint. Or, in other words, there is always 
room for intersubjectivity (though it is not equal to objectivity). That an object 
0 can only be understood from a specific viewpoint P is not in any way 
incompatible with the fact that more than one viewer can occupy P. And that 
P can be occupied by more than one viewer does not entail that 0 can be 
understood adequately without considering the corresponding viewpoint P. 
Even if there is really nothing privately accessible to only one individual when 
we adopt the fixed reading, it does nothing against Nagel's claim about the 
reality of the subjective character of experience. Subjectivity and privacy are 
simply two different concepts^^^, and Nagel states this explicitly: 
I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its 
possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible 
onlytoasingleindividual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible 
to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the 
comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case.— 
Ironically, instead of trivializing Nagel's claim, the example quoted above in 
fact explicates more clearly the essential nature of subjective fact: unless A 
and B exchange both their locations and perceptual apparatus, they cannot 
have the same view of an object. 
107 See section3.1. 
108 Similar criticism can also be applied to the view ofPatricia Hanna, “Must thinking Bats be 
Conscious?", in Philosophical Investigation, 13:4 October 1990，p. 350-355; 
109 "What is it like to be a bat?", in MQ, p. 173. 
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3.22 The Epistemological argument 
Let us now turn to another type of objection against Nagel's claim 
about subjective reality. Some philosophers admit that consciousness has 
subjective character in Nagel's sense, i.e. there is something that it is like to 
be the viewer, which links essentially to its viewpoint. What they deny is that 
this character cannot be understood/explained/characterized exhaustively with 
some objective methods. 
in his paper "On The Logic Of What It Is Like To Be a Conscious 
Subject", Jeff Foss defends physicalism against Nagel's subjectivism with his 
"Super Neuroscientist Argument". He approaches the problem by invoking a 
thought experiment with the introduction of two methodological devices: the 
Super Neuro-Scientist [SNS] and the Super Sympathist [SS]. On the one 
hand, SNS is "a conscious being who knows all of the objective facts about 
the conscious being we care to consider", and "what it is like to be the SNS is 
radically unlike what it is like to be any terrestrial organjsm，，”°. On the other 
hand, SS is a being which possesses "a plastic, self-metamorphosing nervous 
system" and is thus "able to assume the structure of other conscious beings" 
and "have experiences which are qualitatively identical, with respect to 
subjective character, to those of any other conscious being，，’”. Foss then 
formulates the physicalist and the subjectivist thesis [PT and ST] as below: 
PT: The SNS knows both in general, and in particular, what it is 
like to be any sort of，or particular, conscious being.^^^ 
ST: The Physicalist Thesis is false, for there is a sort of fact, 
about conscious states unlike those that SNS can have, 
which SS can know through having the states in question, 
facts which SNS cannot know (or even conceive of) simply 
because she cannot have them or anything sufficiently 
similarto them.^^^ 
Foss tries to prove that even if consciousness has subjective character i.e. 
something that is essentially connected to a viewpoint, no mentioning of or 
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referring to that viewpoint is needed in order to understand it. He invites us to 
a thought experiment of determining if "there is something that SS can know, 
but SNS cannot, about what it is like to be us，，”*. He claims that once we 
engage in this thought experiment, we would all accept the conclusion that 
SNS can know/understand everything about the subjective character of any 
particular conscious being. His main argument runs as follows: 
i) By hypothesis, SNS can know all that I did, do and will say (and 
would have said) - which is an objective fact. 
ii) i) implies that SNS can describe my own experience as well as I 
do. 
iii) ii) implies that SNS can understand perfectly my description of 
my subjective conscious states. 
iv) iii) implies that SNS can understand perfectly what it is like for 
me to be me, even if she does not (by hypothesis) share my 
viewpoint at all.”5 
Therefore, 
V ) The subjective character of my consciousness, i.e. what it is like 
to be me, can be understood objectively. 
What, then, is wrong with Nagel's account? Why does Nagel think that the 
subjective character of experience must be understood from the very 
viewpoint giving rise to it? In explaining this, Foss adopts a Churchlandish 
point, saying that Nagel has confused experience and the knowledge of 
experience. “To experience is not to know what you experience，，”®，and it is 
not necessary to be me in order to know what it is like to be me. Although 
SNS cannot have the same experience as mine, she can know perfectly well 
what my experience is. Therefore, there is no reason to say that the 
subjective character of consciousness cannot be understood objectively. 
113 Foss, "On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject", p. 210. 
114 Jhid.. 
115 Hdd., p. 211. He also tries to argue further that the SNS can describe, understand and conceive of 
my experience better than both the SS and me. I would not discuss this claim here, for I think he is not 
even warranted to say that the SNS can describe, understand and conceive of my experience as well as 
the SS and me. 
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Is this argument sound? I think it is not, for it is grounded upon a 
problematic premise i). The appeal of the argument lies in the intuition that if 
SNS knows all that I did, do and will say about my experience, she must know 
what it is like to be me at least as well as I (and SS) do. Otherwise, how is it 
possible for her to do so? The problem with the argument is precisely that 
Foss begs the question when he stipulates that SNS knows all that 丨 did，do 
and will say about my experience. 
At first glance, Foss seems to be justified in claiming that SNS does 
know this since it is an objective fact, and SNS knows all objective facts (a 
hypothesis which is accepted by the subjectivists). But what does it mean to 
say that SNS knows all that I say? Suppose I utter the words "I am in pain" to 
describe what 丨 feel at time t1. On the one hand, SNS may be said to know 
what 丨 say in the sense that she knows the occurrence of the fact that I utter 
the words "I am in pain" at time t1. It is an objective fact since its occurrence 
does not depend on any viewpoint. It, however, does not follow that SNS can 
know or describe my experience. SNS can do so only if she, besides knowing 
that I utter those words, understands what 丨 say. Given that what it is like to be 
SNS is radically unlike what it is like to be me, it is not obvious how she can 
understand what 丨 mean by "I am in pain". To say that aII the terms in my 
language can be understood by SNS illegitimately presupposes all facts can 
be known objectively. 
Foss anticipates this objection. He gives two examples to show that 
one can understand a term about experience without ever having the 
experience. A doctor who has never had headaches can surely refer to my 
pains as I do. "After all, he can treat the pains, perhaps remove them — why 
can't he talk about them?”7 
Similarly, when a (natural-born) blind person talks about the colour 
"red", he "means the very same thing by ‘red，as everyone else - the only 
difference is that s/he cannot see the colour red，，”®, lt is, Foss argues, 
counterintuitive to insist that the doctor and the blind person do not refer to my 
pain and the colour red respectively. 
116 Foss, "On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject", p. 212. 
117 Foss, “On the logic ofwhat it is like to be a conscious subject", p. 214. 
118lbid.. 
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The above examples do more harm than good to the physicalist 
thesis, and betray how Foss' thought experiment begs the question. Given 
that the doctor does refer to my headaches, and that the blind person does 
refer to the colour red as 丨 do， it shows nothing about whether they can 
describe or know the complete nature of my pain and my perception of red. 
The fact that I can use a term to refer to a particular object or a kind of object 
does not imply that I know its essential feature”®. When 丨 say "I do not know 
the essential feature of helium", I am referring to the same helium as a chemist 
does without knowing any essential feature of it. 
In the case of the doctor, surely he can refer to my headache. 
However, under what condition can we reasonably say that he understands 
what 丨 mean by “I have a headache"? He must at least have experienced 
some kind of pain and have the ability to imagine what it is like for him to have 
this pain in his head. His understanding may still be partial if he has never had 
a real headache. And if he has never experienced any kind of pain before, he 
can know nothing about the subjective experience of headache at all. Whether 
he can treat or even remove it is irrelevant, otherwise an aspirin tablet should 
understand me better. In fact, what would the doctor know about my 
experience of headache if he has never had one before? To insist that there 
is nothing subjective about headache to be known simply begs the question. 
The trick of this example is simply that we all know that normally all doctors 
have experienced some kinds of pain before and so they must know what a 
certain kind of pain is like. Or to quote a line from Nagel, this thought 
experiment "relies implicitly on our first-person understanding of 
consciousness, while pretending to do without it"^^°. 
Similarly, though the blind person can referto the colour red as I do, it 
does not follow that he knows as much as I about it. Knowing that stop signs 
are red shows nothing about his knowledge about red. If I tell you that the 
colour of my car is *八*，you may answer perfectly well when someone ask you 
what the colour of my car is, but you can have the idea of what *八* js only if 
you have seen it or other relevant colours which may help you, as Hume does, 
"9 See Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1990, especially Lecture II. 
120 It is originally a criticism against Daniel Dennett's strategy of "heterophenomenology" employed in 
Consciousness Explained, see "Dennett: Consciousness Dissolved", in OM, p. 87. 
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to deduce what *^* is. 
From what is said above, we can see that while SNS can know all 
that I did, do and will utter, she may not understand all that I did, do and will 
say. To say that SNS can understand all my language because it is an 
objective fact is simply begging the question, assuming that all words/concepts 
can be understood objectively. Why can't it be that there are some 
words/concepts which SNS cannot understand because in doing so SNS must 
at least share part of my subjective constitution? That SNS can repeat my 
words “I am in pain" in no way shows that she can describe and conceive of 
my experience of pain as well as 丨 do. Regarding terms of experience, the 
lack of experience precisely implies what Foss calls an "epistemic lack",. 
This is even more obvious when Foss tries to characterize what it is 
like to be a bat objectively: 
To start with obvious facts about what it is like to be a bat: We 
know that a bat's toes do not get tired from hanging upside down 
from them for months at a time. We know this from the skeletal 
structure and ennervation of the toes. We know that the females 
of many species are not interested in copulation, since they are 
in hibernation when it occurs.^^^ 
Foss thinks that he has made an objective characterization of the subjective 
character of a bat's experience, but, in fact, he has not. It has the appearance 
of being so because what he cites to support his characterization is something 
objective, i.e. "the skeletal structure and ennervation of the toes" and "they 
[female bats] are in hibernation when it [copulation] occurs". However, we 
cannot understand what it is like for a bat to be "not tired" and "interested" 
unless we also assume a sufficient extent of likeness between how it feels 
and how we humans feel. In order words, we can know what it is like to be a 
bat only if we can to a sufficient extent take up its viewpoint. That "sympathy 
is based upon objective evidence"^^^ is irrelevant, since no subjectivist (in 
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objective evidence alone is sufficient for our knowing what it is like to be a bat. 
It follows that Foss has given either an exhaustive but not purely objective, or 
a purely objective but not exhaustive characterization of what it is like to be a 
bat. Therefore, the claim that what is subjective can be 
understood/explained/described exhaustively with some objective methods is 
notjustified. 
From what is said above, we can see why common challenges 
against the reality of the subjective character of consciousness are not 
justified. Essentially connected to and understandable only from a viewpoint, 丨 
it is nevertheless a part of reality, as Nagel writes: 
Reality is not just objective reality, and any objective conception 
of reality must inciude an acknowledgment of its own 
incompleteness...Even ifan objective general conception of mind 
were developed and added to the physical conception of 
objectivity, it would have to include the qualification that the exact 
character of each of the experiential and intentional perspectives 
with which it deals can be understood only from within or by 
subjective imagination•••••In saying this we have not given up the 
idea of the way the world really is, independently of how it 
appears to us or to any particular occupant of it. We have only 
given up the idea that this coincides with what can be objectively 
understood. The way the world is includes appearances, and 
there is no single point of view from which they can all be fully 
grasped.i23 
3.3 Qbiective Realitv 
3.31 Objective Reality: Intelligible or not? 
In 3.1, we see that, for Nagel, reality refers to what is the case from 
no particular viewpoint. We learn further, in 3.2, that this conception of reality 
does not rule out the subjective realm in advance and attempts to expel it 
123 VFN, p. 26. 
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have failed. It follows that it is reasonable to acknowledge subjective reality 
and hence Pan-objectivism is false. The recognition of the reality of the 
subjective character of consciousness, according to Nagel, interestingly 
provides us with a strong reason for rejecting Pan-subjectivism. Given that 
subjective facts are essentially connected to viewpoints and we cannot have 
an adequate understanding of them without taking up the viewpoints, and we 
have reason to believe that there are viewpoints (says the viewpoint of bats, 
other animals or even other intelligent beings) we cannot adequately occupy, 
it seems to follow not only that there are facts which cannot be adequately 
grasped objectively, but also that there are facts inconceivable to us. Once 
this is acknowledged, we cannot but admit that there may also be aspects of 
reality which are inconceivable by any finite mind at all. The world, in this 
sense, is not merely our world, i.e. a human world. Though some aspects of 
it are essentially connected some viewpoints, it is, as a whole, an 
independent world to which we human beings and all other conscious and 
reflective beings 
On the contrary, Pan-subjectivism, as 丨 have defined in 3.1, is the 
view that everything real is ultimately subjective. An object 0 can be 
intelligibly said to be real only if it is viewable 一 perceivable and/or 
conceivable - to us from ourviewpoint. In other words, 0 is not real if it is not 
conceivable to us. Or, to put it more precisely, it is simply unintelligible to talk 
about something which is real but inconceivable to us. According to Nagel, 
this view is at least, At first glance, counter-intuitive. Such view conflicts with 
most of our commonsensical beliefs. People may hold different views about 
the world, some of which may even be unimaginably strange to us. They all, 
however, either implicitly or explicitly, endorse the idea that the world is not 
their (or anyone else's) world, that it exists whether there are human beings 
or not. In a word, we all have a natural view that the world is independent of 
ourthought: 
The idea that the contents of the universe are limited by our capacity 
for thought is easily recognized as a philosophical view, which at first 
sight seems crazily self-important given what small and contingent 
pieces of the universe we are. It is a view that no one would hold 
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except for philosophical reasons that seem to rule out the natural 
picture"i24 
This, of course, is not a sufficient reason for us to reject Pan-subjectivism. 
We cannot conclude that Pan-subjectivism is wrong merely on the ground that 
it conflicts with our commonsense, since there are numerous cases showing 
what seemed bizarre at first turns out to be the correct account of reality. This 
tension between Pan-subjectivism and our commonsense, nevertheless, 
gives us reason to doubt the credibility of Pan-subjectivism. To support such 
a strong (and strange) view, one must have a very strong and convincing 
argument. What a Pan-subjectivist must do is to show that the very idea of an 
independent reality (of any viewer) is incoherent and, hence or otherwise, 
unintelligiblei25. What is its argument? 
Realism about objective reality entertains the claim that: 
R There is something (j> which is real and is inconceivable to us^ ^®. 
The immediate response of a Pan-subjectivist may be as follows. The fact 
that we can assert that cj> is real implies that cj> is conceivable to us. How can 
we assert anything, including its existence, about cj> if it is not conceivable to 
us? This, however, is not an adequate reply. On the one hand, we should 
remember that，>，，is just a symbol representing that something which is real, 
and not a specific name for a specific object we have identified. A Realist 
may concede that that is all that we can possibly conceive about cj>; we can 
know nothing about what it is and its nature except that it is real. Realism 
about objective reality can hold even if we make that concession. On the 
other hand, what is in question is whether the fact that cj> is real is independent 
of our viewpoint. That it is conceivable to us does not in itself implies that it is 
124 VFN. p. 92. 
125 "...[idealism] is the position that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us, or possibly 
something for which we could have evidence. An argument for this general form of idealism must 
show that the notion ofwhat cannot be thought about by us or those like us makes no sense", VFN, 
p.93. 
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subjective, i.e. it existence depends on its being viewable to us. While the 
former claim is epistemological, the latter is metaphysical, and any connection 
between them is not obvious. To support Pan-subjectivism, a much stronger 
connection between the reality and conceivability of cj> must be established. In 
other words, the Pan-subjectivist has to justify an epistemological test of 
reality. It is not sufficient to show that cj> is real and conceivable. It must be 
shown that: 
PS 小 is real only /fit is conceivable to us. ; 
1 
•； 
There are various arguments for the fundamental thesis of Pan-subjectivism 
PS. In this section,丨 am going to examine one of the most influential 
arguments against objective reality in the contemporary philosophical 
discussion. I will examine Donald Davidson's rejection of the intelligibility of 
the idea of an independent, uninterpreted reality. Davidson endorses PS in 
his rejection of any sense in talking about an objective reality, reality which is 
independent of any viewpoint (i.e. conceptual scheme). He considers the 
idea of different conceptual schemes presupposes "something neutral and 
common that lies outside all schemes"^^^ and such uninterpreted "something" 
is unintelligible. 
3.32 Davidson 's Rejection of Objective Reality 
One of the most remarkable arguments for PS is provided by 
Davidson. His argument aims originally at refuting conceptual relativism，the 
doctrine that "Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one 
system may not in another—. According to him, conceptual relativism implies 
126 That is, we cannot conceive cj) from our viewpoint. 
127 Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", in Inquiries into Truth and 
interpretation, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 190. 
128 Davidson, "On the Very Idea ofConceptual Scheme", p. 183. It seems that what Davidson 
advocates is incompatible with Putnam's intemal realism, which is, as I am going to argue in the next 
section, in fact a specific version of conceptual relativism (it is more evident if we take a look at his 
discussion ofthe difference between Camap's world and the world ofPolish logician in The Many 
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that there are different incommensurable conceptual schemes，which 
presupposes the distinction between conceptual scheme and uninterpreted 
reality. By showing that the scheme/content distinction is unintelligible and is 
"itself a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma"^^®, Davidson claims to have 
shown that the idea of an alternative conceptual scheme which is 
untranslatable to ours does not make sense, and hence conceptual relativism 
is not intelligible. In refuting conceptual relativism, Davidson also rejects the 
idea of an "uninterpreted reality", something “neutral and common that lies 
outside all schemes，，^，i.e. independent of our conceptual scheme. In other 
words, he gives up the idea of objective reality (in Nagel's sense), i.e. reality 
which is independent of any viewpoint. How does Davidson's argument 
against the idea of an alternative conceptual scheme, i.e. a conceptual 
scheme that is "largely true but not translatable”^，have any implication on 
our idea of objective reality? 
Objective reality exists independently of any viewpoint. How can we 
show that this idea does not make sense? Is it sufficient to show that there is 
always a possibility that there may be some kind of mind (whose nature may 
be unknown to us) which produces the reality which we consider to be 
objective? Anyway, how can anyone rule this possibility out? Perhaps it is 
really a possibility, in the sense that it is logically possible. However, it is 
obvious that merely stating the possibility does not automatically proves that it 
is the most plausible one. Moreover, it is difficult to see what further proof can 
be given to support such a hypothesis, given such a vague concept of that 
"creative" mind whose nature is claimed to be unknown to us. In fact, no 
contemporary idealist is really serious about such an unpromising proposal. 
Still, there is a more plausible approach. The idea of objective reality 
is intelligible only if the idea of some aspects of reality whose existence is 
inconceivable to us is intelligible. If we can show that any talk of the existence 
of an entity is intelligible only if it is conceivable to us, we can have a strong 
Faces ofRealisni, p. 18-21). Therefore, it seems strange that Putnam cites Davidson, with his rejection 
ofthe distinction between "scheme" and "content", as a supporter for his view ….20). 
129 Davidson, p. 190. 
13° ft)id., p. 198. 
131 Jbid, p. 194. 
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case against any talk of objective reality. As we have mentioned, realism of 
objective reality claims that: 
R There is something cj> which is real and is inconceivable to us. 
R commits us to the thought that: 
R1 It is true (or it is the case) that (j> exists, but we cannot conceive 
anything else about it. 
R1 amounts to saying: . 
R2 No other concepts we possess except our general concept of 
"something being true"(or "something exists", "something being 
the case") can apply to cj)J^^ 
R2 implies: 
R3 There is a conceptual scheme (a set of interrelated concepts) which is 
largely true in our sense but is constituted of concepts different 
from ours significantly. 
R3 means exactly: 
R4 There is a conceptual scheme which is largely true but not translatable 
to ours. 
R4 is Davidson's formulation of the idea of alternative conceptual scheme. 【 
How well we can understand it depends on "how well we understand the 
notion of truth, as applied to a language，independent of the notion of 
translation", and his answer is that "we do not understand it independently at 
all"i33. Why is it the case? 
Suppose there are two languages L1 (our language) and L2, and s 
is a sentence in L2. We can say that s is true (in our sense) only if we can 
specific its truth condition in L1 • In other words, we must be able to say: 
s is true if and only if p 
where p is a translation of s in L1. l fwe cannot specify the truth condition for 
s in our language, we cannot determine whether s is true or not. It amounts 
to saying that we cannot determine the truth value of s if s is not translatable 
132 VFN, p. 93. 
1" Davidson, p. 194. 
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to our language L1. Therefore, if L2 expresses a different conceptual scheme 
from L1, its sentences must both be true and untranslatable to L1. Since we 
cannot assert that L2 is true without assuming that it is translatable to L1, we 
do not really understand what an alternative conceptual scheme can be. 
Now the realist asserts that "(j> exists" is true both in L1 and L2, and 
all other true sentences about cj> in L2 are not translatable to sentences in our 
language L1. Can he make this assertion intelligibly? Davidson argues that 
we cannot because of the principle of charity, in order to assert that a 
sentence s is true, we must first be able to interpret it as something we can 
understand. Interpretation of s involves two interdependent aspects: the 
attribution of beliefs to the speaker and the interpretation of the meaning of s. 
We cannot make sense of s without knowing its meaning, but knowing the 
meaning of s requires us to know the beliefs of the speaker of s. Suppose a 
man X pointing at a deer utters the word "it is a horse". How should you 
interpret what he says? On the one hand, it may be the case that X has 
mistaken a deer for a horse, i.e. he holds a false belief about what he sees. 
On the other hand, it may be that his "horse" means exactly what you mean 
by "deer" and he does not hold any false belief at all. The interdependence 
lies in the fact that without knowing the beliefs of X，we cannot understand the 丨 
meaning of his utterance, while without first knowing the meaning of his 
words, we cannot know what beliefs he holds. 
Apparently, there is no way out of the circularity involved in the 
interpretation of belief and meaning, which seems to follow that we cannot 
even start our interpretation and so understanding is impossible. However, 
Davidson argues that the ridiculous conclusion does not follow. Given that 
interpretation is possible, the question is how it is possible. Davidson claims 
that interpretation is possible only / fwe adopt the principle of charity, that is, to 
assume that there is general agreement on beliefs between X and us^^^. 
Here, we neither assume any knowledge of the meaning of his sentences nor 
any knowledge about what his beliefs are. We only assume that he is correct 
about most of the things from our viewpoint. Otherwise, we simply have no 
ground to regard what he utters as meaningful sentences at all: 
134 Davidson, p. 196. 
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Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to 
understand others, we must count them right in most 
matters...We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts 
of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement.^^^ 
Accordingly, the realist cannot sensibly assert both that，，小 exists" is true (in 
both L1 and L2) and all other true statements about cj> in L2 is untranslatable 
to L1，since it violates the principle of charity. To assert that "(j> exist" is true in 
both L1 and L2 implies that speakers of L2 and we have general agreement 
on beliefs about 小.Otherwise, how can we assert that “小 exists" is true? How 
can we know that we are talking about the same object? But to say that we 
have general agreement on beliefs about cj> means that what is true about cj> in 
L2 can be translated into sentences in L1. It follows that the realist is wrong, 
and when he talks about the idea of something real but inconceivable to us, 
he is talking about either something which is conceivable to us, or nothing at 
all. 
How does Nagel respond to it? First of all, he shows that Davidson's 
argument will lead to some intuitively unacceptable consequences. If what is 
said above is true, it follows not only that we cannot talk sensibly about an 
objective reality which is inconceivable to us, but also that no intelligent 
be/ngfi36 Qgn ever form any idea of reality inconceivable to him, whatever he 
is. For any intelligent being X, if he tries to form such an idea, he is 
condemned to fail since he will violate the principle of charity as we do. To 
talk about the reality of 9 which is inconceivable to him, X is asserting that 
there is something 0 to which only his concepts of "truth" and "existence" and 
no other concepts he possesses can apply. It amounts to saying that there is 
an alternative conceptual scheme (says, Sy, which is the conceptual scheme 
of Y, intelligent being of a different species) to that of X (Sx). However, 
according to Davidson's argument, X cannot intelligibly assert that Sy is both 
a conceptual scheme and untranslatable to Sx. Therefore, no matter whose 
135 Davidson, p. 197. 
136 By "intelligent being", I mean reflective being which is capable of developing thought about itself 
and reality. 
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conceptual scheme Sy is, it must be translatable to Sx, and so whatever is 
conceivable to Y is conceivable to X. It follows that nothing that is 
conceivable to an intelligent being Y, whatever Y is, is inconceivable to X, 
whatever X is. 
What has just been said, however, cannot be true. It is obviously 
false that nothing is inconceivable to X，whatever he is and that he cannot 
think sensibly of the idea of objective reality independent of him. Suppose 
there is a world in which there are two congenital nine-year-old boys - one 
with realist aspiration (let's follow Nagel to call him Realist junior^^^), and the 
other holds a Davidsonian anti-realist view (let's call him Davidson junior)-
and we adult human beings, who are capable of conceiving some aspects of 
the world which is beyond the cognitive capability of the two boys. Besides, 
the two boys are not aware of our existence. Suppose further that Realist 
junior speculates that 
H There are aspects of reality which are inconceivable to him. 
The question now is that: Will Realist junior be just talking nonsense in doing 
so? Is what he is thinking about a sensible hypothesis about the world? 
Davidson junior would argue that the intelligibility of the hypothesis 
presupposes the idea of alternative conceptual scheme which cannot be 
endorsed by Realist junior. Therefore, with the above argument, he will 
conclude that H is unintelligible. However, it seems to be strange to deny that 
H is intelligible. Notes that what is at issue is not whether H is true or whether 
Realist junior has any ground to assert that it is true, but whether H is 
intelligible at all. How can we determine that? We must try to understand 
what H means from our viewpoint, which means, according to the principle of 
charity, we must take most of Realist junior's belief to be true, i.e. assuming 
that we have general agreement on beliefs. One of our belief is that there are 
some aspects of the world which are inconceivable to the two congenital nine-
year-old boys, and it is shared by Realist junior and us (but not Davidson 
junior). It may be true that Realist junior can have no ground to assert that H 
is true, but it does not mean that it is unintelligible. From our point of view, H 
expresses a hypothesis which is not only intelligible, translatable to our 
137 VFN, p. 96. 
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language but also true, and Davidson junior is clearly wrong. As Nagel puts it: 
According to Davidson (as far as I can see) I could say that Realist 
junior was right and Davidson junior wrong, but Realist junior would be 
wrong to agree with me 一 as Davidson junior would no doubt point out 
to him. This doesn't make the doctrine any less paradoxical. And if 
these consequences are unacceptable with regard to the nine-year-
olds, they are unacceptable with regard to us.^ ®^ 
It follows it is not the case that nothing is inconceivable to X (whatever he is) 
and that he cannot think sensibly of the idea of objective reality independent 
of him. 
The problem with the Davidsonian argument is that the principle of 
charity is not necessarily incompatible with the idea of alternative conceptual 
scheme. Granted that the principle of charity is the condition of possibility of 
any interpretation and/or translation, we may still make sense of the idea of 
alternative conceptual scheme. That L2 is translatable to L1 does not rule out 
the possibility that they express different conceptual schemes. The 
appearance that it does is due to our ignorance of the asymmetry character of 
the notion of translation. The fact that L2 is translatable to L1 does not imply 
that L1 is also translatable to L2. In other words, I can translate all the 
sentences in the language of Realistjunior into sentences in mine, but he may 
not be able to do the same thing^^®. He simply, by hypothesis, lacks the 
conceptual tools to do the translation. To him, our conceptual scheme, though 
with some overlapping, is inconceivable and different from his, and so the 
portion of reality conceivable to us may not be equally conceivable to him. It 
follows that the idea of independent and inconceivable reality to Realist junior 
is at least intelligible. If this idea is intelHgible，so is the idea that there is 
reality independent of and inconceivable to us, for we are in exactly the same 
situation in our speculation about it. Whether there are really some "higher 
138 VFN, p. 97. 
139 “I might be able to translate a sentence of someone else's language into a sentence o f m y language, 
even though he cannot translate my sentence into his", VFN, p. 97. 
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beings" is not essential to our point, just as whether we exist or not is 
irrelevant to the intelligibility of Realityjunior's hypothesis. 
One useful way to assess a linguistic theory is to test it against our 
linguistic practices and the intuition goes with it, for they are the data which 
any linguistic theories claim to explain. Theories which entail consequences 
which are contrary to our linguistic practices - such as "meaning is 
impossible", "reference is impossible，，or "no one ever mean what they intend 
to mean", etc. - are for that reason untenable—. The Davidsonian picture 
seems to be wrong because it implies such an implausible result, namely we 
cannot sensibly speculate that there may be portions of reality inconceivable 
to us. We clearly can and do do this all the time. The fact that Davidson's 
theory of interpretation has such a counter-intuitive implication seems to 
undermine the theory itself, rather than rendering the idea of objective reality 
unintelligible. 
What is said above can be reinforced if we can show further that such 
an idea is natural in the light of our linguistic practice. Nagel himself provides 
a much more plausible picture about what is thinkable. As anyone can easily 
recognize, 
Every concept that we have contains potentially the idea of its own 
complement 一 the idea of what the concept doesn't apply to. Unless it 
has been shown positively that there cannot be such things - that the 
idea involves some kind of contradiction (like the idea of things that are 
not self-identical) - we are entitled to assume that it make sense even if 
we can say nothing more about the members of the class, and have 
never met one^^^ 
For example, if we have the concept "apple" which applies to a 
certain kind of fruit, we also, at the same time, have the complementary 
concept of "what is not an apple", which applies to "the collection of all things 
that do not belong to the original class"^^^. In this case, it is the class of non-
apple, e.g. pineapple, woman, cars, music, etc. We may not be able to 
specify all the members or their characteristics of this complementary class, 
14° This strategy is employed by Kripke in his argument against the description theory of name, see 
Kripke, Naming and Necessity. 
141 VFN, p. 97-98. 
142 Irving. M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 9'^  edition, Macmillan Publishing Company, 
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but it does not in any way imply that the class of non-apple is empty, or the 
notion unintelligible. To generalize what is said above, we can say that for 
any one of our concepts a, we also have a corresponding concept 〜oc，which 
refers to everything that is not a. Our having the concept 〜a does not require 
us to have a clear conception of what 〜a is. Instead，it is enough for us to 
have a clear conception of a. Unless it can be shown that 〜a involves self-
contradiction (e.g. things that are not self-identical), or denial of existence (i.e. 
things that do not exist), we cannot say that 〜a is unintelligible or has no 
reference. That is simply the way we ordinarily talk and use our concepts. 
Therefore, it seems to be groundless to rule out the intelligibility of 
the concepts such as "all the things we can't describe", "all the things we can't 
imagine", "all the things humans can't conceive o f , and "all the things no finite 
mind could ever form a conception of^^^. Such an idea of objective reality 
may not be of much cognitive significance to us (for we may not be able to 
have comprehensive knowledge about it), but it shows neither that it is 
unintelligible nor that there is no such reality. 
3.4 Thelnescapabil i tvoftheldeaof Subiective and Obiective Reality 
In 3.2 and 3.3, we have seen that various attempts to render both the 
ideas of subjective and objective reality unintelligible fail. Nagel, however, 
does not stop with that. He positively argues that both of the ideas are 
inescapable to all rational reflective beings. We cannot rationally and 
intelligibly deny that there is something whose existence is essentially 
connected to a certain viewpoint, and that there is something which is 
independent of any viewers. These two kinds of fact are real in the sense that 
they are not merely appearance. In other words, both of their existences are 
not ultimately consisted in their being viewed by an external viewer. The 
beliefs that there is subjective reality and that there is objective reality are 
1994,p. 221. � VFN, p. 98. 
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intuitively unrevisable. 
We should notice that what is said above is just a claim about the 
general ideas of subjective reality and objective reality. I am not (neither is 
Nagel) claiming that there must be something it is like to be a bat, or the table 
before my eyes must be something independent of me. It is always possible 
to discover that, through empirical means or otherwise, bats are not conscious 
and the table is just a dream-table. We can always deny the reality of any 
particular fact (subjective or objective) by showing that it is only an 
' i 
appearance for a particular viewer from its specific viewpoint. However, we 
cannot sensibly deny subject and objective reality as such, claiming that 
nothing is real subjectively or nothing is real objectively. 
3.41 The Inescapability of the Idea of Subjective Reality 
We cannot escape the idea of subjective reality. The belief in 
subjective reality (not something essentially private but something essentially 
connected to viewpoints) is an instance of unrevisable intuitive belief because 
we do not have any sensible alternative to it. As conscious beings, we 
necessarily view the world from a certain viewpoint (see 2.3). Our view -
perception and/or conception - is determined, at least partly, by the specific 
viewpoint we occupy. As a result, when we view an object 0，it appears to us 
in a specific way V 0 which is (to a certain extent) determined by our viewpoint 
P. This specific appearance of 0 (i.e. how 0 appears to us) V0, is essentially 
connected to P from which it arises^^^. However, it would be wrong to 
conclude that V 0 cannot be a part of reality. Although V 0 may not represent 
what 0 is in itself, i.e. independent of any viewer, that 0 appears to us as VO 
is a real fact，a fact whose existence does not consist in its being viewed by 
other viewers. To engage in the thought that there is no subjective reality 
involves the self-contradictory rejection of our act of thinking about it. 
Furthermore, in conceiving our act of viewing and the resulting view 
of the world, we cannot but conceive them as situated in the objective order, 
not in the strict sense they are in no way related to any viewpoint, but in the 
144 As we have discussed in chapter 2, it is identical with our view of 0, i.e. how we view - perceive 
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loose sense that their existence does not consist in being viewed by any 
further viewer. Even if our thought is all that the world consists of, we can only 
take it as the way the world is in itself. This leads us to the inescapability of 
the idea of objective reality. 
3.42 The Inescapability of the Idea of Objective Reality 
As we have seen in 3.3, the possibility of objectivity reality cannot be 
ruled out by saying that the idea is unintelligible. More than this, Nagel argues 
1 that the idea that "there is some way the world is" is, like the idea of subjective ! ii 
'1, 
reality, inescapable for all rational reflective beings. But why is it so? Suppose 
the Pan-subjectivist challenges us in the following way. Granted we do have 
the idea of objective reality, the Pan-subjectivist may argue - under the name 
of internal realist - that "our apparently objective world picture should be 
understood as essentially a creative product of our language and point of view, 
and the truth of our beliefs should be understood as their survival in an ideal 
development of that point of view"^^^ In other words, such an idea simply 
refers to nothing: 
,ii! 
To talk of ‘facts，without specifying the language to be used is to 
talk of nothing; the word ‘fact，no more has its use fixed by 
Reality itself than does the word ‘exist，orthe word 'object'^ ^® 
What does it mean? How does Nagel respond to this challenge? In this 
section, I will discuss Hilary Putnam's internal realism and see if it works. 
According to Putnam, it makes sense and is true to say that 
something really exists. The sun in the sky and the computer in front of you 
are as real as common people think. The problem is in what sense they are 
real. Putnam distinguishes two philosophical perspectives about the status of 
reality. On the one hand, there is the externalist perspective, conceiving 
reality from a God's Eye point of view, or, in Nagel's term, the view from 
nowhere. Such perspective gives rise to metaphysical realism (MR), which 
endorses the idea of objective reality : 
and/or conceive - 0, if we consider VOa from the viewpoint of the viewer. 
145 LW, p. 87. 
101 
The Foundation of The Philosophy Of Thomas Nagel 
...the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent 
objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 
‘the way the world is，. Truth involves some sort of 
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and 
external things and sets of things.^^^ 
On the other hand, there is the internalist perspective, leading to the position 
•i 
of internal realism (IR) which claims that "'Objects' do not exist independently 
of conceptual schemes，^. What is real is internal to a specific theory or 
language. To talk about a viewpoint-independent reality as the metaphysical 
realist does is to talk about nothing. 
Why should we accept internal realism? The argument Putnam 
provides seems to be of the following pattern. Regarding the question of 
whether (j> is real, we can hold either a realist view or a relativist view. For a 
relativist, "every person (or, in a modern 'sociological' formulation, every 
culture, or sometimes every 'discourse') has his (its) own views, standards, 
presuppositions, and that truth (and also justification) are relative to these"^^^. 
Accordingly, a person A (vi//7oev^er he is) can say 小 is real while another 
person B can say 小 is not real without being contradictory to each other. Both 
of them are equally right. Putnam argues that this is an untenable view—. 
On the other hand, a realist claims that there is an objective answer to the 
question. We cannot, in some sense, choose our answer arbitrarily. If we 
want to retain realism, we can hold either metaphysical realism or internal 
realism. If we can show that the former is false, we can justify the latter. 
Putnam thinks that he has accomplished the task. What, then, is his 
argument? 
According to Putnam, metaphysical realism consists of, as we can 
see from the passage quoted above, two essential claims: 
146 Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces ofRealism, LaSalle, I11.: Open Court, 1987, p. 36. 
147 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 49. 
148 Ibid, p. 52. 
i49lbid,p. 121. 
150 See chapter 5 "Two conceptions ofrationality" in Reason, Truth and History and "Why Reason 
Can't Be Naturalized" in Reason and Realism: Philosophical papers, vol.3, Cambridge University 
Press, 1983. 
102 
The Foundation of The Philosophy Of Thomas Nagel 
[I] The world (or reality) is viewpoint-independent] and 
[ I I ] There is exactly one true and complete description of the 
way the world i s ^ i 
Putnam has never explained clearly the relation between [I] and [II]. It is 
obscure whether only [I] is the main thesis of MR and it implies [II], or MR is 
the conjunction of [I] and [II]. For him, it does not make much difference, for， 
i_ i. 
if [ I I ] is false, MR is false whichever interpretation we take. If [ I I ] is the 
implication of [I], i.e. MR, and [I I ] is false, by modus tollens, [I] is also false. 
On the other hand, if MR is the conjunction of [I] and [I I ] and [I I ] is false, MR 
is also false. As we can see from his work, he established internal realism by 
denying [II]. He calls such denial of [ I I ] conceptual relativity, i.e. there can be 
more than one true and complete description of reality. To determine whether 
小 is real, we must first specify the theory/language/conceptual scheme we 
employ. While only particles and energy are real in the language ofphysics, a 
table is equally real in our commonsense language. In other words, what is 
real is relative to a specific theory/language/conceptual scheme. Therefore, it 
does not make any sense to talk about any "object" independent of any 
viewpoint. 
What, then, is the difference between internal realism and relativism, 
which Putnam himself reject forcefully? Why is such position realism at all? 
According to him, though what there really is is "version-relative"^^^, once we 
have specified our version, there is only one true answer and it is not 
determined by me or our culture: 
Once we make clear how we are using ‘object，(or 'exist'), the 
question ‘How many objects exist?' has an answer that is not at 
all a matter of 'convention'. That is why I say that this sort of 
example does not support radical cultural relativism. Our 
concepts may be culturally relative, but it does not follow that the 
truth or falsity of everything we say using those concepts is 
simply ‘decided’ by the cu l t u red 
151 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 49. 
152 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p.l9. 
153 Jbid, p. 20. 
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This last remark betrays the problem with Putnam's internal realism. If our 
concepts are^^^ culturally relative, how can it be that the truth or falsity of 
everything we say using those concepts is not decided by the culture? What 
else can play a role in deciding it? It cannot be any brute fact which is 
independent of any conceptual scheme，for Putnam himself denies it. The 
fact that truth and falsity is not wholly arbitrary (since it is regulated by the 
specific the conceptual scheme) does not make such position any less 
relativistic. Most people will agree that whether what we say is true is not 
wholly arbitrary but regulated by the fundamental beliefs embodied in our 
culture. In fact, the most controversial issue about relativism is precisely that 
any justification seems to run up ultimately against a particular set of 
fundamental beliefs inherent in a particular culture, which seems to be 
incommensurable with those of the other. That is what cultural relativism 
really means. Though presented as the middle ground between relativism 
and metaphysical realism, Putnam's internal realism is just relativism in a 
realist disguise. As a result, it is not clear how he can escape his own 
criticism against relativism. 
Moreover, Putnam's refutation of metaphysical realism is grounded on a 
serious misunderstanding. He illegitimately imports [II] into MR. Though it is 
true that all advocators of MR hold [I], it is not obvious that they also need to 
hold [II]. First of all, Putnam's distinction between metaphysical (external) 
and internal realism presupposes that reality must be 
understandable/conceivable/describable to us (so there is one complete 
description). He then seems to have confused metaphysical realism with 
scientific realism, taking what is objectively real as what can be asserted to be 
real by physics. Only against such background could he justifies his 
formulation (i.e. only one true and complete description, namely physics) and 
hence the rejection (i.e. there are other equally true and complete 
descriptions) of MR. However, some metaphysical realists like Nagel (as 
Putnam would surely regard him to be) hold that there may not be, due to our 
limited conceptual capability，any complete description of reality as a whole. 
154 Given his argument above, I don't see how he can consistently accept the possibility of concepts not 
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What is real may never be known, conceivable or describable by us. 
Secondly, for the part of independent reality which we can describe, there 
need not be just one true and complete description for it. In characterizing 
internal realism, Putnam writes: 
Internal realism is, at bottom, just the insistence that realism is 
not incompatible with conceptual relativity. One can be both a 
realist and a conceptual relativist.^^^ , 
However, even a metaphysical realist can admit the phenomenon of 
conceptual relativity. What he essentially claims is only [I], i.e. reality is 
viewpoint-independent, which is a metaphysical claim about the ontological 
status of reality. It is in no way incompatible with the claim that we can 
describe the same reality in different ways, with different languages or from 
different viewpoints. Accepting [I I ] does nothing to undermine [I] as Putnam 
thinks. We can illustrate this point with an example given by John Searle. That 
we can say that a man weighs 73 in kilograms and 160 in pounds does not 
render the weight of the man in any sense dependent on or determined by the 
scale we choose to employ^^®. To deduce from the obvious fact that a 
description of cj> is relative to a set of linguistic categories to the striking 
conclusion that the existence of 小 described is relative to a set of linguistic 
categories is to commit what Searle calls the use-mention fallacy^^^. We 
simply have no reason to attach [II] to MR, whether as an implication or as a 
component; it is simply irrelevant to MR. 
Therefore, we can conclude that while internal realism is not 
essentially distinguishable from relativism, metaphysical realism is not 
necessarily incompatible with the phenomenon of conceptual relativity (which 
relative to a specific culture. 
155 Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 17. 
156 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 165. 
157 "Ifwe try to take these arguments as counting against ER [external realism], we commit a massive 
use-mention fallacy: From the fact that a description can only be made relative to a set of linguistic 
categories, it does not follow that the facts/objects/states of affairs,/etc., described can only exist 
relative to a set of categories", in Searle, p. 166. Simon Blackbum raises a similar doubt, see his 
"Enchanting Views", in Putnam and His Critics, p. 13-30. In the fmal chapter of this book, Putnam 
gives a response which, in my opinion, is weak and slippery, trying to avoid rather than face the 
charge. See chapter 10 "Comments and Replies", especially p.248-251. 
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Putnam considers to be the main defect of it), and hence we have no ground 
to accept the former and reject the latter. 
Above all, internal realism, as a subjective interpretation of the idea of 
objective reality, is condemned to fail because we simply cannot give up the 
idea of objective reality. According to Nagel, in speculating about world, we 
cannot but begin from the idea that there is some way the world is and 
understand any plausible theory as providing a candidate for what the world is 
in itself: 
We do not get to the idea of how the world is from the 
appearances; rather, we begin with that idea, since the 
appearances from which we start are ways in which the world 
appears to be. We may decide after reflection and further 
observation that some of these are mere appearances, that the 
world is not like that after all. But this always represents a 
modification in our view of the world, based on alternative 
possibilities and reasons for preferring some of them to others. 
What we cannot avoid is the idea that something is the case, 
even if we don't know what it i s ， 
Even the hypothesis "the world is nothing but what is perceived by me", if it is 
sensible at all, must be understood as advancing the idea that the world we 
used to consider to consist of various people and objects external to me is in 
fact a world which consists of only me and my perception. Such hypothesis, 
nevertheless, is not about me but the way the world, which contains (or is 
even identical with) me, is in itself. Accordingly, internal realism can only be 
understood as a hypothesis proposing that what we used to think to be an 
objective world is in fact a product of our viewpoint, and such a proposal is 
sensible only if we take it as representing what is really the case. The 
metaphor "the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world—， 
if it is intelligible at all, can only be a metaphor of what the world is in itself. 
It is sure that we can and do always discover what we used to think to 
be the case turns out to be unreal. The world as it is in itself may contain 
^'' LW, p. 81. 
159 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. xi. 
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much less than we have thought. However, such doubt cannot be applied to 
the whole realm of objective reality, i.e. we cannot reject the idea altogether. 
We cannot occupy a position from which we can make such claim intelligibly. 
To make sense of the assertion "^ is only real relative to P，，，we cannot but 
admit that this represents what is objectively the case. If fact, any assertion 
we made, any belief we endorse commit us to this claim either explicitly or 
implicitly. It is how we naturally consider our thought to be and any alternative 
seems implausible. The idea of objective reality, in this light, is simply another 
instance ofunrevisable intuitive belief. 
；丨 I 丨  
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4 
THE CONFLICT 
In the above discussion, we have examined the three fundamental 
concepts of Nagel's philosophy: intuition, viewpoint and reality. We have 
explained what Nagel's trust of intuition means and why it is rational. Then 
we have examined three undeniable intuitive facts: 
① As reflective beings, we can view the world and ourselves from 
both a more subjective and a relatively more objective view. 
② There is subjective fact, i.e. a part of reality which is 
essentially connected to viewpoints. 
③ Reality as a whole is independent of any viewpoint. 
According to Nagel,① to ③ represent our beliefs of three intuitive facts that we 
cannot sensibly doubt or deny, and we must acknowledge them no matter 
what specific theory of reality - of what there really is and what we really 
should do - we endorse. It does not mean that they are foundational in the 
sense that all other beliefs can be derived from and/or justified by them. They 
are, however, still of great importance. On the one hand, they provide a 
simple test for the credibility of any theory about what there is and what we 
should do. Since they are undeniable, theories fail to acknowledge these 
facts are necessarily wrong. In fact, it is how Nagel argues for his specific 
reformulation of philosophical problems—. On the other hand, they provide 
the elements from which Nagel can construct a coherent and persuasive 
account of the common source of philosophical problems. In this chapter, I 
160 For a brief account of this approach, see 4.3. 
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will, basing on our preceding discussion about intuition, viewpoints and reality, 
elucidate Nagel's central claim that the deepest common source of all 
philosophical problems is ultimately the conflict between the subjective and 
the objective viewpoint. I will begin with an explication of the two subjective-
objective distinctions underlining Nagel's theory. Then, I will examine the 
nature of the conflict — what it involves, how it arises and what its significance 
is. 
4.1 Subjective and Objective Reconsidered 
From the above discussion, we learn that the distinction between 
subjective and objective is crucial for Nagel. The distinction, however, is 
drawn differently regarding viewpoint and reality. Indeed, what is most difficult 
to grasp and thus appreciate in Nagel's philosophy is his deliberate 
employment of the distinction between subjective and objective in a variety of 
senses. Basically, there are two related but distinct subjective-objective 
distinctions. Nagel himself has never given any explicit clarification of the two 
distinctions, and without a proper understanding of this distinction, we are in 
no position to appreciate the force of Nagel's reformulation of traditional 
philosophical problems.丨 believe it could be a source of misunderstanding 
and hence underestimation of his claim about the conflict between the 
subjective and the objective viewpoint as the fundamental source of all 
philosophical problems. Therefore, before discussing the nature of the 
conflict, I will first give an elucidation of the two subjective-objective 
distinctions in this section. 
"Subjective" and "objective" may be two of the most frequently used 
adjective Nagel employs in his writing. Generally speaking, the distinction is of 
a relative nature and is drawn according to the level of detachment. A is more 
objective than B if and only if A is more detached than B, and B is more 
subjective than A if and only if B is less detached than A, where A and B can 
be two viewpoints, views, conceptions, facts, properties and kinds of reality. 
Though the same terms are used, they are used in quite different ways. To be 
more precise, since there are two different senses of "detachment," there are 
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two different ways of drawing the distinction between the subjective and the 
objective. 
In describing viewpoints, views and conceptions, subjective and 
objective are employed in the epistemological sense, referring to the mode of 
understanding, i.e. how something is understood. Here, detachment means 
detachment from the particularity of the viewer in viewing an object. Primarily, 
the distinction is employed in qualifying our methods of understanding and 
their resulting conceptions^^\ If we try to understand an object by detaching 
as far as possible from the particularity of any viewpoint, we are adopting the 
objective method. If, on the other hand, we try to make sense of the specific 
content of a view by deliberately committing to and exploiting as far as 
possible the specific viewpoint from which the view is derived, we are using 
the subjective method. 
An objective conception of 0，which is obtained by objective 
detachment, does not care about how 0 appears to any particular viewpoint 
but aspires to discard the influence of the particularity of the viewer as far as 
possible in order to reveal the real nature of 0，i.e. how 0 is in itself. 
Regarding an object 0，a view VO[n] is more objective than another view 
VO[n-1] if and only if it is viewed from a more objective viewpoint P[n], which 
commits less to the particularity of the viewer, and includes in it both VO[n-1] 
and the viewpoint P[n-1] from which VO[n-1] is derived. VO[n-1], in this case, 
is more subjective than VO[n]. Here, we should always remember one very 
important point. Both VO[n] and VO[n-1] claim to represent reality in intent, 
though it may turn out that VO[n-1] should be revised or even abandoned in 
the light of VO[n]^^^. Accordingly, an objective conception always claims to be 
the conception of reality, which alone reveals what is really the case. 
On the other hand, we can obtain a subjective conception of an 
object 0 through the method of subjective imagination. Such a subjective 
conception is different from the conception which is revealed to be subjective 
…"Objectivity is a method of understanding. It is beliefs and attitudes that are objective in the 
primary sense," in VFN, p. 4. 
162 Physical science is such an enterprise. It aims at representing the world from an absolutely detached 
viewpoint so that an absolute conception of reality, which is free from any subjective influence, can be 
formed. For the idea of absolute conception of reality, see Bemard Williams' Descartes: The Project 
of Pure Enquiry, pp. 64-68. 
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by objective detachment, in that it is a deliberate attempt to make sense of the 
specific content of how something appears to a certain viewpoint by actively 
taking up the viewpoint. Notice that what it claims to represent is just how 0 
appears to the viewpoint. Such conception may or may not represent the real 
nature of 0 . The point, however, is that it is simply not its concern, and, given 
the possibility ofdistortion, it is impotent to guarantee that what it represents is 
the reality of 0 . This point can be illustrated with the following examples. 
When 丨 try to understand how grasses taste to a sheep,丨 have to engage in 
subjective imagination, by taking up its viewpoint. Suppose it is possible and I 
do succeed in doing so. What 丨 can know is only that how grasses taste to a 
sheep. Whether it represents the real nature of grass is neither my concern 
here nor what can be guaranteed by our subjective approach. Or we can 
consider the case of anthropological understanding of the behaviours of a 
culture different from ours. Suppose you encounter a tribe whose members 
never chop down any trees in their habitat but kill all the snakes they find. In 
order to understand their behaviours, you have to take up their viewpoint and 
try to understand the vast body of beliefs they endorse. In this case, you may 
discover that they do so because they believe that every tree is inhabited by a 
spirit which protects them and that snakes feed on these spirits. You can 
never make sense of their behaviour from your own point of view or a 
detached standpoint without engaging in subjective imagination, exploiting 
their worldview in your understanding. The fact that you can now form a 
subjective conception of how the world appears to the members of the 
community and hence understand the meaning of their behaviours, however, 
does nothing to guarantee that their worldview represents reality in itself. It is 
of course possible that there are really spirits living in the trees and that 
snakes really eat these spirits, but that is not what a subjective conception is 
supposed to tell. 
Besides characterizing our mode of understanding, Nagel also 
employs the subjective-objective distinction in the metaphysical sense, 
referring to the mode ofbeing, i.e. how something is, when it is used to qualify 
objects, facts, properties and reality. Here, detachment refers to the 
detachment of an object from a viewpoint. Generally speaking, a fact is 
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objective if and only if it is in no way related to any viewpoint, and is subjective 
if and only if it is essentially related to a viewpoint. From this general 
characterization, it seems that in regard to facts, the distinction between 
subjective and objective should be all-or-nothing. It seems that it "makes no 
sense (in this sense) to say that the distinction between subjective and 
objective facts is a matter of degree: facts either involve consciousness or they 
do not,i63 It is, however, at odd with Nagel's claim that we may "think of 
reality as a set of concentric spheres, progressively revealed as we detach 
gradually from the contingencies of the self."^^^ Should we abandon Nagel's 
bizarre view? 
In my opinion, there is an interpretation of Nagel's claim that will make 
it much more plausible. The key point is to take the distinction of subjective 
and objective as being applied within the realm of subjective reality. We have 
distinguished two senses of "being independent of any viewpoint," and hence 
two senses of "objective". In the strict sense, what is objective is what is in 
no way related to any viewpoint, while, in the loose sense, it refers to objects 
whose existence does not require any viewer to view it (see 3.1). Accordingly, 
we can intelligibly assert that subjective facts are objective in the loose sense 
that their existence is independent of their being viewed by a further viewer, 
i 
though they are not objective in the strict sense since they are essentially 
connected to v iewpoints， 
To avoid confusion, let's replace "objective" (in the metaphysical 
sense) in the loose sense with "real" and retain the word to what is objective 
in the strict sense, i.e. in no way related to any viewpoint. Accordingly, 0 is 
real is if and only if its existence does not consist in its being viewed by any 
viewers. 0 is subjectively real, if and only if it is essentially connected to 
viewpoints but its existence does not consist in its being viewed by any 
163 Colin Mcginn, "Nagel: The View FromNowhere", p. 90. 
164 VFN, p. 5. Mcggin has also pointed it out, but he only complains that Nagel does not sufficiently 
wam us against such confusion, see "Nagel: The View From Nowhere", p. 90. 
165 One peculiar instance of this kind of fact is the existence of viewpoints. No one can deny that there 
is viewpoint because the very denial itself implies its existence. This fact is, of course, subjective, for 
it essentially connects to viewpoints, but it is simultaneously a fact in the objective order, i.e. any 
viewpoint is a viewpoint in the world. Though each viewpoint can generate and make up its own 
world, the viewpoint itself must be situated in the objective world. Suppose everything in the world 
owns their existence to my viewpoint. In this case, I am the God, but this absolute viewpoint must still 
be objective in the loose sense. In other words, even ifthe world contains only me and my imagination 
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viewers. Finally, 0 is objectively real if and only if it is in no way related to any 
viewpoint and exists independently of its being viewed. On this level, the 
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is all-or-nothing: 0 is either 
objectively real or subjectively real. It makes no sense to say a thing or a fact 
is more subjective or objective than another is. 
However, that two objects are both subjectively real does not entail 
that they are equally subjective. Though they are both essentially related to a 
certain viewpoint (thus subjective), they can be related to it to a different 
degree. That is, it may be the case that one of the object is related to a 
viewpoint which consists of elements less specific to the particular viewer than 
the other. If there is something which is essentially related to the particularity 
of a specific viewer, it is more subjective than one which is essentially related 
to a human point of view. This would in turn be more subjective than another 
object or fact which is essentially related to the viewpoint of reflective beings 
in general. That means, within the realm of subjective reality, there may be 
some facts which are more detached from the particularity of a certain viewer 
than others. Conceived in this way, this is absolutely intelligible to say that 
some portions of reality are more objective (or subjective) than the others. 
From the above discussion, we can see the complexity of Nagel's 
conception of subjectivity and objectivity. As we will see, the interplay 
between the epistemological and the metaphysical subjectivity and objectivity 
plays an essential role in Nagel's theory of the nature of our philosophical 
puzzlement. 
4.2 The Nature of the Conflict 
This section will be divided into two parts. In 4.21，I will give a general 
picture of what a world with reflective beings like us is like and how this gives 
rise to the possibility of any conflict between the subject and objective 
viewpoints. Then,丨 will explicate the nature of this conflict in detail in 4.22. 
(or creation), it is what the world is in itself, not for me or any other viewpoints. 
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4.21 The General Picture of the World 
We human beings, like any other things, exist in an independent 
world, which as a whole is not the product of any viewpoint. However, we are 
distinct from other things in the world in that we are conscious. To be 
conscious is to view (i.e. perceive and/or conceive) the world and form a view 
V (perception and/or conception) of it from a particular viewpoint P (i.e. a 
particular set of - spatio-temporal, physical, psychological, cultural and 
historical - pre-conditions). Furthermore, unlike other animals, we are capable 
of self-consciousness. That is, we are not only conscious of some object 
(which appears to me in a specific way) but also the very conscious act of 
viewing, and we are always able to recall that it is me who had or is having an 
awareness of the object. 
Besides perceiving, we are also capable of conceptual thinking, a 
power which enables us to form beliefs. It makes our view of the world 
different essentially from that of other merely-perceptual beings: our view is 
made up of a set of beliefs about the world. The set of beliefs constitutes our 
understanding or the conception of the world and ourselves. These beliefs 
have a built-in objective claim, which always claim to represent the world as it 
really is, i.e. independent of any particular viewpoint. In holding a belief, we 
cannot but take it as representing what is really the case. To believe that 
there is a guitar beside me is to believe that it is notjust an appearance to me, 
but a real fact. To say that I believe there is a guitar beside me but it is just 
what appears to me to be the case is either to talk nonsense or to deny the 
former belief. It amounts to saying that our view of the world always claims to 
represent the world as it really is in itself. 
Though all our beliefs have, at least, an implicit objective claim, it may 
turn out that some of our beliefs are false. With our self-consciousness, we 
may discover that what we once thought to be really the case represents only 
what the world appears to us in a particular manner because of our specific 
constitution. Once we are aware of it, this possibility is enough to undermine 
our confidence in our beliefs and we begin to doubt their objective claim. In 
order to keep a belief, we demands a justification for it, which should show 
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that our view represents not only what is the case for us but also what is the 
case in itself. It naturally draws our attention back to our viewpoint - our 
spatial position first, then our physical and psychological constitution and 
finally our cultural and historical background. While these factors are the 
preconditions that enable us to form the view we have about the world, they 
also limit, at least partly, what this view can be. The recognition of this fact 
generates the need to examine all these factors from a more detached point 
of view so that any distortion due to our specific personal condition can be 
discarded: 
The object [of objective detachment] is to discount for the features of 
our pre-reflective outlook that make things appear to us as they do, 
and thereby to reach an understanding of things as they really are. We 
flee the subjective under the pressure of an assumption that everything 
must be something not to any point of view, but in itself.^ ®® 
That means our self-consciousness is more than just a form of 
perception. With our conceptual capability，we are able to examine ourselves 
and articulate the relation between our view and viewpoint. In this sense, we 
are reflective beings. As reflective beings, we can always conceive the world 
and ourselves from a relatively more objective viewpoint. We take our 
viewpoint and view as the object of a higher level of reflective consciousness. 
In this act of reflecting, we try to detach as much as possible from our 
particularity and aim at regarding “the world as centerless, with the viewer as 
just one of its content—. Through this process of detachment, we hope to 
achieve a comprehensive understanding of what the world is in itself. The 
former view and the corresponding viewpoint, from this more detached, 
objective standpoint, is now shown to be more subjective, in the sense that it 
commits more to our particularity^®^. 
At first glance, this more detached objective viewpoint seems to be 
superior and more reliable. As mentioned above, reality as a whole is 
166 "Subjective and Objective," inMQ, p. 208. 
167 lbid., p. 206. Here, Nagel only took the belief that "everything must be something not to any point 
ofview, but in itself，as an assumption. However, as we have discussed in chapter 3，he now claims 
that it is rationally undeniable. 
168 Here, the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" is used in an epistemological sense as 
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independent of any viewpoint. How can the world, in which we found 
ourselves, contains any feature which is accessible only to us? If there are 
really rocks in the world, what they are must be different from what they 
appear fo us. If a rock exists independent of any viewers, a true view of it 
must be one which is free from any influence of any viewpoint. If it looks grey 
only when it is perceived under a certain kind of light by a certain type of 
viewer, it is reasonable to assume that it is grey not in itself but only in relation 
to a specific viewpoint. Since how something appears to a viewer is inevitably 
affected by the nature of his viewpoint, it seems that the most reliable way to 
achieve a precise and comprehensive view of the world in itself is to eliminate 
the influence of his viewpoint as much as possible. Accordingly, a viewpoint 
is necessarily distorting. As a result, the less a view relies on the particularity 
of the viewer - i.e. the more objective the view, - the more reliable it is as a 
representation of what is really the case. Therefore, we should modify, correct 
or even abandon ourformer, more subjective beliefs. 
It seems to make perfect sense when what we are considering are 
some physical things, or the physical aspect of things. If there is any physical 
(aspect of) thing at all, it must be something independent of any viewpoint— 
It means that any true understanding of physical things must be (in the strict 
sense) objective, i.e. understanding without essentially referring to any 
viewpoint. However, we have seen that there is also subjective (in the 
metaphysical sense) reality, i.e. the part of reality which is essentially 
connected to viewpoints. The viewpoints, in relation to this kind of fact, are 
constitutive, i.e. they give rise to or are a part of these facts. We have already 
seen how it is compatible with the claim that reality as a whole is independent 
of any viewpoint and a proper understanding of it make reference to them 
essentially (see section 3.2). This means that there are two irreducible 
regions of reality: the objective and the subjective. 
What has just been said, of course, does not mean that we have a 
unified and comprehensive conception of reality as a whole. To put it in 
attributes to "view" and "viewpoint." See 4.1 above. 
169 It may be said that, as suggested by Nagel's dual aspect theory, physical things can also be related to 
viewpoints. If it is the case, it is not clear why we should call these things physical at all. It would 
invite less confusion if we describe these things as having both a physical and a perspectival aspect. 
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Putnam's terminology, the fact that we do have the concepts of "reality", 
"subjective reality" and "objective reality" does not entail that we also have a 
clear conception about t h e m ^ . So far, all we know is only that there is a real 
world with both subjective and objective facts and the general characterization 
of them. We, however, have not specified what facts, subjective or objective, 
are real and what their characteristics are. To have a comprehensive 
understanding of reality, we have to form a coherent conception - i.e. a set of 
beliefs - of reality, of a world in which we reflective human beings find 
ourselves. Nagel has never provided such a unified conception. In fact, one 
of his claims is that "often the pursuit of a highly unified conception of life and 
the world leads to philosophical mistakes 一 to false reductions or to the refusal 
to recognize part of what is real". Why is it the case? If it is true that we can 
make sense of the concept of subjective and objective reality, why can't we 
achieve a unified conception of reality? What is a unified conception of 
reality? Here, we finally come to the central claim of Nagel: we cannot not 
achieve a unified conception of reality because of our reflective nature, i.e. the 
very fact that we can and do occupy two different 一 the subjective and the 
objective -viewpoints in viewing the same object, and at some point, the 
resulting views are conflicting. What does it mean? 
4.22 The Conflict 
In "Subjective and Objective", Nagel, for the first time, formulated what he 
considers to be the central problem of philosophy - in the sense that it is the 
common source of all philosophical problems - in the following passage: 
The problem is one of opposition between subjective and 
170 "When we translate a word as, says, temperature we equate the reference and, to the extent that we 
stick to our translation, the sense of the translated expression with that of our own term 'temperature', 
at least as we use it in that context... In this sense we equate the ‘concept’ in question with our own 
‘concept，of temperature. But so doing is compatible with the fact that the seventeenth-century 
scientists, or whoever, may have had a different conception of temperature, that is a different set of 
beliefs about it and its nature than we do, different ‘images ofknowledge', and different ultimate 
beliefs about many other matters as well", see Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 117. In the 
original context, Putnam is discussing the Kuhn's incommensurability thesis and charging him as 
confusing concept with conception. 
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objective points of view. There is a tendency to seek an 
objective account of everything before admitting its reality. But 
often what appears to a more subjective point of view cannot be 
accounted for in this way. So either the objective conception of 
the world is incomplete, or the subjective involves illusions that 
should be rejected.^^^ 
Later, he devotes a whole book, The View from Nowhere, to tackle the 
aforementioned problem, namely "how to combine the perspective of a 
particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, 
the person and his viewpoint included"^^^. This, according to Nagel, is a 
problem that "faces every creature with the impulse and the capacity to 
transcend its particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole". 
If what Nagel says is true, philosophical problems are unavoidable to all 
reflective beings and hence justified as real problems for us. 
In the last section, we have delineated the general picture of what the 
world with reflective beings is like. It contains both subjective and objective 
facts, and beings that reflect upon it. Reflection, as we have discussed in 2.2, 
is the conscious attempt of revealing, clarifying, explicating and justifying 
one's viewpoint and hence the view from which it arises from a more 
detached viewpoint. It is driven by our awareness of the possibility that our 
particular beliefs may not represent what the world really is and our impulse to 
understand the world as it is. Since many of our beliefs are about the externa! 
world, we, in trying to achieve a true understanding of the world, naturally 
regard our viewpoints as distorting and try to form a view that is as detached 
as possible. Such advance in objectivity is proved to be a great success in 
physical science，which has the physical world (or the physical aspect of the 
world) as its object. As the physical world is an objective world independent 
of any viewpoint, it is tempting to draw the conclusion that it alone is the real 
world. Here, "physical" is taken as the synonym of "objective", which is in 
turns understood as "real". Accordingly, anything which is not physical, such 
as mental states and values, is at most only appearance of something 
171 "Subjective and Objective", inMQ, p. 196. 
172 vFN, p. 3. Since the theme ofthis essay is the foundation ofNagel's reformulation of traditional 
philosophical problems, I would not discuss issues concerning the reconciliation ofthe conflict. 
118 
The Foundation of The Philosophy Of Thomas Nagel 
objective and not part of reality. It seems to follow that the only reliable 
method of understanding reality is objective detachment, which aspires to 
leave any viewpoint behind. 
However, we have seen that the equation among "physical", 
"objective" and "real" is unjustified. What is real admits subjective elements 
and what is objective need not be physical. It leaves room for the method of 
subjective imagination in our understanding of the world. To understand the 
view VO of a viewer X about an object 0，one must take into account of and, 
at least to a sufficient extent, take up the specific viewpoint P that gives rise to 
it and try to understand VO from within. An objective account of an alien 
view is sure to leave much out and cannot do much to advance our 
understanding. Though VO may not really represent what 0 is, the fact that 0 
appears to Vas VO is real as an appearance. If appearance is part of reality 
and our aim is to understand everything real, subjective imagination is surely 
indispensable and irreplaceable. 
Up till now, it seems that it goes perfectly smooth and there is not any 
conflict at all. It is true that we can understand the same object 0 from two 
viewpoints of different levels of objectivity, forming two different views. They 
are surely different, for they commit to a different degree to the particularity of 
the viewer. We can also admit that, if the object of our understanding is the 
world as a whole, both objective detachment and subjective imagination are 
partial. It, however, does not mean that the two methods, and hence the two 
views, are conflicting, since the purposes that drive us to employ the two 
different methods of understanding are different. We employ objective 
detachment in order to understand the aspect of the world which is 
independent of any viewpoint. Though it may be able to accommodate the 
existence of views and viewpoints in the objective (in the sense of being real) 
order under appropriate interpretation^^^, it surely leaves out the content or 
the "most specific qualities— of these subjective facts, which can only be 
173 "The aim was to place perspectives and their contents in a world seen from no particular point of 
view", in VFN, p. 25. 
口4 Ibid. 
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adequately understood from the corresponding viewpoints^^^. However, such 
an understanding can be supplemented by subjective imagination, which aims 
at making sense of the content of the view as an appearance. Whether the 
view represents the real world as it is in itself is，at least in this case, not its 
concern. In other words, we can say that while objective detachment 
concerns about what there really is the case, subjective imagination is 
employed to understand what the particular content - phenomenological 
qualia in the case of perception and particular claims and beliefs in the case 
of conception (says, conceptions of freedom and value) - of a view is. 
Consider the case of colour: 
Instead of conceiving the world as full of colored objects, we 
conceive it as full of objects with primary qualities that affect 
human vision in certain subjectively understandable ways. The 
distinction between appearance and objective reality becomes 
the object of a new, mixed understanding that combines 
subjective and objective elements and that is based on 
recognition of the limits of objectivity. Here there is no conflict.^^® 
In other words, if detachment can take ail objective facts into account 
and imagination can specify the content of all subjective facts, they together 
should form a comprehensive and unified conception of the world as it is. 
Certainly, we have not achieved and are not likely to achieve such a 
comprehensive view. We may even follow Nagel to admit that the best view 
we can ever achieve will still leave out a vast portion of reality, given the 
limitation in our conceptual capacity in conceiving both the objective aspect of 
the world and the subjective content of some unimaginable kinds of mind. 
Nonetheless, there is still not the slightest sign of conflict between the 
175 "There are limits of objectivity as a form of understanding that follow from the fact that it leaves the 
subjective behind. These are inner limits. There are also outer limits of objectivity that fall at different 
points for different types of beings, and that depend not on the nature of objectivity but on how far it 
can be pursued by a given individual. Objectivity is only a way of extending one's grasp of the world, 
and besides leaving certain aspects of reality behind, it may fail to reach others, even if more powerful 
forms of objectivity could encompass them", in VFN, p. 99. 
176 The example is supplied by Nagel, see VFN, p. 87 
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subjective and the objective viewpoint or view^^^. 
When do such conflict occur? It occurs when: 
...something appears to require subjective and objective 
conceptions that cover the same territory, and that cannot be 
combined into a single complex but consistent view. This is 
particularly likely with respect to our understanding of ourselves, 
and it is at the source of some of the most difficult problems of 
philosophy, including the problems of personal identity, free will, 
and the meaning of life.^^^ 
What Nagel means is quite clear. It is not the case that the subjective and the 
objective viewpoints always clash. When what we are concerned are objective 
facts, the objective view should always be dominant and the subjective view 
serves only as a supplement of the specific qualities of our view about these 
facts as appearances. It is obvious in the case of colour. Pre-reflectively, we 
believe that colour is a quality of external objects. On reflection, we discover 
that it is in fact a product of both the external world and its effects on our 
sensory organs. With this discovery, we modify our former view and form a 
new picture of the world in which colour is considered to be a secondary 
quality of the external objects. While the subjective viewpoint is indispensable 
in understanding the specific quality of colour, i.e. what a particular colour is 
like for a particular viewer, it does nothing to challenge the claim of the 
objective viewpoint because ontologically, objective facts are neither 
constituted by nor related to any viewpoint. That means, with regard to an 
objective object 0，we can reconcile the two viewpoints by insisting that the 
objective view should dominate over the subjective, representing the true 
nature of 0 , while admitting that 0 does appear to the viewer as V 0 from P. 
There is no resistance from the subjective viewpoint. 
Nevertheless, when our understanding turns back to ourselves, to the 
nature of reflective beings that understand and view from their viewpoint, the 
177 This is the question raised by Vinit Haksar. He tries to argue that "the most that we are entitled to 
claim is that the objective picture is incomplete, in need of supplementation'‘. See his "Nagel on 
Subjective and Objective," in Inquiry 24, 105-121. 
178 VFN, p. 87. my italics. 
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situation is far more complicated. We are not only able to view objective facts 
but can also form self-conception of ourselves. It is certain that some aspects 
of us - our physical constitution, physiological structure and biological 
development - can be accounted for objectively without referring to any 
viewpoint. However, it is equally obvious that we are reflective beings, whose 
reflective nature is revealed in two aspects. On the one hand, we are 
reflective thinkers who aspire to understand reality and are capable of 
reflecting upon the pre-conditions which give rise to our belief. We can and 
do examine which beliefs are endorsed out of ignorance and prejudice, and 
which are grounded on reasons. On the other hand, we are reflective agents 
who act according to our will and are able to reflect upon the motives and 
principles according to which we act. We can and do examine whether what 
we take to be reasons for our action are in fact disguised bias and prejudice. 
As in the case of objective facts, how we appear to ourselves may be 
distorted by the particularity of our viewpoint and hence may not represent our 
real nature. Our awareness of this demands us to reflect further to achieve an 
undistorted view of ourselves by objective detachment, leaving as much 
particularity as possible. Given our aim of understanding the real nature of 
ourselves and we are just part of the objective world, such a demand seems 
perfectly reasonable. Accordingly, it seems that we should accept an 
objective view of ourselves as the only real picture. While it may not be 
actually accomplished, we should take it as our ideal. 
However, things do not go so smoothly this time. “The trouble 
occurs when the objective view encounters something, revealed subjectively, 
that it cannot a c c o m m o d a t e . ^ Some of the most essential features - mind, 
freedom, meaning of life, value and reason - of reflective beings are 
unaccountable in objective terms, while, unlike colour, they claim to be more 
than just appearance but reality in itself, and it is at this point the two 
viewpoints clash. 
The conflict is most obviously revealed in our attempt to conceive our 
minds. We all have a natural impulse of understanding the world. We are not 
179 "Subjective and Objective,"inM0, p. 210. 
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satisfied with just knowing what there is but further demand a comprehensive 
understanding of its characteristics. We all admit that there is consciousness, 
but we don't know its exact nature. Is it just an instance of objective fact, or 
something irreducibIy subjective? First of all, it seems, as Nagel argues，that 
whatever there is must be objective, in the sense that it is located in the 
objective order. Even subjective facts are objective in this loose sense if it is 
real. What then do we need to know to achieve an adequate understanding 
of consciousness? Different answers are available, depending on how 
objectivity is understood. If the objective view is the only view to be trusted 
and the only form of an objective view is the physical one, consciousness can 
only be something physical. A mental process, (says pain), which seems to 
involve essentially the fact what it is like to be X，is simply the appearance of 
something more fundamental, namely a physical process (says C-fibre firing). 
A physical account of the nature of consciousness is exhaustive and no 
reference to any viewpoint is required. In other words, if we understand the 
physical nature of consciousness, we understand everything real about it. Of 
course, one endorses the objective view of consciousness need not accept 
the physicalist account above. He may argue that though mental process 
should be something objective, it need not be identified with any physical 
process. What is important is that all mental processes (says, pain) tend to 
produce behaviors — verbal and non-verbal actions and reactions that are 
objectively observable and understandable (says shouting when being hurt, 
moving away from the fire that burns me, etc.). Mental process, in this sense, 
is only the tendency to behave in certain ways. According to such a 
behaviourist account, once we have specified the totality of action-tendency of 
a man, we have fully described his consciousness. 
The common Pan-objectivist assumption of all these reductionist 
theoriesi8o is that everything real is objective and can be objectively 
understood. Accordingly, consciousness, if it is something real, can be 
understood exhaustively by some objective means. The assumption is 
attractive because it is in accord with the belief that what is real is objective, 
and it guarantees that we can have an exhaustive understanding of 
180 Other examples are functionalism and eliminative materialism. 
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consciousness and hence the world. If consciousness involves something 
essentially subjective, its real nature and its specific quality cannot be 
understood objectively and it cannot occupy a place in the objective order. 
The fatal mistake of Pan-objectivism is that it tries to understand 
consciousness as independent of viewpoints. It is condemned to fail since 
consciousness is essentially link to viewpoints. The recognition of this even 
drives some philosophers to deny its existence^^^ We have discussed why 
Pan-objectivism is wrong in 3.2. We have to admit that consciousness is real 
and its distinct features 一 its phenomenological properties - can only be 
understood subjectively. Objective and subjective facts are irreducible to 
each other. It seems tempting to draw the conclusion that while objective facts 
should only be understood objectively, subjective facts like consciousness 
should only be conceived subjectively and there is still no obvious conflict 
between the two viewpoints. Instead, the subjective and the objective 
conception of ourselves are complementary to each other. 
...if we reject the mind-brain identity theory, as Nagel and Kripke 
do, then the subjectivist's claim will not conflict with the objectivist 
approach, but rather be complementary to it 一 the objectivist 
approach would study brain-states, the subjectivist approach 
would be needed to study the inner mental states. In any case, 
even if the mind-brain identity theory were true, what this would 
show is that the subjectivist approach is in principle redundant, it 
would not show that the two approaches would be in coIlisionJ®^ 
From the discussion of the various distinctions between subjectivity and 
objectivity, we are in a better position to evaluate Nagel's claim about the 
clash between them. Our reflection upon our consciousness aims at 
discovering its real nature. For example, in studying the phenomenon of pain, 
what we want to know is what pain really is, i.e. what is really happening when 
丨 feel pain. Though the subjective character of pain can only be conceived by 
taking up the corresponding viewpoint subjectively, a subjective conception, in 
this case, fails to give us what we want. For those who are able to share our 
181 It is the strategy ofDaniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained and Paul Churchland's Matter and 
Consciousness. 
182 Vinit Haksar, "Nagel on Subjective and Objective", p. 106. 
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viewpoint, they certainly know what pain feel to us. But what can they say 
about our pain? All they can say is that pain is this kind of feeling for us, and 
it clearly explains nothing about pain. It is precisely such dissatisfaction 
which drives so many philosophers to adopt a reductionist account of 
consciousness. Though it is a groundless over-reaction, it is understandable. 
A genuine explanation of the reality of pain must be, at least, to a certain 
extent, and in some sense, objective (epistemologically) since it is what claims 
to represents the reality from no particular point of view. It, then, seems that 
the best explanation for pain is that the feeling of pain is in reality the mere 
appearance of something objective (metaphysically) - certain action-tendency 
or brain states - to us. Here, the objective viewpoint claims dominance over 
the subjective one. The subjective viewpoint, however, resists, for it would 
amount to saying that pain is something not essentially related to any 
viewpoint, which is obviously wrong. Though we may not be able to specify 
the real nature of pain, the fact that pain is something subjectively real is 
undeniable. 
The above discussion about the mind-body problem can be 
generalized. To begin with, the stalemate first lies in the contradiction 
between two equally undeniable facts. Firstly, there is，as we have 
established, subjective reality and it can only be understood subjectively, l fwe 
try to understand a subjective fact from the absolutely objective viewpoint, i.e. 
the view from nowhere, we are doomed to leave out what we want to 
understand. It means that while subjective reality must be acknowledged from 
the absolutely objective viewpoint, we can never specify its specific qualities 
without taking up the viewpoint. In this sense, due to the subjective nature of 
the object of understanding, the subjective viewpoint claims dominance over 
the objective one. 
However, the subjective view is undermined by the insistence of a 
more objective one to claim dominance over it even if the fact that subjective 
facts should be understood subjectively is acknowledged. The fact that any 
exhaustive understanding of the real nature of subjective facts is subjective 
does not rule out the aforementioned possibility that what is revealed to a 
particular viewpoint may merely be appearance and not something real. We 
do sometimes find ourselves falsely "remember" something which we never 
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experience. Besides subjective facts, there are also subjective illusions. 
There is no guarantee that what we understand is true, representing the world 
as it is, unless it can be established from a more objective v iewpoint .， 
Here, we can see how the conflict between the subjective and the 
objective arises and why it is so difficult to resolve. It arises in our attempt to 
understand the real nature of subjective reality. On the one hand, while the 
objective view is the correct view about what there really is, all it can achieve is 
at most the acknowledgment of the existence of subjective facts and it fails to 
provide any adequate account for them. On the other hand, while the 
subjective viewpoint is more appropriate in understanding subjective facts, it 
cannot guarantee what is revealed to it about itself is real and not illusive. 
However, it cannot accept the verdict that what is revealed to it, especially 
some features we consider to be central and essential to reflecting beings, is 
mere appearance either. They come to a total deadlock because both of 
them claim dominance over but are rejected by the other: 
The opposition between subjective and objective can arise at any 
place on the spectrum where one point of view claims dominance 
over another, more subjective one, and that claim is resisted.^^^ 
Such conflict, Nagel argues, underlines all philosophical problems. 
Consider the problem of free will^^^. Pre-reflectively, we take for granted that 
we as reflective agents are free, which is revealed in our sense of autonomy 
and responsibility. We naturally regard that we can and do act according to 
our will and hence should be responsible for what we have done. Suppose I 
go into a supermarket and buy a packet of GG chocolate. It is natural for me 
to regard this as my voluntary action, something I do out of my own decision. 
However, it may turn out that the real cause of my very act of buying is simply 
that 丨 am persuaded or manipulated by its repetitious commercial 
advertisement unconsciously, together with my characteristics, my early 
environment and my genetic makeup over which 丨 have no control. I only 
seem to be free from this pre-reflective viewpoint. That is not what I’ as a 
183 "Subjective and Objective", in MQ, p. 206. 
184 See Nagel's "Moral Luck" and "Subjective and Objective" in MQ, and Chapter VII of VFN. 
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reflective agent, want. In order to ensure that what I do is free from any 
external manipulation, I begin to examine the motives and reasons involved in 
my decision. In order words, I am trying to examine my previous view from a 
more objective viewpoint. By this and only this objective detachment, I am 
able to ensure and increase my freedom by eliminating whatever I would not 
accept consciously and rationally and basing all my decision on my deliberate 
rational choice as far as possible. 
Nevertheless, this objective detachment, if carried out too far, would 
undermine our sense of freedom. When viewed from a highly objective 
viewpoint, our actions are merely instances of events happening in the world. 
Whether they are causally determined is not the point. Even if it can be 
shown that determinism is wrong, it doesn't render the concept of free agency 
any more intelligible: 
...free agency is not implied by the absence of determinism, even 
though it appears to be threatened by the presence of determinism. 
Uncaused acts are no more attributable to the agent than those caused 
by antecedent circumstances.^ ®^ 
Once our action is viewed objectively as an event, there is simply no room for 
our agency. Since the objective view presents itself as the correct view of 
reality, it seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that we only appear to 
ourselves to be free. It amounts to saying that our sense of autonomy and 
hence responsibility is just an illusion for us, even if it is an inevitable one. 
The relentless reliance on the objective view is expressed in various forms of 
determinism, whose central claim is that "there are laws of nature, like those 
that govern the movement of the planets, which govern everything that 
happens in the world - and that in accordance with those laws，the 
circumstances before an action determine that it will happen，and rule out any 
other possibility"i86. 
Such a conclusion, however, is intuitively unacceptable, in that it 
contradicts with the very idea of reflective agency, the self-image that we are 
185 Vinit Haksar, "Nagel on Subjective and Objective", p. 106. 
'^^ Mean, pp. 51-52. 
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in no position to abandon. Though it is possible that many of our "actions" are 
indeed caused by some non-rational factors of which we are not conscious 
and have no control, and that sometimes we are wrong in attributing 
responsibility to ourselves or others, it seems impossible for us not to regard 
ourselves as reflective agents. Our reflective nature, that is, our ability to 
examine our previous viewpoint (in this case our desires and motives) from a 
more detached, objective viewpoint implies the practical question "what should 
I do?" whenever we act. Our awareness of the factors and preconditions that 
may have an influence on what we are going to do presses the question on us, 
and we simply have no choice but to make up my mind as to what to do, no 
matter what theory of freedom we accept.丨 may give up my choice and act 
simply according to my inclination or the majority view, but it is my decision 
nonetheless. Our freedom is, then, derived from and guaranteed by our 
reflective nature: 
We cannot evade our freedom. Once we have developed the capacity 
to recognize our own desires and motives, we are faced with the 
choice of whether to act as they incline us to act, and in facing that 
choice we are inevitably faced with an evaluative question. Even if we 
refuse to think about it, that refusal can itself be evaluated.^ ®^ 
In other words, the belief that we are free, that it is always up to me as to what 
to do, is an unrevisable intuition, a belief that we cannot question from a more 
objective position. Freedom must then be something real. Since there is no 
room for freedom from a totally detached viewpoint, the real nature of freedom 
must be conceived subjectively. The question is how subjective our 
conception of freedom should be. It cannot be too subjective. For example, 
we cannot be contended with the freedom we aware of on the pre-reflective 
level. As 丨 have mentioned, it is always possible that we misidentify our 
freedom, taking the product of some external factors that are beyond my 
control as the outcome of our will. Therefore, it must be objective to a certain 




The Foundation of The Philosophy Of Thomas Nagel 
The stalemate, as we could expect, is reached because we do not 
have any neutral position from which we can determine how subjective (or 
objective) our conception of freedom should be. As with all of the other 
philosophical problems, all that we know is simply that, in general, the true 
view about freedom is not located on the two extremes - the pre-reflective 
view or the view from nowhere - but somewhere in between. The problem, 
however, is that we cannot justify a resting place in the subjective-objective 
spectrum. As long as a certain position is adopted, we, driven by our 
reflective nature, cannot but ask, “is it really the case?" and try to form a more 
objective view. Up to a certain point, the detachment is resisted by the former 
more subjective view as being an inappropriate means of understanding the 
real nature of freedom. The claim of the objective viewpoint remains 
nonetheless and this renders the conflict intractable. In a word, the real 
problem of free will "stems from a clash between the view of action inside and 
any view of it from outside，，，— which is perceived by us as "a bafflement of 
our feelings and attitudes 一 a loss of confidence, conviction or equilibrium."^®® 
Other problems like the meaning of life^®°, death^®\ value^^^ 
ethicsi93, political theory—, and knowledge^ have the same underlying 
structure. Pre-reflectively, we take ourselves to be beings with certain 
characteristics. On reflection, some of them turn out to be illusion, 
representing only what we appear to ourselves to be and not what we really 
are. To obtain a more secured conception of ourselves, we detach more and 
more from our particularity so that distortion may be eliminated as far as 
possible. Such detachment, if practised relentlessly, may not always yield a 
result, since what we want to understand is the nature of reflective beings, 
who are essentially beings with viewpoints. At some point, the subjective 
view pulls back and resists a more objective one, but we do not know where 
to stop. While we can reasonably assume that most, if not all, of the our 
188 "Subjective and Objective" inMQ, pp. 198-199 and Chapter XI of VFN. 
189 VFN, p. 112. 
190 "The Absurd" inMQ, pp. 11-23 and VFN, pp. 214-223. 
191 "Death" in MQ, pp. 1-10 and Chapter XI of VFN. 
192 "The Fragmentation ofValue" in MQ, pp. 128-141 and Chapter VIII of VFN. 
193 Nagel has written a number of articles on the nature of ethical problems, see especially Chapter IX 
and X of VFN and Chapter 6 of LW. 194 See especially his Equality and Partiality. 
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features (meaning of life, values, freedom, concern about our death, 
skepticism toward our own attitudes and beliefs, etc.) are, if they are real at 
all, essentially related to the particularity of our viewpoints to different 
degrees, we can only obtain different conflicting views about them. 
Therefore, no unified conception of reality is likely to be achieved and the 
intemperate appetite for such a conception generates all those unacceptable 
theory of the world and ourselves. 
4.3 The Significance of Naael's Reformulation 
In the last section,丨 have explained the nature of the subjective-
objective conflict and why Nagel considers it to be the deepest common 
source of philosophical problems. If Nagel is correct, all traditional 
philosophical problems should be reformulated in terms of this conflict. They 
are mortal questions: questions of and for us， concerning the nature of 
reflective beings and arise only because of our reflective nature. The 
significance of this reformulation is threefold. Firstly, it spells out and 
explains the real nature of traditional philosophical problems. Secondly, it 
legitimizes these problems as still worth investigating in such a so-called 
"post-philosophical" era. Finally, it provides a new direction for approaching 
these problems. 
First of all, Nagel's reformation serves an explanatory function. In 
trying to capture the real sense of ourvarious philosophical perplexities by his 
unique and original reformulation of traditional philosophical problems，Nagel 
provides a better explanation to the source and nature of these problems. He 
195 C h a p t e r V o f P m 
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argues convincingly how the problems arise and why they remain 
unanswered. According to Nagel, philosophical problems arise because of 
our reflective nature, which give rise to the conflicts between a subjective and 
a relatively objective viewpoint. The past theories fail to solve these problems 
because they are not sensitive enough to such a conflict and misidentify the 
real source of the problems. They do not even have the right questions to 
answer and so they are always committed to either of the extremes implicitly. 
Utilitarianism for example, represents an Pan-objectivist moral attitude 
toward what we should do. Taking the objective view as the real picture, it 
deliberately ignores or even suppresses anything personal and subjective. I 
think most philosophers would have the following feeling. Although 
utilitarianism has its own irresolvable problems, and can neither account for all 
moral phenomena satisfactorily nor provide comprehensive guidelines for our 
action, somehow we (or even a Kantian) have to admit the importance of the 
overall utility produced by a action. Such acknowledgement seems to be 
intuitive, in that we all think it is certainly the case, an obvious fact that need 
no further reason to support. However, Nagel's reformulation can provide a 
good explanation to our dissatisfaction of and yet strong commitment to the 
utilitarian doctrine. According to Nagel, ethical problems arise because, 
regarding the question of what we should do, we can view our concerns, 
motives and interests from both a more subjective and personal and a 
relatively more objective and impersonal points of view. The conflicts 
between my interest and that of the others are primarily internal ones, 
conflicts within the individual: 
The _e rsona l standpoint in each of us produces...a powerful 
demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal 
standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements which 
present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals. The 
recognition that this is true of everyone then presents the impersonal 
standpoint with further questions about what is required to treat such 
persons with equal regard，and this in turn presents the individual with 
further conflict.''® 
The aim of our ethical deliberation is then to work out some ways to reconcile 
'''E&Q, p.4. 
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the conflicting viewpoints without suppressing either of them to an 
unreasonable extent. Now, the utilitarian maximization of overall utility has 
such a strong claim on us because it expresses a demand from our 
impersonal viewpoint. It is grounded upon our reflective nature. The 
impersonal viewpoint，however, is only one part of our selves. The demand 
from our personal viewpoint - concerns developed from and essentially 
related to our particularity - resists being swallowed up by the impersonal one 
and so rejects utilitarianism as the comprehensive ethical theory. Personal 
interests and desires should also be taken into account in ethical deliberation 
as some kind of ends we should pursue instead of a mere means of achieving 
overall happiness. Besides impersonal demands，personal or subjective 
demands are also ethical in nature. This explains why it is so difficult for us to 
endorse utilitarianism wholeheartedly, especially in the cases where the 
promotion of general interests demands tremendous sacrifice of ones' 
personal interest. Accordingly, we can see the explanatory power of Nagel's 
reformulationi97. 
Besides, the Nagelian reformulation serves a legitimizing function. 
Given it does provide a better explanation of the nature of philosophical 
problems, what we are now concerned about is the question whether such 
problems are real problems worth studying. In a word, what is the point of 
philosophizing? How can our pursuit of philosophy as something significant 
be legitimized7 A convincing answer,丨 believe， can also be provided by 
Nagel's reformulation. We have already shown that, according to Nagel: 
① The capability of transcending one's view to a more objective level and 
form more detached view is the fundamental feature of all reflective 
beings; and 
② All traditional philosophical problems have their common source of 
perplexities in the conflict between a more internal, subjective and a 
more detached, external and objective viewpoint of the same reflective 
being. 
197 Similarly, the popularity of all implausible forms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind ("What 
Does It Like To Be A Bat"), determinism and agent-causation theory regarding the problem offree will 
("Subjective and Objective" and Chapter VII of VFN), standard argument for absurdity ("The 
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① and ② together show that philosophy is inescapable for us, in the sense 
that once we are aware of our reflective nature, we cannot avoid these 
problems and they are thus worth our effort. 
It may be asked that even if all reflective beings are capable of 
viewing and do view the same world and themselves from both a subjective 
and a relatively more objective point of view, and the source of perplexity of all 
traditional philosophical problems does lie in the conflicting views derived from 
these two viewpoints of the same reflective being, it at most follows that 
philosophy is inescapable to all reflective beings. However, there are not 
many reflective people, so why should we be worried about the problems, if 
there are any, of the reflective minority, namely intellectuals, or only the 
philosophers? 
It is true that philosophical problems are problems only for reflective 
beings. It does not mean, however, that they are problems only for some 
highly reflective human beings. It is true that philosophers directly engage in 
formulating, explaining and attempting to provide solutions for philosophical 
problems, but it is not true that they are dealing with problems only for them. 
The question raised above misconceives what a reflective being is. In 
defining "reflective being", I do not say that it is what in fact reflects upon its 
viewpoint and view, but what is capable of doing so. It is true that not every 
(in fact no) human being engages in reflection every single minute, but at 
least most of them (except infants or some serious mentally handicapped) are 
capable of doing so, and do reflect occasionally. Once they have been 
conscious of their view and viewpoint, engaged in such reflection, they are 
never the same as before. 
Finally, Nagel provides a new direction and an approach for us to deal 
with philosophical problems. Since philosophical problems are generated by 
the subjective-objective conflict, the ultimate goal of philosophical thinking 
should be the reconciliation of the two viewpoints. This is achieved by 
examining the existing theories of different philosophical problems, pointing 
out why they fail to recognize, address and reconcile the conflict adequately 
and advancing better alternatives for them. The procedure depends much on 
Absurd"), and scientism and idealism in metaphysics can be illuminated by Nagel's reformulation. 
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the use of intuition, which shows us some fundamental and undeniable facts, 
In turn, they, as we have mentioned, provide a simple test for the credibility of 
any theory about what there is and what we should do. Since they are 
undeniable, theories fail to acknowledge these facts are necessarily wrong 
and a new hypothesis should be advanced. The approach can be briefly 
stated as follows. A theory T of the reality of an object 0 is acceptable only if it 
succeeds in taking everything real about 0 into account. If a specific theory 
Ta fails to accomplish this, it should be rejected. It amounts to saying that Ta 
should be rejected if it can be showed that there is more to reality than what 
Ta can accommodate, and that in accepting Ta, we will inevitably leave part of 
reality of 0 behind. In arguing against existing philosophical theories, Nagel 
first shows that it is an intuitive fact that an object 0 (e.g. in the case of mind-
body problem, the subjective character of experience), which is excluded from 
reality by Ta (physicalism), is real. Then, he refutes all the anti-realist 
arguments which claim that 0 is just appearance and cannot be real by 
showing that these theories are only the products of certain unjustified 
assumptions (what is real can be explained exhaustively by scientific method). 
Finally, he provides a reinterpretation of the reality of 0 Tb (the dual aspect 
theory) that can accommodate 0 as part of reality^^^ 
In defending the distinction between subjective and objective, Nagel 
seems to be doing something out-dated, already-proved-to-be-pointless, 
contrary to what is taken for granted in contemporary philosophy. It is 
generally thought that some traditional ways of categorization and some 
dichotomies once believed to be very important — noumenal-phenomenal, 
rational-irrational, reality-appearance, objective-subjective, fact-value — are 
now obsolete, useless, cause more trouble than they worth, and we had 
better abandon them altogether. Among them, what has been attacked most 
is precisely the dichotomy between subjective and objectivei99，and it seems 
198 His employment of this strategy is the most explicit in his treatment of mental reality and value. 
Regarding free will, he explains why all existing theories fail to address the problem without providing 
any candidate. 
199 See, for example, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature (Princeton: Princeton 
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to be a commonsensical belief in philosophy that no one should adhere to 
such a dichotomy anymore. In reformulating traditional philosophical 
problems as the conflict between the subjective and the objective viewpoint, 
Nagel seems to be doing something that there is no longer any point to do. 
This fact to some extent explains why Nagel gives us the impression that he is 
traditional, boring, ignorant and irresponsive to the contemporary — 
pragnnatist, post-modern, whatever — challenge to traditional notions in 
philosophy, and hence why he is,丨 believe，underestimated. Nevertheless, 
my view is that though Nagel does employ some old terms and support all the 
dichotomies mentioned above in formulating and explaining old problems, he 
is in fact a reactionary thinker. He is reactionary in that his project of 
reformulation aims at giving new and original re-interpretation to most of the 
traditional terms used in philosophical discussion — intuition, subjectivity, 
objectivity, reality, epistemology and ethics. In doing so, he deliberately 
argues against those contemporary challenges to the legitimacy of philosophy 
by showing that there are still many possibilities that have not been and hence 
should be explored. In a word, Nagel is reactionary to the contemporary 
philosophical laziness or childishness, which are driven by the "rebellion 
against the philosophical impulse itself: 
It is like the hatred of childhood and results in a vain effort to grow 
up too early, before one has gone through the essential formative 
confusions and exaggerated hopes that have to be experienced on 
the way to understanding anything. Philosophy is the childhood of 
the intellect, and a culture that tries to skip it will never grow up.^°° 
Here, we can see the basic conflict between Nagel and those who 
promote, in one way or another, the end of philosophy. While philosophers 
like Rorty tells us that philosophy is dead because there is nothing more for 
philosophy to say or do, Nagel shows that philosophy is only in its infancy; we 
do not even have the proper formulations for our problems, not to mention the 
appropriate solutions. While the former complains that there is nothing more 
University Press, 1979); Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 
200 VFN, p. 12. 
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to do, the latter argues that there is still a lot of work to do, and the former do 
not see it only because they turn their back against it; they are clouded with 
self-deception driven by philosophical laziness. 
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5 
CONCLUSION: 
THE ULTIMATE MYSTERY 
In the above chapters, I hope I have accomplished what 丨 set out to 
do, namely to access the contribution of Nagel .丨 have argued that Nagel 
succeeds in capturing the intuitive sense oftraditional philosophical problems 
through reformulating them in terms of the conflict between the subjective and 
the objective viewpoint, and hence shows that they are all grounded on 
fundamental facts of human beings. This injects a new life into and 
reestablishes the legitimate status of philosophy in this so-called post-
philosophical era. As a conclusion,丨 am going to discuss what Nagel 
regards as the ultimate mystery in philosophy - the very fact that we are 
reflective beings at all. 
As we have mentioned, Nagel regards philosophical problems，which 
are revealed to us in an intuitive sense of puzzlement, as originated from our 
ability to view the world and ourselves from both the subjective and the 
objective viewpoint. These problems are rooted deeply in our reflective 
nature. We have an impulse for truth, which drives us to reflect upon our 
beliefs about and attitude toward what there is and what we should do. 
During the process of reflection, we discover that some of our beliefs are 
groundless, irrational and false due to our particularity, and so we strive to get 
rid of these distortion by forming more and more objective views. Problems 
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arise when we try to understand the subjective features of reflective beings 
with the same method of objective detachment. On the one hand, what is 
subjective can only be understood exhaustively with subjective means, but a 
conception we know to be subjective does not guarantee what it represents is 
real. On the other hand, what is real must be metaphysically objective in the 
sense that its existence does not consist in its being viewed and so it must be 
acknowledged from an objective viewpoint. As a result, regarding features 
like mind, knowledge, freedom, value, ethics and meaning of life, which are so 
fundamental to us as reflective beings, we cannot justify a unified view in the 
subjective-objective spectrum. While we have to acknowledge their 
existence, we cannot form any unified and comprehensive conception about 
them, and it is precisely this indeterminacy that renders such features so 
mysterious. We know that we are conscious and free and that our life has 
meaning, but we do not know exactly what it is and how it is possible to be 
conscious or free orto have a meaningful life. 
Such mysterious feeling is overwhelming when our reflection turns 
back to the very capability of reflection itself. It is an unrevisable intuitive 
belief that we have the capability of reflection, since its denial presupposes 
such capability. What is this capability? As we have seen, we are capable of 
reflection only if we have the capability of objective detachment, i.e. the 
capability to detach from the previous viewpoint and transcend to a more 
objective one. This, however, is not yet sufficient. To reflect, we must also be 
able to evaluate our view and viewpoint, and distinguish what is valid from 
what is generated out of bias and prejudice. This, according to Nagel, is 
accomplished by our rationality, "the capacity to recognize objectively valid 
reasons and arguments"^°\ This is a faculty which we cannot but employ in 
all our reflection. Whenever we evaluate a particular belief or conception, we 
always tries to find out what is really the case, and we always rely on our 
rationality in doing so. The authority and hence our reliance of rationality, 
whether on the issue of what to believe or what to do, is intuitively undeniable. 
Given we are just the contingent products of evolution, it seems astonishing 
that we are capable of thinking rationally and knowing the reality at all. Is it 
^^'LW,p. 138. 
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really the case that we have such capability? How is it possible that 
something that appears to us as rationally undeniable is real in itself? 
Furthermore, we always discover that what we take to be rational are in fact 
the outcomes of something irrational. Isn't it, then, possible that there is in 
fact no such thing as rationality at all? 
All the above questions clearly arise from our reflection about our 
own rationality. From an objective viewpoint, we human beings are just one 
particular kind of thing in the world. All our capabilities are the joint products 
of our contingent and specific physical, physiological, psychological, social, 
cultural and historical conditions. Besides, the substantial contents of these 
factors can be tremendously different among different human beings. All 
these together seem to render the existence of rationality, whose claim is not 
just local but objective and universal, in such limited beings like us, highly 
incredible. However, subjectively, as reflective beings, we cannot have the 
least doubt about its existence. To deny the existence of rationality is equal to 
denying that we are reflective beings, which is impossible. The problem, as 
Nagel formulates，is how it is possible that "creatures like ourselves, supplied 
with the contingent capacities of a biological species whose very existence 
appears to be radically accidental, should have access to universally valid 
methods of objective thought,202 This sense of bafflement is expressed in 
what Nagel calls "subjectivism" of rationality in the contemporary philosophical 
discussion, which is a skepticism about the objectivity of rationality, claiming 
that: 
The relativistic qualifier - "for me" or “for us" - has become 
almost a reflex, and with some vaguely philosophical support, it 
is often generalized into an interpretation of most deep 
disagreements of belief or method as due to different frames of 
reference, forms of thought or practice, or forms of life, between 
which there is no objective way ofjudging but only a contest for 
power. ...Since ail justifications come to an end with what the 
people who accept them find acceptable and not in need of 
further justification, no conclusion, it is thought, can claim 
validity beyond the community whose acceptance validates it.^°^ 
202 LW, p. 4. 
^' 'LW,pp. 4-5. 
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It takes the form of various attempts of providing a naturalistic explanation of 
the existence of rationality in the contemporary philosophy. Here, "natural" is 
in contrast with neither "supernatural" nor "social-cultural" but "normative". An 
explanation of rationality is natural if it tries to give a non-normative account of 
the normativity of rationality. Despite the variety among them, many 
contemporary philosophers^®^ have tried to explain the somewhat amazing 
existence of rationality as a natural phenomenon，a product of the natural 
process of human development which can be accounted for by specifying the 
circumstances - biological, psychological, sociological, economic or political -
of its emergency. The general tendency is to "collapse its content into its 
ground, so that it doesn't reach as far beyond us as it appears to do."^°^ 
If a naturalistic explanation of rationality is true in the sense that it 
accounts for the nature of rationality exhaustively, the only conclusion seems 
to be that rationality itself is subjective and relative to what give rise to it. The 
general form of the argument can be formulated as follows: 
① We are the products of evoIution?^^ 
② Rationality as a distinctive feature of us is generated and shaped by 
some natural (and cultural) facts throughout the long evolutionary 
process. 
③ Rationality, along with our biological and psychological constitution 
and our cultural beliefs，is simply a natural fact about us. 
Therefore, 
④ Our rationality reflects only what is particular about our own 
evolutionary history and has no universal authority at all. 
In a word, our reflective nature drives us to reflect upon our rationality and as 
a result, we find that rationality is a natural and contingent fact about us. The 
natural consequence seems, then, to be a skepticism of the fruits of our 
204 "More recently, versions ofi t are found in W. V. Quine, Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam, Bemard 
Williams, and Richard Rorty," LW, p. 7. 
^LW，p.7. 
206 Here, "evolution" is taken in a broad sense, referring to not only the biological but also the social 
and cultural development of human beings. 
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reasoning, especially science, ethic, and ultimately, philosophy, the very 
reflection about our reflective nature. In the end, the only truth seems to be 
relativism. 
The problem with the above argument, as Nagel points out, is that 
even if a naturalistic account, whether appealing to biological, psychological, 
economic political or cultural facts，succeeds in explaining causally how 
rationality emerges, it alone says nothing about its normativity. In other 
words,④ does not follow from ① - ③ . T h a t something arises naturally does 
not entail that it cannot be also of a normative nature. It would be the case 
only if we assume that what is real must be accountable naturalistically. While 
the Pan-subjectivist odour of such assumption renders it highly implausible 
(see 3.3)，the normativity of rationality, as we have mentioned, is something 
we cannot deny. Indeed the recognition of this fact is the precondition of our 
acceptance of any such naturalistic explanation of rationality. If the 
naturalistic explanation, which renders the objectivity and universality of 
rationality questionable, were true, it would undermine itself because our 
acceptance of it is grounded exactly on our rationality. 
All the above amounts to saying that our rationality, with its 
essentially normative character, cannot be accounted for naturalistically 
without ceasing to be what it is. We still do not understand why we are 
rational and capable of getting to know about parts of the world in which we 
are merely tiny specks. What alternatives are left? One popular and 
influential explanation of this idea of "a natural sympathy between the deepest 
truths of nature and the deepest layers of the human m i n d ^ is a religious 
one: that is the design of a God. Nagel, however, rejects it on the ground that 
its apparent explanatory power is illusive: 
Here, as elsewhere, the idea of God serves as a placeholder for 
an explanation where something seems to demand explanation 
and none is available; that is why so many people welcome 
Darwinist imperialism. But there is really no reason to assume 
that the only alternative to an evolutionary explanation of 
208 
everything is a religious one. 
207 LW, p. 130. 
'° ' Ibid., p. 133. 
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The appeal to God in explaining the possibility of our rationality in fact 
explains nothing unless we can specify clearly the nature of God, which have 
never been successfully accomplished. We simply do not have a clear and 
coherent idea of God, and so such a practice is simply to explain what is 
obscure by something even more obscure. What is more important, however, 
is to realize that such an irrational reliance on God has a common root with all 
the reductionist and deflationary philosophical theories. They are all different 
expressions of our intemperate craving for explanation for anything we 
encounter. When we fail to give any plausible account for something, we tend 
either to deny its reality or to project some kind of entity which is simply 
defined as the placeholder of an explanation. Both of these reactions is 
derived from the assumption that what is real is accountable by us, which we 
have already shown to be unjustified. 
So apart from subjectivism, reductionism, evolutionism and God, 
what is left for us? Nagel believes that the most plausible attitude we should 
adopt is to admit that the possibility of rationality cannot be explained: 
In fact, the objective capacity is a complete mystery. While it obviously 
exists and we can use it, there is no credible explanation of it in terms of 
anything more basic, and so long as we don't understand it, its results 
will remain under a cloud.^ °® 
Perhaps there can be no unified and comprehensive explanation of our 
rationality, and hence of the world as a whole. The possibility of rationality 
presents us with the ultimate mystery that shows us the limit of our 
understanding. We simply have it, think with it and rely on it， but cannot 
explain and justify its objectivity and universality non-circularly. It，however, 
does not imply that we should abandon rationality as our tool of reflection. If 
rationality is something inescapable, and in many occasions fruitful, we should 
employ it as far as possible, with the recognition that what we have 
established may be proved to be wrong in the future. It seems to be the fate 
of all reflective beings like us. 
209 VFN, p. 78. 
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